

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THE DEFENCE OF SEBASTOPOL.

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AND CHARING CROSS.

GENERAL TODLEBEN'S HISTORY

OF THE

DEFENCE OF SEBASTOPOL.

1854-5.

A Review.

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BY

WILLIAM HOWARD RUSSELL,
LATE SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT OF 'THE TIMES.'

LONDON:
TINSLEY BROTHERS, 18 CATHERINE STREET, STRAND
1865.

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PREFACE.

As the extraordinary number, size, and consequent costliness of the maps with which General de Todleben's History of the DEFENCE OF SEBASTOPOL is accompanied, interpose considerable difficulty in the way of producing the work in English, I have been requested to republish the account of the book which appeared in 'The Times.' By the permission of the Proprietors I now do so. In order to complete the description of the battles of the Alma, of Balaklava, and of Inkerman, and of the principal events treated of in the first volume, I have added some extracts from the Russian narrative, which would have swelled the

Review far beyond the limits of even the columns of 'The Times.' I am not without hopes of seeing the whole of the work, which has been imperially brought out by the Russian Government, translated into our tongue in its entirety; but private enterprise stands appalled at an outlay which would need an imperial purse to bear, as the demand for such a publication at the present day would necessarily be limited. Meantime, the actual substance of the Russian account is laid before my readers in the following pages. In the Review, I sought to give an idea of what our Author said, rather than to criticise his statements or to controvert his facts. I have been led to add a few comments in the present volume to the matter which appeared in the first instance without note or remark, because I considered it expedient to correct assertions which I knew to be erroneous or unjust, as regarded our portion of the Allied armies. I may be pardoned for drawing attention to the remarkable corroboration afforded to the statements of those anonymous and somewhat discredited correspondents who described

the events of the famous campaign in the Crimea as they occurred at the time, by the matured history of the siege which has been prepared by the illustrious defender of Sebastopol.

W. H. RUSSELL.

Temple, December, 1864.

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THE DEFENCE OF SEBASTOPOL.

THE ancient Romans were almost as much interested about the site of Troy and the history of the great siege as were the German and English professors of the last century. The scientific New Zealander who may have completed his sketches of St. Paul's, and have wandered over the ruins of that modern Babylon which sent out General Cameron to conquer his Maori forefathers, will probably be driven by his thirst for knowledge to extend his explorations, and to visit scenes made famous by the people who civilized his race. In his rambles the Maori *savant* may be shot out of a pneumatic tube, or descend, by his private parachute, on a little angle of the world whereupon just ten years ago was turned in breathless expectancy the gaze of the great English people. What he will then see there we cannot pretend even to conjecture.

The traveller would now behold a widespread solitude and the calm which succeeds the tempest of battle. Great ruins never die. The Tartar araba and the official drosky roll over the plateau where the fresh springing vines rise up amid a rude necropolis. Stately forts still frown over the deep calm fiord in which, as if waiting for its resurrection, lie the bones of a navy, and crumbling quays, shattered towers, and broken shells of houses mark the margin of waters on which once floated the armaments of a giant aggressive Power. A few grey-coated soldiers clamber over the heaps of broken masonry, and creep in and out of the dilapidated barracks and shot-riven dwellings. Listless citizens, flat-capped and booted, saunter slowly about the city of the past. A group of boats in the centre of the harbour is engaged in endeavours to raise to the surface the hull of some rotted ship. Encircling this scene of desolation and violent decay, rounded knoll and deep ravine, and undulating plain, all seamed and dented with grass-grown earthworks, spread from the sea to the great cleft in the plateau, through which rolls the stream of the Tchernaya. Within that narrow front, once white with the tents of the Western Powers, where the thunder of the cannon never ceased day after day, and the lightning of

battle flashed from cloud to cloud, and leapt from hill to hill for long, long months, the herdsman now peacefully tends the flocks which browse fatly in the enriched ravines, and all that strikes the ear is the plover's whistle mingled with the lowing of the kine.

It is but ten years since this nation suddenly found itself adrift in the raging sea of a great European war. It will soon be ten years from the time when the news came that the old mettle had not failed us, and when the hearts of the people swelled with pride at the words "Alma," "Balaklava," "Inkerman." Then swiftly came the terrible winter, and ere the pæans of triumph had died away, a grievous solicitude and an anxiety beyond expression fell upon us, concerning the fate of those in whose glorious deeds we had just been exulting. The spot where so many were suffering seemed so near and was yet so distant. Letters but fourteen days old appeared as though they had travelled from some *inferno* to tell us of misery beyond all human aid. With all her boundless devotion, her vast wealth, her unequalled resources, her noble heart, England could not save her perishing children.—At last the plague was stayed.

Reinforcements arrived, supplies poured in,—the army revelled in abundance. All went well in the spring and early summer till the time came for the assault. Then we heard, with unaccustomed ears, that British soldiers had recoiled from the face of an enemy. It was hard to bear. But our allies had failed also. Next time we hoped for better fortune and the siege went on. The joy diffused by the fall of Sebastopol soon afterwards was mingled with feelings of mortification and shame caused by our second repulse from the Redan, and the news of peace was received without gratification by a nation anxious to wipe off the dust which obscured the lustre of its arms. Great controversies and important changes sprang out of the incidents of the struggle. The discussion of questions which arose at the moment when the intelligence of events was spread among the people, by what Mr. Kinglake characterizes as means before unknown, continued long after the war was over. Angry debates, the fall of Ministries, commissions of inquiry, argumentative pamphlets, and even, at a very recent period, suits at law, cropped out of the disasters and confusion at Balaklava, like the wild flowers which now bloom over the mud that had nigh swallowed up the remnants of our army in that disastrous winter. A

Staff was organized; the Commissariat was amended; a Transport Train was organized; and serious alterations were made in the administration of the War Department. The Muse of History at length took up her pen. M. Le Baron de Bazancourt wrote an account of the war, in which the English army was made to appear very much as the single Highlander is represented in the picture of the Battle of the Alma, among the friendly and victorious Zouaves. The English were always late, and always needing help from their magnificent allies. Then Mr. Kinglake presented the world with his notable description of the English commander at the Alma, where the French troops, "who had perpetrated an extensive massacre of their unarmed fellow-countrymen" in the streets of Paris, made painful and laborious efforts to climb the steep, and failed because "the Russians were armed," and because it was not France which fought, but the French Empire. The Frenchman was first in the field after the letters of the correspondents of the English press. The Englishman came next, but his story is not yet told, for he still halts on the banks of the Alma. The Russian is the last, and he takes us in his first volume, the only one yet translated into French, down to the spring of 1855. We had, to be sure, many

other publications in French, and English, and German, relating to the war, and the Russians had their controversies in high places as well as ourselves, but we mention these histories because they have an official character. M. de Bazancourt was a literary gentleman specially commissioned by the Emperor to record what he saw before Sebastopol, and to write an authoritative account of the expedition to the Crimea. Mr. Kinglake was a literary gentleman who went out as an amateur, and returned to England with so great an admiration for Lord Raglan, that he was intrusted with his lordship's papers, and may be considered as the historical executor of the English Commander-in-Chief. Lieut.-General E. de Todleben is—but what need is there to tell the world who he is? His name will live as long as that of Sebastopol itself. The man who laboured so successfully in that immortal siege, whose genius sheltered the beaten army, and covered the cowering fleet of Russia, now gives us his version of the wondrous tale.

Can we wonder if General Todleben has written a thoroughly Russian account of the Crimean war? At the very outset, in rendering every justice to the immense amount of information contained in his

book, we must protest against many of his statements, and declare that his narrative is, in many parts relating to the British army and its operations, careless, inexact, and untrue. In all that relates to the Russian army, to its labours, and to the work of the siege, and of the battle, we presume General Todleben to be an unimpeachable authority. His account of the gradual increase of the trenches and the arming of the batteries may be classed with the arid journal of our own engineers. In the description of battles, he seems to have consulted few authorities on the French and English side, and to have been easily misled; but his statements with respect to the Russian troops, founded on the best information, are incontrovertible—at least we are acquainted with no authority to oppose to his. General Todleben, soon after the evacuation of the south side, having collected, in his capacity of chief engineer, all the necessary documents, instructed Lieut.-Colonel Khlebinkoff to edit the journal of the defence, which was finished in the autumn of 1856. His wound—as he modestly says, "*ma santé affaiblie*"—compelled him to go abroad for two years, and he carried on the description of the defence, with the aid of several officers, till the intervention of the Grand Duke Nicholas

enabled him to execute the project he had formed of enlarging the original scope of the work, and, instead of a mere engineer's report, to make it a history of the war in the Crimea. The special works published in France and England, he says, related mainly to the attack, and the statements which they contained concerning the defence were for the most part erroneous. He found the French and English plans not only opposed to each other, but full of discrepancies in themselves, and he therefore caused a new survey to be made of the ground by horizontal sections, which he verified in order to correct the errors in those plans, and in the drawings of the Russian engineers. At last, in 1861, he began in earnest. "To raise a literary monument to be worthy of the immortal defence, I could not give to my work," he says in his Dedication to the Emperor, "more solid foundations than truth and impartiality." A modern Pilate might ask, indeed, "What is truth?" after reading Mr. Kinglake's first volume and General Todleben's opening chapter. The Russian declares that England made the question of the Holy Places, in which she had no earthly or heavenly interest, a pretext for the war she so much desired in consequence of the increasing influence of Russia in the East. Up to the time of

Peter the Great, the policy and ambition of Russia had been Oriental, but from that period she became at once of the East and of the West. Peter gave her the dominion of the Baltic, and Catherine II. secured her supremacy in the Black Sea. Never losing sight of the suffering Christians in the East, who seemed specially confided to her guardianship, she pushed her way till the partition of Poland established her influence in Europe, which culminated when her glorious efforts against Napoleon placed her at the head of the Holy Alliance at the Congress of Vienna.

The Russian view of the causes which led to the war is very unlike those of the English or French historians. Indeed, if the views agreed, there would have been no war. But M. de Todleben unconsciously affords good grounds for concurring with those who have never ceased to regard Russia with mistrust, and have always denounced her as a persistent, unscrupulous aggressor. In a few pages he draws a picture of the means by which she has achieved the greatness she possesses, which justifies the assertions of her worst enemies. What do we see on his canvas? The incessant march of an army, first towards the east and south of Asia, then towards the north, then

towards eastern Europe, till the Czars of Moscow, at the end of the sixteenth century, had established themselves in Central Asia, in northern Asia, on the shores of the Caspian, and at the foot of the Caucasus. From the east the Czars crept on, sword in hand, slow, but sure, and by degrees Livonia and Poland felt their power, and Sweden in vain endeavoured to stem their massive hordes. The Russians exercised all the force of a barbarian invasion, with a fixed principle and a base of operations behind it. The successors of Peter—the rock of the empire—made war and religion work harmoniously together. "Each victory over the Turks, each advantage obtained by her, became an additional motive for Russia," says M. de Todleben, "to insert in the treaties of peace some clause intended either to improve the condition of the Christians in Turkey, or to stipulate for the creation of new rights in their favour." By such means Russia became the *natural* protectress of the Christians under the rule of the Sublime Porte. It will be seen at once that no such claim could be admitted without putting an end to the integrity of Turkey, but the Russian of to-day is as ready to make it as was the Russian of 1853. Destroying every trace of national life in her path, the power

which declared herself the natural protectress of the Christians of the East, appeared before Europe as the declared protectress of conservative principles. M. de Todleben is free to confess that the attitude of Russia not only irritated Europe, but impeded her influence, as she was obliged to repress every attempt at change, no matter how strong might be the public opinion in its favour. Despite the dislike of Europe, events favoured the progress of the Muscovite. The liberation of Greece, the peace of Akermann, which augmented Russian influence in Servia and the Principalities, the peace of Tourkmentschaï, which extended the frontiers of Russia to Mount Ararat; the treaty of Adrianople, which secured her rights to the mouth of the Danube to the western shore of the Black Sea, and annihilated the dominion of the Turk in the Transcaucasus; and the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which closed the Black Sea to foreign ships of war, were all so many rungs in the ladder by which the Czars kept climbing upwards to the point from which they might survey the states of Europe prostrate at their feet. But it was, according to M. de Todleben, the despatch of a Russian army to put down the Hungarian insurrection, which definitively aroused these States to a sense of their danger, and excited the

public opinion of Europe against the guardians of conservative principles. It will do no harm to M. de Todleben to recognize the liberal spirit in which he alludes to some of these events, though it is not manifested in words. For some reason or other the General is out of favour — at least he has not received the high rewards in places of emolument and trust which he had reason to expect, and which he would no doubt have received had he been popular at court. He certainly does not disguise the fact that Russia did excite the public irritation and arouse the public opinion of Europe by her conduct. The first manifestation of that feeling was, he says, the refusal of the Porte, under the influence of England, to deliver to Austria and Russia the Hungarian and Polish refugees. England, therefore, stood forth to give effect to the public opinion of Europe, from which Austria appears excluded. The diplomacy of the Western Powers from that moment began to meddle with the question of the protectorate of the rayahs, "hitherto exclusively reserved to Russia." The question of the Holy Places arose, and began to dominate every other. "But," piously remarks M. de Todleben, "it is not in the tomb of our Lord, who taught only peace, that we ought to

seek the motives of war." Those who watch what happened will remark, says our author, with what subtlety and art Russia was driven to demonstrations against Turkey which rendered war inevitable. The acts of Russia rendered the war inevitable, but she was driven to commit them by the craft of the diplomatists, foremost among whom stands the Great Eltchi. When the Porte confirmed the rights of the Latin Christians to that celebrated key, much to the prejudice of the Greek Christians, Russia was forced to take active measures to vindicate her position. The Porte, under the influence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, trifled and delayed with the firman demanded by the Emperor Nicholas, and finally introduced modifications in it, to the prejudice of the Eastern Church, which decided him, relying on the co-operation of Austria to send Prince Menschikoff to Constantinople to conclude a separate treaty, founded on a firman defining the rights of the two Churches, or to obtain a peremptory declaration guaranteeing the inviolability of the Eastern Church. Turkey, instigated mainly by the Ambassador of England, would not hear of it—would not give Prince Menschikoff even the simple note he asked for. The world knows how the Prince shook off the dust from his feet and left the city of

Constantine. The diplomatists were delighted. They saw their way to force Russia to acts which would compromise her in the eyes of Europe, and she very soon gave them the pretext which they wanted to direct definitively against her, the public opinion of Europe. The occupation of the Principalities followed the refusal of the Porte to accept the Czar's *ultimatum;* but the allied fleets arrived at Tenedos three weeks before the passage of the Pruth, and encouraged Turkey to reject the proposal. Although England and France might have declared war as soon as Prince Gortschakoff, at the head of 70,000 men, took hold of his "*gage matériel,*" they sought to gain time by diplomacy, and under the plausible pretext of a desire for peace, they opened the Conference at Vienna, the result of which was the Austrian note of the 1st of August, approved by the Western Powers and admitted by Russia, with the proviso that the Porte should accept the note without modifications. But not only did Turkey refuse the note as it stood, but demanded modifications which Russia could never entertain. Then it was that the secret desire of the Western Powers for a European war was made visible to all. Austria and Prussia might indeed still have

preserved peace by energetic measures, but, drawn along fatally in the current of public opinion, they kept aloof, and Austria at last passed the bounds of neutrality and had recourse to menaces. War was declared by Turkey on the 3rd of October, but the Western Powers declared they would not commence hostilities unless the Russians crossed the Danube, which in effect was to let the Turks cross and attack the Russians at their convenience. At the same time the Allies permitted the Turkish fleet to navigate the Black Sea, to transport their troops wherever they pleased, and menace the coasts of Russia under cover of their powerful combined navies. But with all their advantages and immense superiority, the Turks were beaten in Asia at Akhaltsikh and Baschkadiklar. Fort St. Nicholas indeed yielded to numbers, and a detachment of Russians was repulsed at Oltenitza, but the efforts of the Turks at Tourno and Tschétate were unavailing, and the action at the latter place, which the Allies described as a victory, was in effect a total defeat of a corps of 18,000 Turks and twelve guns by a Russian force of 2,500 men and six guns. On the 30th of November occurred the battle of Sinope, and on the 3rd of January the allied fleets entered the Black Sea, and notified the Russian admiral that

he was not to leave Sebastopol. As the Turks were left free to act, it was evident such an extraordinary proceeding in regard to one of two belligerent powers indicated warlike intentions, although the Western Powers still assured Russia of their desire to preserve friendly relations. The Russian envoys were recalled from Paris and London, and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg took measures in the winter of 1853 and spring of 1854 to prepare the coast against the first blows of the enemy. War was formally declared on the 27th of April, but the allied fleets bombarded Odessa on the 22nd of the same month, in consequence of an ordinary occurrence in war time being regarded as an insult to their flag. Russia was attacked at once in the White Sea, in Kamtschatka, in the Baltic, and in the Black Sea, in the Caucasus, and on the Danube. At Solowitsk and at Petropaulovski the Allies were signally defeated, but they were more fortunate in their assault on the unfinished fort at Bomarsund. All the swarms of Asia Minor, Arabia, and Syria flocked to the holy war against the infidel, and in 1854 the Turks opened the campaign in Asiatic Turkey, with about 100,000 men in line, while the Russians had little more than one half. Nevertheless, the Russians gained repeated

and invariable successes, and eventually drove the Turks under the walls of their fortified places. Determined to strike a vigorous blow at the Turks before the Allies could help them, Prince Gortschakoff passed the Danube on the 23rd of March, 1854. Trenches were opened against Silistria, May 20, and the glacis of Arab Tabia was crowned on the 6th of June. The fall of the place was inevitable, but the Russian generals were obliged to modify their dispositions in consequence of diplomatic negotiations with Austria, which became so unpromising that the Prince of Warsaw raised the siege on the 20th of June, and recrossed the Danube. As to the defence of Silistria, of which we have heard so much, General de Todleben inserts a long note to show the exaggeration and errors of the newspaper accounts of the operations. Twice only did the besieged attempt to attack the Russian trenches. On the night of the 28th of May they made a sortie, in which they were repulsed, and in the ardour of the pursuit two battalions which followed them into the Arab Tabia, being left without supports, were driven out with a loss of 700 men. On the 3rd of June a second sortie was repulsed with slaughter. On the night of the 20th of June, when the Russian troops were drawn

up for the assault against the bare and ruined parapets, a courier suddenly arrived with the order to raise the siege and retire across the Danube. Their loss during the siege was only 2,500, of whom 700 fell in the sortie; so that the boasted defence only cost the Russians fifty men a day. The concentration of troops by Austria might have rendered the position of the Russian army untenable in case of hostilities; but it is impossible to believe that, in anticipation of such a result to the pending negotiations, they would have withdrawn so precipitately from Silistria, if they had been quite sure of inflicting on their hated enemies an additional disgrace, and of adding to their reputation, by the capture of a place defended by the generalissimo and flower of the Turkish army, even though they had abandoned their prize next day. But Russia went further than the other side of the Danube. Actuated by a desire for peace and for *a limited circle of military operations*, as well as to save central Europe the horrors of war, no matter what its horrors might be in Turkey or Asia, the Czar, yielding to Austria and Prussia, ordered his troops to recross the Pruth on the 15th of September, and Prussia ceased to take any part in the Conference at Vienna. The moment Austria occupied the Prin-

cipalities, the Allies were left free to undertake an expedition against the Crimea, which would have been otherwise impossible. In fact, Russia was forced into war by trickery, and prevented from carrying it on properly by false friends and doubtful allies. So far from entertaining the ambitious designs attributed to her, no preparations had been made on her frontiers for attack or defence, when suddenly she was exposed to the force of the greater part of Europe. "Public opinion"—the phrase is used again and again by M. de Todleben, who seems much more enlightened with respect to the influence thus exercised and the mode of expressing it than his rival, Mr. Kinglake—ran so strongly that she could no longer count on her old alliances, and there was ground to fear that every Government in Europe would be forced into the Anglo-French league. Every point of the frontier was open to her ubiquitous enemies. If Sweden joined the enemy, Finland might become the theatre of war. St. Petersburg itself, if not open to a decisive operation, was at least liable to some sort of hostile demonstration. All the ports of the Baltic were more or less exposed, and a descent might be effected along the coast of Esthonia. Riga itself was not safe. It was necessary to concentrate

troops for the defence of the principal points along these shores, and at the same time to cover the frontier, which extends for 1200 miles between the Baltic and the Black Sea. The fortified line of the Vistula was, indeed, favourable to defence, but the conduct of Austria made it necessary to collect a large army in Poland, and on the south there was only the fortress of Kiew capable of resisting an aggression from Galicia or the Principalities, as Khilia and Kotine were not then of the least importance. Sebastopol, indeed, was well defended toward the sea, but was almost entirely open on the land side, and Otchakow and Kinburn were quite inadequate to protect the Liman of the Dneiper or Nicolaeff. The entrance to the sea of Azov was quite open; in fact, from Finland to the Caucasus there was not a spot safe from the enemy. To add to these disadvantages, there was "*le manque très prejudiciable*" of good roads towards the frontier as in the interior. One incontestable superiority Russia did possess,—she could recruit and maintain an army such as no other State could equal. The influence of despotic power and the cheapness of subsistence, enabled Russia to enter upon the war with 678,000 men, and 178 batteries, with a reserve of 182 battalions, 86 squadrons of cavalry, and 60

batteries, or 212,000 men and 480 guns. To these must be added 242,000 irregular troops, by no means the weakest of her defensive forces, and to swell that total there still remains the *corps de la garde* of the interior, or something like our militia, of 144,000—making a gross muster roll of a power of 1,290,000 men. Russia, however, was as little entitled to count on all these men as Great Britain would be justified in carrying to the credit of her resources, in a European war, the immense establishments of her old Indian army. Three conscriptions or recruitments were necessary to get 700,000 men in line for the war. So scared and ignorant were the authorities with regard to the intentions of neutrals, friends, and foes, that in August, 1854, they had only 39,000 men in the Crimea, while 200,000 were concentrated in the Baltic, 140,000 in Poland, 180,000 on the mid frontier to the West, 54,000 on the Asiatic frontier. But there were 32,000 men on the northern shores of the Black Sea, and 46,000 about the sea of Azov and the Don, who could be sent to the Crimea under ordinary circumstances. The Russian fleet consisted of the Baltic squadron, 295 ships, 4105 guns; the Black Sea squadron, 145 ships, 2855 guns; the Archangel squadron, 34 ships, 60 guns; the Caspian

squadron, 30 ships, 49 guns; the squadron of Kamschatka, 8 vessels, 30 guns; but of these only 82 were steamers, of which 18 were frigates and 6 were corvettes. General de Todleben disputes, with success, the estimates formed by European writers of the Turkish army, and fixes it at 230,000 men, and 608 guns, regular and irregular, at the time of the invasion of the Crimea.

Great Britain, defended by its powerful navy and insular position from aggression, has far less need than any European State of a large army, and in war time England is always obliged to raise foreign mercenaries. In 1813, her army counted 210,000 men; but its strength before the war was only 145,000, independent of her militia and levy *en masse*, which De Todleben says we can resort to *en cas écheant*. England, however, he says, could not well send more than 30,000 to 35,000 men as her contingent to the war in 1854. France, in 1853, had only 280,000 infantry and 60,000 cavalry; but in all which concerns the material organization of an army, France has arrived at the highest point of perfection. In a few months her army was augmented to 680,000 men. Of these, only 63,000 were designated at first

for service in Turkey. The total force of the Allies in the East on commencing the war was, therefore, only 328,000 men, but the balance, nevertheless, was in favour of the assailants. In the first place, we had an enormous preponderance in naval resources. It was not surprising that England should exhibit her fleets at once in the Black Sea, White Sea, the Baltic, and the Pacific, as soon as war was declared; but what astonished the world was, the sudden appearance of the French navy rivalling that of Great Britain in every sea. The administration of the Prince de Joinville and the firm will of Napoleon III., according to M. de Todleben, caused such a development of her maritime power that, in 1854, France yielded very little indeed to England. United, the Western Powers presented a force which put the resistance of Russia in the open sea quite out of the limits of possibility.

The two chapters of which we have thus given an abstract, having conducted us to the threshold, of the war, are followed by one in which there is a minute geographical and statistical description of the Crimea, and the theatre on which the principal scenes of the great drama were to be played out is described in two

separate chapters in the minutest detail. In 1783, a colonel of Engineers began the defences of Sebastopol, which were extended after the Turkish war in 1794, but it was in 1822, under Admiral Greig, that a committee of defence recommended a system enlarged by the Engineers, in 1834, for the fortification of the harbour and coast, which was successfully completed just a year before the commencement of hostilities, and which gave to Sebastopol the stately lines and yawning casemates of Fort Constantine, Fort Michael, Fort Alexander, and Fort Paul. Nor was the south side neglected all that time. The plan of 1834 was modified by Nicholas himself when he visited the Crimea in 1837, and eight bastions were ordered by him to be constructed from the Careening Bay round to the sea. These works, however, had scarcely been commenced when the war broke out. Three barracks intended to close the gorge of as many bastions, a crenellated wall, and some pieces of detached masonry, were the only works actually visible on the south side, in the spring of 1856. That Russia, notwithstanding all her pacific protestations, was persuaded war was imminent, and that she calculated on the possibility of an attack on Sebastopol, may be well inferred from the cautious statement of General Todleben, that the Em-

peror sent the chief of the artillery staff and another officer to arm the batteries so early in the quarrel, that in the autumn of 1853 the coast batteries were mounted with 533 guns, red-hot shot furnaces were constructed, men were trained by constant firing, and experiments were made to determine the best ranges and most destructive charges and projectiles, under the direction of Prince Menschikoff. In the beginning of 1854 the exertions of the authorities were redoubled. Fifty-nine guns were mounted on new works. The Black Sea fleet, now concentrated in Sebastopol harbour, was disposed there in March, 1854, so as to combine its fire with that of the batteries. Although Menschikoff was convinced, particularly as the year wore on, that no descent would be made on the Crimea, he provided, as far as possible, to meet such a danger. Fire-ships were prepared, telegraphs and coast patrols were established, and as early as May, 1854, the Wasp Battery and the Telegraph Battery and a mortar battery were constructed and armed with eighteen pieces. During the winter and spring, indeed, he caused additions to be made to the land defences, but he was persuaded that it was only necessary to throw up such works as would stop a small corps, landed for a *coup de main*, from marching into

the city; and he did not think, nor did those around him, that the Allies would be imprudent enough to land an army in a country so destitute of resources that even water fit for drinking was very scanty. In the middle of April, 1854, Colonel Todleben was sent to Sebastopol. There is a whole history in the little sentence which mentions the fact. The imperious character of Menschikoff, and the jealousy between him and Prince Gortschakoff, which finally gave to the world the unusual spectacle of two Russian generals quarrelling in print, are clearly revealed. "Attached to Prince Menschikoff," to whom he was sent by Prince Gortschakoff, "Colonel Todleben, up to the landing of the Allies in the Crimea, had no settled sphere of action in the work of fortifying Sebastopol." He was in, but not of, the work. How little the ambitious young man, as he walked about in the suite of the old sailor general, could have dreamt that out of the very stones and earth around him would arise an immortal monument to his genius and his glory? We have no space to give a detailed account of the defences of the south and north side inland, which sprung up under his inspiration. His description of them, indeed, would scarcely be intelligible without diagrams and plans. It is enough to say

that 145 guns were mounted along a line exceeding four miles in length, leaving many open spaces, and others on which only three or four pieces could be brought to bear, and that 60 guns were mounted on the north side. Prince Menschikoff had available for the defence of Sebastopol 39,000 men and 88 guns of the land forces, and 18,000 sailors, but there were also about 12,000 men stationed under General Khomoutoff in other parts of the Crimea. Not only in men but in material was Sebastopol deficient. In fact, M. de Todleben tells us that there were only 172 guns, all under 24-pounders, in the Forts, although 1,944 old pieces had been deposited, from time to time, by men-of-war in the Arsenal, of which 931 might be, in case of need, rendered available for arming the works. Adding the guns of the fleet to them, the whole number of serviceable pieces was only 2,822, and, deducting the ammunition for the sea-side defences, there were only 300,000 shot and shell for the guns of position, and 590,000 rounds for the guns of the fleet, while there were only 325,000 charges of powder for the guns in store. Such a miserable state as the poor Russians were in! They had only tools for 200 men. They had to send the boarding-axes of the sailors on shore. They had no building materials.

The depôts were without supplies. The Commissariat were without money. They were in debt to the troops. After all, however, there was four months breadstuffs for the soldiers and seven months for the navy. It requires a close examination to detect the fallacy of this general statement of inadequate supplies, and to find lurking underneath it the special fact that Sebastopol was intended to strike a blow, not to receive one; that for all aggression its resources were ample, though for resistance it was wanting in many respects. The materiel and ammunition distributed among new works do not appear formidable, but the fleet and the forts were armed to the teeth, the one to cover the other, and the fleet to do as it listed in the Black Sea. The arm which was raised to despatch "the sick man" was, however, suddenly obliged to defend the very heart which gave it strength. It is plain that the Russians never expected that the whole allied army would be thrown on the Crimea, any more than the Allies ever contemplated the possibility of failure in taking Sebastopol by a *coup de main*, or were prepared for the siege and the winter which followed. The Prince placed the harbour, arsenal, and city, beyond the reach of a raid, as he thought, and he was waiting on Providence

very placidly, when on the morning of the 12th of September, about ten o'clock, he was summoned from his breakfast, to hear that two men-of-war were visible on the horizon in advance of a dense cloud of black smoke, which rose over the sea. Then came the news that twenty vessels of war had doubled Cape Loukoul. The telegraph threw up its arms in despair when later in the day it announced that the enemy's flotilla swarmed by hundreds, and at last a panting Cossack arrived with the news that the number of hostile vessels was so great it was impossible to count them. The Prince was suddenly called on to oppose the descent in which he did not believe. It is said that Menschikoff, although dissembling his apprehensions to those around him, repeatedly expressed his fears to his Imperial master, who at last rebuked him somewhat sternly on account of his teasing entreaties for reinforcements for the Crimea. The Czar was persuaded the Allies meant to attack Odessa and march on Nicolaeff, and would not diminish the force concentrated in Bessarabia. It was related to me by an eye-witness, that the Emperor was at table one evening when a despatch was handed to him. He gave a slight start when he read the contents, his brow flushed, he crumpled up the paper in his

hand, and rising suddenly, stalked out of the room to the Empress's boudoir, in which there was at the time one of the ladies in waiting standing by a window. "My God!" he exclaimed, in great emotion; "it is true—the French and English have landed in the Crimea." Then the Empress, by a gesture, dismissed the lady, and was left alone with his Majesty of all the Russias. The Czar indeed was perplexed by this unexpected blow. How much more puzzled was his lieutenant! For the first time the potency of steam was made manifest to an unfortunate chief who had the long shores of a kingdom, without railroads or even decent highways, to defend. Neither infantry nor cavalry could keep up with a steam fleet. The enemy, indeed, were off Eupatoria, but if the Prince hastened thither with his army, the fleet might at once sail for some point near Sebastopol, disembark troops, and carry the unfinished land defences, which must necessarily be left with a very feeble garrison, as there was a chance of the army having to encounter the full force of the Allies. The enemy, covered by their ships, could easily land close to the city, the fate of which would then be decided long before the Russians could march back from Eupatoria. But, supposing the Prince knew the exact spot they were

going to land at, it would not have followed that he could successfully oppose the descent, covered as it would be by the batteries of the fleet, and if he failed the city would have been lost just as effectually as if he had lost a battle. It is remarkable that Todleben, in speaking of the places where the Allies might have landed, indicates two spots which were unaccountably overlooked by the Allies, although one of them was afterwards the base of supplies of the greater part of the army, and the other would certainly have answered the purpose of a base for an immediate attack —to wit, Kamiesch and Streleska, or Artillery Bay. These bays were well indicated in the maps in the hands of the allied engineers and generals, but they never appear to have thought of them. Menschikoff having weighed all the difficulties which beset his action under the circumstances, decided on taking up a defensive position on the Alma. He selected the left bank of this river as his position, because it was near enough to cover the city, and at the same time it would enable him to move his forces to meet any alteration in the plans of the Allies against the place. He at once took measures to concentrate his troops upon the river, where he hoped to offer such a resistance as would give time to the Russians to reinforce him from

Perekop, Kertch, and Theodosia. While the Allies were landing, he was enabled on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of September, and on the 18th and 19th, to strengthen the position which was only held by one brigade on the first of these days, and to crown the heights with the bulk of the troops which fought the battle of the 20th. The delay in landing, which occurred after the first day's operations, enabled the Russians to double their army, and, as a proof of the exertions they made, Todleben tells us that the Moscow regiment arrived the day before the battle, after a march of 166 miles in 5 days. Those who remember Mr. Kinglake's amusing stories—and who does not?—must recollect the capital anecdote he tells about the Governor or head man of Eupatoria, who ordered the Allies to go into quarantine. The Governor and his people left early, but the doctor of the quarantine was left behind, and he it was, no doubt, who appeared as Governor of Eupatoria, and insisted on the execution of the official ceremonies. Mr. Kinglake says the place was occupied by a small body of English troops; Todleben says the Allies occupied it with upwards of 3,000 men and 8 field-guns. It is worth while to note that Todleben assigns to Canrobert and Martimprey the expedition to recon-

noitre finally the place of disembarkation, and to lay down the buoys and different coloured flags for the divisions of the shipping, and thus takes from Lord Raglan the credit assigned to him by Mr. Kinglake of not only forcing these troublesome Frenchmen to consent to a landing, but of choosing the very spot for them to do it on. It is unquestionable that the French would have preferred landing at Theodosia or Kaffa. Had the Allies done so, some obscure Tartar village might have become as famous as the Alma; and Balaklava and Inkerman might never have been heard of. Assuredly the whole character of the campaign would have been changed. The Allies might have been spared the long siege and the dreadful winter; but who can tell what trials would have awaited them had they abandoned the siege and marched on Simpheropol.

THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA.

So far everything had gone well for the Allies. They had surprised Menschikoff. They had found him unprepared to resist their landing. The Euxine itself favoured them. They threw their army on the soil of the Crimea without the feeblest show of resistance on the part of the Russians. According to Todleben, 62,223 men were disembarked at Old Fort, which is a little in excess of the actual number engaged at the Alma. On the 19th, the Allies began their march. They took their time. They were from nine a.m. till two p.m. traversing the ten miles between Old Fort and the Boulganack. About three o'clock —let our readers understand that we are always quoting Todleben, unless distinct intimation be made to the contrary—Lord Cardigan, by Lord Raglan's orders, pushed forward a reconnaissance of cavalry, and drove in the Russian outposts. Menschikoff, in order to support them, and feel the force of the enemy, despatched a brigade of Hussars supported by two regiments of infantry and two light batteries. Lord Raglan having perceived this, sent up the Light

Division and the Second Division, and two additional regiments of horse and a field battery, to sustain his troops. While the skirmishers on both sides were exchanging harmless shots, General Kiriakoff, who commanded the Russians, mistaking a squadron of the Duke of Leuchtenburg's Hussars, who were in white tunics, for the enemy, opened on them with four guns, and caused them to retreat between the two fires. Soon afterwards the Allies began to retire, and the Russians, imitating the movement, fell back on the Alma.

The Allies bivouacked nearly on the line of the river, and Todleben tells us how the Russian army watched our fires through the night, and saw the sea illuminated by the lights on board our ships. The useless baggage and waggons of the Russians were sent away to the Katcha; two field ambulances were established. As a curious instance of the indifference to medical assistance, only too common among generals (our ambulance waggons were left behind at Varna), we may mention that to each of these two field-hospitals there were just three surgeons attached, with a very small number of apothecary assistants, and ten waggons for the carriage of the wounded.

There is a little of bitterness in the remark by General Todleben that the "other surgeons, whether *from curiosity* or by the *orders of their chiefs*, remained, with all their attendants, near the hospitals, and there were far more vehicles there than had been prescribed." The Russian wounded, next day, were doubtless very little interested in deciding whether the doctors were too inquisitive or were only implicitly obedient. The night of the 19th of September passed in such preparation. Before dawn next morning a single gun was heard from the French flagship. Then they heard the "*Diane*" beat along the French lines; then the *reveillée* sounded along the English front; finally, the Russian battalions were roused for the work of the day by the hymn to Heaven, "*Qu'il est glorieux*." The troops sank on their knees while the priests traversed their ranks with the cross on high and the holy water. Thus fortified, they prepared to resist the oncoming enemy. The Russians were drawn up in a position which was very favourable for defence in some respects, while in other regards it presented signal disadvantages. One of the principal drawbacks was its great length—five and one-third miles; another was that the left flank could not touch the sea in consequence of the fire of the

fleet. The Russian left, therefore, scarcely reached the road from the village of Alma Tamack in that direction. Along a portion only of the front of the position were drawn up the 42½ battalions, 16 squadrons, and 11 sotnias of the Russian army (a sotnia is 100 nominally, but generally runs up to 120 Cossacks), making a total of 33,600 men, with 96 guns. Mr. Kinglake's authority is opposed to that of Todleben as to the strength of the Russians, for he makes them 39,017 men, and 106 guns. According to Todleben they were disposed as follows, running from left to right:—At the village of Aklese, two-thirds of a mile from the sea, and in the rear of the line on the Alma, the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment of Minsk. In the right front of it, and one-and-a-quarter mile from the sea, between the Alma Tamack road and the road from the ford at Bourliouk, 4 Battalions of Reserve of the Regiments of Bialostock and Brest, in columns of companies on the steep slope of the hill. Behind these, in the second line, in column of attack, the Light Infantry Regiment of Taroutino, and between it, in reserve, the Regiment of Moscow, with the light field battery, No. 4 of the 17th Brigade of Artillery. So far for the left. In the centre of the position, on the right of the Reserves of the Regiments

of Bialostock and Brest, were drawn up the light batteries Nos. 1 and 2 of the 16th Brigade of Artillery, which enfiladed the road to Eupatoria. Behind the guns was the Light Infantry Regiment of Borodino, drawn up in two lines in column of attack. To the right of the road, about 400 yards from the river, were drawn up the four battalions of the Light Infantry Regiment of the Grand Duke Michael. In front of the interval between the battalions of the centre, at grapeshot distance from the river Alma, the battery of position of the 16th Brigade of Artillery No. 1 was placed behind an epaulement. To the right of the Grand Duke Michael's Regiment, partly in columns of company, partly in columns of attack, was disposed the Regiment of Souzdal, having on its left and in front the battery No. 3, and on its right wing in front the battery No. 4 of the 14th Brigade. Behind the Grand Duke Michael's Regiment the Regiment of Wladimir was deployed in the second line. The Regiment of Ouglitch was deployed behind the Regiment of Souzdal. In the rear of the Regiment of Wladimir was disposed, so as to sweep a ravine, the battery of position No. 3, and the light battery of reserve No. 1, of the Cossacks of the Don. The Reserve consisted of the Regiment

of Volhynia, of 3 Battalions of the Regiment of Minsk, the light battery No. 5 of the 17th Brigade, and the Brigade of Hussars of the 6th Division of Light Cavalry, with the Horse Artillery troop No. 12. The whole of this Reserve was placed behind the centre of the position near the great road to Eupatoria, the infantry to the left and the cavalry to the right. The centre and right were commanded by Prince Gortschakoff, the left by Lieut.-General Kiriakoff. The Regiments of Cossacks No. 75 and No. 60 were sent across the river to guard the right flank and observe the enemy. The 6th Battalion of Tirailleurs, the Combined Battalion of sailors, and the 6th demi-Battalion of Sappers were thrown out as sharpshooters on the right bank of the Alma in the plantations about Alma Tamack, Bourliouk, and Tarkhanlar. To set on fire these villages in case of necessity, and to destroy the bridge, a mass of combustible matter had been prepared. A detachment of Sappers was stationed at the bridge over the river.

We shall now proceed to describe, as nearly as possible in the words of Todleben, the memorable battle of the Alma. According to the Russian version, the allied Generals decided on the 19th of September

to attack simultaneously in front and on both flanks. Bosquet was to move at half-past five a.m., to turn the left; Canrobert, Prince Napoleon, and Forey were to move against the centre at seven a.m. The English army was to have marched at half-past five a.m., and to have turned the right flank. At six o clock Bosquet was already afoot, but at seven o'clock, when the French centre was beginning its movement, St. Arnaud, being informed that the English army was not ready, halted his right. Meantime, the fleet cast anchor near the shore, and the French steamers having gone close in discovered a fordable shoal at the mouth of the Alma, and gave information of it to Bosquet. At half-past eleven, a.m. the whole allied army attacked the Russians in the following order:—Bosquet's Division, formed in two columns, with the artillery in the centre, and followed by the Turks, preceded the line on the right, and was directed against Alma Tamack. The Division Canrobert and the Division Napoleon, in two lines, in columns of division, with artillery between the lines, were to advance on Bosquet's left towards the space between Alma Tamack and Bourliouk. The Division Forey in columns of regiments, followed by artillery, and with the 5th Chasseurs on its right, was placed behind the Division Napoleon, and the reserves of artil-

lery were placed behind the Division Canrobert. The front of advance of the French, as well as that of the English, was covered by numerous sharp-shooters, and the latter had, in addition, a field battery protecting their advance. The right flank of the English army on the left of the French was formed by the 2nd Division under Sir de Lacy Evans, having on its left the Light Division of Sir George Brown, each in two lines of three regiments each, and between the divisions, and in front was a field battery. Behind the 2nd Division came the 3rd Division, under Sir Richard England; the 1st Division, commanded by the Duke of Cambridge, marched in rear of the Light Division, and the artillery was placed between the divisions of the second line. The 4th Division, under Sir George Cathcart, marched on the left rear of the Duke of Cambridge, and the cavalry was placed on the left wing to protect the army against the Russian horse. Towards half-past twelve o'clock Bosquet reached the right bank of the Alma, and at the same moment the fleet, increasing their fire, caused considerable loss to the Russian left, even at the distance of one-and-a-third mile from the sea. Under cover of this fire, d'Autemarre's Brigade advanced to the ford of Alma Tamack, a battalion of

the 3rd Zouaves at once crossed the river, and, spreading out as skirmishers, in the face of all commenced to ascend the heights. They soon showed themselves on the summit of the cliffs, whence they opened a very lively fire of rifles. Seeing this, Bosquet hurled the whole of d'Autemarre's Brigade up the heights, where they formed on the plateau across the road from Alma Tamack, supported by a battery of artillery, and there awaited the arrival of the other brigade under Bouat. While d'Autemarre had been gaining the heights, Bouat, followed by the Turks, begun to pass the ford at the mouth of the river on the right, but the battery which accompanied him, finding it impossible to get over, turned towards Alma Tamack, and joined the other battery with the other brigade.

The first battalion which opened fire on the Russian side was that of the Minsk Regiment, stationed at the village at Aklese, which did not perceive d'Autemarre's movement till the Zouaves were actually on the heights. This battalion, placed in a most critical position, isolated from the rest of the army, decimated by fire in front, in enfilade, and even in the rear, began to retreat towards Orta. At the same time

Kiriakoff, under a very brisk fire from the very outset, and enfiladed by the guns of the fleet, began to retire his troops in the direction of the Telegraph. Prince Menschikoff, now seeing the French appear suddenly on his left flank, ordered the Regiment of Moscow, and the batteries No. 4 and 5 of the 17th Brigade, to march in their direction. The Battalion of Minsk perceiving these reinforcements, at once halted, while the battery No. 4 galloped to its aid. Exposed to the guns of the fleet, and having only ten pieces against twelve, the Russian battery had still more to suffer from the rifles of the enemy. Here, as elsewhere in his account of the action, Todleben lays great stress on the terrible effect of the arms of precision. In a short time, out of 100 men, the battery lost more than 48, and suffered still more in horses. Aiming at the distance of more than 900 yards, the French sharpshooters, who had been directed to concentrate their fire on the artillerymen, prevented the artillery coming close enough to deliver their fire with effect. The French howitzers, on the contrary, fired with such success that Bosquet attributed the success of his flank movement to the superiority of their calibre over the Russian guns. The Regiment of Moscow and No. 5 Battery only arrived after the whole

Brigade d'Autemarre covered the heights of the left bank, and just as the Brigade Bouat issued out of the ravine. It was then too late to drive the French across the river. With the Regiment of Moscow came Prince Menschikoff in person, who, seeing his danger, ordered up the three remaining Battalions of the Minsk Regiment, two batteries (No. 3 of position, and No. 4 of light reserve) of Cossacks of the Don, and the troop of artillery No. 12, and four Squadrons of Hussars. The position of Bosquet's Division before the rest of the French had begun to cross the river, would have now been indeed perilous if the Russians could have attacked him with superior forces; but the retreat of Kiriakoff towards the Telegraph had put it out of their power, and the reinforcements which were sent only arrived one after the other. True they had 28 guns to oppose to Bosquet's 12, but the latter, of greater calibre, reached the Russians a long way off, and the enemy's riflemen did not permit them to equalize their chances by getting nearer. While Bosquet had succeeded in occupying the heights on the right side of the river, Canrobert was leading his division towards the left, and Prince Napoleon was conducting his division to the right of the village of Bourliouk. At

one o'clock they approached the river, and their skirmishers attacked the Russians in the gardens, while a battery of Canrobert's, two batteries of Napoleon's, and two troops of artillery of the reserve, opened fire against the centre. The second battery of Canrobert's Division proceeded towards Alma Tamack, to join Bosquet. At the same time, St. Arnaud directed Lourmel's Brigade and one battery to strengthen the latter, and Aurelle's Brigade to reinforce Canrobert. Thus, against the open space between the Regiment of Borodino and the troops engaged with Bosquet, the French directed 24 battalions and 28 guns. The English up to this had not yet been engaged; more slow in their movements than the French, they halted beyond cannon-shot, and Lord Raglan decided to wait till the success of the French had become more developed.

In consequence of the arrival of Canrobert and Napoleon, the Russians had to oppose 11 battalions with 5 battalions, and their situation would have been desperate, had the reinforcements sent by Menschikoff delayed on their march; and, as the Regiment of Minsk of the reserve had to come nearly a mile and a half before they reached the scene of action, the

whole of Bosquet's Division and a part of the Turks already occupied the heights. Bouat's Brigade and the Turks were now formed *en échelon* on the right and rear of d'Autemarre. Once more the Allies found themselves the stronger. Counting every battery, although all were not engaged at the same time, the Russians on the left wing had only 8 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 44 guns, not reckoning more than 6,000 men, while Bosquet had nearly 7,000 men, whose flank was covered by 7,000 Turks. Notwithstanding that superiority, the Russians had tried, on the arrival of the Minsk Regiment, to repulse the French from the heights they occupied with the bayonet, but, avoiding a hand-to-hand engagement, the latter received them with grape and a hail of rifle-balls from their skirmishers and deployed battalions. Seeing the impossibility of passing over a space ravaged by deadly projectiles without enormous loss, the Russians were obliged to abandon a charge, and confine their efforts to the defensive. Exposed to the fire of the enemy's batteries and riflemen, the infantry and artillery stood stoically under the murderous discharges, but from the moment they were obliged to give up the attempt to drive Bosquet and the Turks over the river, their position became more

than doubtful, particularly as at that moment the 1st and 2nd Divisions of French were already about crossing the river. Canrobert and Napoleon had by this time driven the Russian skirmishers between Alma Tamack and Bourliouk over the stream, and as Kiriakoff's troops had now left their position, Canrobert's Division hastened to ford the Alma and mount to the plateau. The battery, passing the stream near the former village, proceeded to join Bosquet. It is true the two companies of the 6th Battalion of Rifles could have annoyed the French during the crossing, but they were out of ammunition, and could not find the reserves, which had been sent to the rear of the right wing. So they withdrew, and Canrobert's men began to show themselves on the heights. When they had deployed on the plateau, Napoleon, with whom was St. Arnaud, began to cross, and a battalion of Zouaves threw themselves over immediately.

"At half-past one o'clock the English troops, marching very slowly (*forte lentement*), reached the right bank of the Alma, and halted just where the fire of the Russian troops became already effective. The Divisions of Brown and De Lacy Evans deployed in one line, and their skirmishers, supported by two

troops of Horse Artillery in position, began to open a very brisk fire. The men of the 6th Battalion of Rifles, and of the Battalion of Marine Riflemen in the vines, received the English by a well-sustained fire, while the Russian batteries increased the rapidity of their discharges. The English, to whom the fire of the riflemen, and, above all, the artillery, caused sensible losses, sheltered themselves behind the inequalities of the ground. Their soldiers, armed with rifled pieces, replied briskly to the Tirailleurs, and hailed bullets on the Russians on the left bank. The English, firing with great precision, hit as they pleased, officers, soldiers, and artillerymen."

At that moment St. Arnaud learnt that the 1st Division, having crossed the river, was meeting with resistance. In effect Canrobert's Division had debouched on the left flank of the Regiment of Moscow, already engaged with Bosquet, but the Russian battalions, with a few pieces of artillery, throwing back their right flank, opened a well-sustained fire of musketry and cannon against the French columns. At the same moment Canrobert encountered the troops of Kiriakoff, which had halted behind the Telegraph, and these different obstacles arrested the French.

But the success of the Russians was only temporary. Aurelle rushed to the aid of Canrobert, and Bosquet detached two batteries to his assistance. These troops re-established the equilibrium in the onward movement, and facilitated the access of the heights on the left bank to Prince Napoleon. A fact of importance which ought to be remarked is, that Canrobert's troops met no resistance till they had ascended the steep. The Prince concentrated his troops and advanced his batteries, which, with those of Canrobert's, opened a murderous fire. He sent at the same time to demand the co-operation of the English.

"The French batteries overwhelmed our troops with grape and shell, and we suffered in turn very sensible losses. Colonel Prikhodkine of the Minsk Regiment, the General Major Kourtianoff of the Moscow Regiment were wounded; the greater part of the *chefs de bataillon* were also killed or wounded. It was then that our troops, deprived of the greater part of their leaders, began to fall back towards the Telegraph. Although the Regiments of Minsk and of Moscow had lost between them 1,500 men, they retreated in good order, halting at intervals and opening a violent fire against the enemy. They also lent assistance to the light batteries Nos. 4 and 5 of the 17th

Brigade, which had suffered more than the others. These batteries, having lost the greater part of their gunners and of their horses, worked their pieces, nevertheless, with ardour. Although they were reduced to two horses for each gun, and to one horse for each caisson, they never ceased firing as long as the retreat lasted. Finally, the left wing, halting at the Telegraph, offered a last resistance to the French, and it was not till after a bloody struggle that it was obliged finally to yield to the enormous superiority of the enemy's forces. The Telegraph Hill, the culminating point of the centre of our position, was occupied by the French, who planted their flag upon it."

Then the French and Turks united deployed in an irregular line, of which the right was in advance of the village of Hadji Boulat, and the left in front of the Telegraph.

To cover his left flank, Napoleon changed front and formed an angle with the general line. Lourmel's Brigade occupied the interval between Canrobert and Bosquet, and the whole French army advanced simultaneously.

We now come to the English army. We have been looking for some time to ascertain what M. de

Todleben has done with them. Here they are at last:—

"It was thus that while the right wing of our army was still engaged in a bloody struggle, in which the efforts of the English exhausted themselves against the courage and firmness of our troops, the battle on the left wing was already over. It has been said above that towards two o'clock, and at the time when Canrobert had succeeded in deploying on the heights, the English reached the right bank of the Alma. They maintained themselves in that position while making us suffer from the effects of a very brisk fire of precision, until the whole of Napoleon's men had crossed the river. Having received news that the Prince had effected his passage, Lord Raglan made an onward movement. The Division Brown advanced towards the gardens and vineyards, and the Division De Lacy Evans partly towards the right and partly towards the left of Bourliouk. The Division of the Duke of Cambridge, behind the Division Brown, deployed in columns. The Division De Lacy Evans was followed by the Division England and the Division Cathcart, while the cavalry, still on the left, somewhat in the rear, assured the movement of the left wing. In front of the centre marched two

batteries. Notwithstanding our fire, which caused sensible loss to the enemy, the English advanced in perfect order. Their artillery hailed grape on our skirmishers ensconced in the vines and houses. When the English had reached the Bridge two of our batteries, occupying the heights on two sides of the high road, received them with a violent fire of grape, and the riflemen of the Regiment of Borodino and those of the Regiment of the Grand Duke Michael concentrated their fire upon them. Codrington's Brigade, which advanced towards the Bridge, received by musketry and a cannonade, experienced considerable losses, confusion seized the ranks, and it retired in great disorder behind Bourliouk.* But the enemy's riflemen, concealed behind the walls of the gardens, opened fire, and began to penetrate into the villages on the left bank. The sharpshooting of the English riflemen caused our troops terrible losses, and, above all, did great mischief to the two light batteries placed in front of the Borodino Regiment on the left of the high road. The situation of these batteries became more difficult still, when, after some time, two English guns succeeded in crossing the Alma by the

* This statement is inaccurate. No part of the Light Division fell back behind the blazing village of Bourliouk from the bridge.

fords below Bourliouk, and, after having ascended a rise of the hill, got into position, and took our two batteries in enfilade. A hail of rifle-balls committed great ravages among the gunners of the artillery, and among the columns of the Regiment of Borodino, which, with the light battery No. 1, placed in advance of its left wing, was obliged to retire. Meanwhile, the light battery No. 2, more on the right, continued to mow down with its fire the retreating battalions of Codrington's Brigade. The troops of General Kiriakoff, after their encounter with the French, near the Telegraph, never halted in their retreat till they reached the Katcha, and they were now followed by the Regiment of Borodino.* The light battery No. 2, quitted its position last of all. It was with difficulty they could drag their guns up the hill, in consequence of the loss of horses. The passage of the Bridge then became more easy. At last the Division of the Duke of Cambridge and of De Lacy Evans, having reached the river, set about effecting the passage. England's Division and the reserve of artillery alone remained on the right

* If General de Todleben be correct about the part played by General Kiriakoff in this action, the whole of Mr. Kinglake's account, so far as it rests on that officer's narrative, is destitute of solid foundation. General Kiriakoff must have quitted the field very early. Hodasevich implies that he did so.

bank as soon as Cathcart and the cavalry began to gain the left side. Brown's Division, notwithstanding the fire of the Chasseurs of the Grand Duke Michael's Regiment, and of twelve guns behind an epaulement on the right of the high road, passed to the left bank also. Seeing the movement of General Brown, Prince Gortschakoff ordered two battalions of the Grand Duke Michael Regiment, which had suffered less than the others, to attack the enemy with the bayonet. The Regiment of Ouglitch was brought forward from the epaulement, and posted in a ravine near the place previously occupied by the Cossack batteries. The 3rd and 4th Battalions of the Grand Duke Michael Regiment advanced with the bayonet against the English. By this movement the infantry masked the battery, which was obliged to stop its fire of grape. The enemy, seeing the movement of our troops, fell back towards the river, and having let them approach within a little distance, opened against them a most murderous fire. The commander of the regiment, Colonel Selesnew, and the two majors were killed. It was then that after sustaining a considerable loss, and seeing the greater part of their senior officers fall, our battalions retired directly towards the epaulement, thus preventing the battery from reopening its fire and covering the re-

treat of our infantry. On the heels of our retreating troops marched the 23rd Regiment of English infantry. On reaching the epaulement our troops occupied the flanks, and thus unmasked the battery, which immediately recommenced firing. But it was too late! The English were not more than a pistol shot from the battery. Our artillerymen, seeing that the enemy were on the point of rushing into the epaulement, limbered up their guns, and retired along with the battalions of infantry, which had suffered considerable loss. The two other battalions of the regiment, placed on open ground and exposed to fire, were also much weakened, and could no longer oppose the English columns. Two pieces of the battery of position No. 1 of the 16th Brigade, of which one had the trail broken, and the other its two wheelers killed, could not be carried off, and remained behind the epaulement, which was at once occupied by the English. In a moment, on the parapet so lately held by our battery, we saw the English banner waving. The 1st and 2nd Battalion of the Regiment of Wladimir, sent to support the retreating Chasseurs, rushed to the fight. The charge was executed with great impetuosity. Without troubling themselves about the terrible fire of the English, the battalions

advanced in a compact mass with the bayonet. The enemy could not resist the shock, and, abandoning the epaulement, retreated before they had time to do more than fire a few shots. The epaulement was occupied by our troops, who, concealing themselves behind the parapet, opened a very brisk fire against the enemy now forced to fly precipitately towards the river. While all this was taking place the French had occupied the Hill of the Telegraph, and their reserves were already massed on the left bank, while the troops of Kiriakoff were retreating towards the Katcha. In the meantime, the English, driven out of the epaulement, and beyond the reach of our smooth-bores, had only to meet the fire of a handful of riflemen of the Regiment of Wladimir, for the riflemen of the Grand Duke's Regiment had no more cartridges. The English halted there about 100 yards from the river, and, having begun to reform, opened fire once more. Lord Raglan caused the Divisions of the Duke of Cambridge and De Lacy Evans, which had already effected their passage, to advance to the aid of the weakened troops of General Brown. A fresh attack of the English was imminent. The Division of the Duke of Cambridge, supported by the Division of Brown, which had succeeded in

rallying, and by Pennefather's Brigade, once more advanced towards the epaulement. The situation of our troops was becoming very critical. The perilous contest might have been rendered to some extent less unequal by the support of a battery; but as they had not attached one to the Wladimir Regiment, the enemy was enabled to organize his battalions at his ease. The battery, which had quitted the epaulement, could with great difficulty carry off the ten guns which remained to it, in consequence of the enormous loss sustained by it in gunners and horses, and found it absolutely impossible to reoccupy the work and renew the combat. They might have advanced the light battery, which was left almost uselessly near the Souzdal Regiment, but it would have had to make a very difficult movement in the bottom of a ravine, in rear of the regiment, and it could not have arrived in time. Notwithstanding the danger of their position, our troops stood firm. The terrible fire of the clouds of skirmishers deprived our troops in a very short time of the greater part of their officers and chiefs. All those who surrounded Prince Gortschakoff fell, the Prince himself had his horse killed under him, and his coat was pierced with six balls. But Prince

Gortschakoff and General Kvizinsky did not recoil from a fresh sacrifice to save the position. They both commanded a bayonet charge, and led in person what remained of the Regiment of Wladimir. Animated by the example of its chiefs, the Regiment of Wladimir, with loud hurrahs, rushed on, part over the epaulement, part by its flanks, and precipitated itself upon the enemy. At the sight of the determined onslaught of the Regiment of Wladimir, the first line of the English regiments lost order in the ranks, wavered, and began to retire towards the Bridge. But at this supreme moment our troops were suddenly taken on the flank by the French artillery,* and this unforeseen attack determined the success of the action in favour of the English. St. Arnaud, in fact, having learnt the obstinate resistance which the English were meeting, had suspended for some moments the movement of his troops, and, after the occupation of the Hill of the Telegraph, had advanced against our right flank two troops of Horse Artillery of the reserve, a mounted battery of the 4th Division, and half an English battery. This artillery, numbering twenty-three pieces, opened a murderous fire against our flank, and at the same

* This is denied by those who were with Lord Raglan.

moment the French troops recommenced their onward march. Overwhelmed by this incident, as terrible as unforeseen, the Regiment of Wladimir paused, and the English, emboldened, directed against it a very brisk fire. But the regiment, after a momentary halt, with loud hurrahs, once more renewed its bayonet charge! Received by the thundering fire of the infantry, and of the artillery of the French and of the English, having lost nearly all of its officers, and, having no supports, it was obliged to abandon the attack, and fall back towards the epaulement which we had not time to reoccupy with artillery. The English pursued the Regiment of Wladimir. Its shattered fragments found a refuge behind the parapet, and succeeded in checking, by a rolling fire, the progress of the enemy for a moment. General Kvizinsky, being exceedingly anxious to carry off the two guns abandoned by the battery of position No. 1 of the 16th Brigade, and wishing to afford a means of retreat to the artillery in the epaulement more to the right, halted stiffly with the regiment to check the enemy. Thus opposed in their march, the enemy replied to the fire of the Wladimir Regiment without relaxing their fusillade. For twenty minutes the regiment maintained itself behind the epaulement,

and at the same time that it made head against nearly a whole English division, was taken on flank and rear by the fire of the French battery. While the Regiment Wladimir was falling heroically behind the epaulement, the Brigade Colin Campbell threatened to turn its right flank, the Division of Prince Napoleon, advancing more to the left, hastened to cut off its retreat to Sebastopol, the French batteries thundered on its flank, and the Divisions Brown, Evans, and the Duke of Cambridge rained on it a hail of bullets and shell. But the Regiment of Wladimir wavered not. Although it had lost its colonel, three majors, fourteen captains, thirty officers, and about 1,300 men, it stood firm on its ground. Fearing that they might cut off the retreat on Sebastopol, and seeing that neither at the centre nor on the left wing were there any means of making the chances of the battle more favourable for us, Prince Menschikoff, towards four o'clock in the afternoon, at last ordered Prince Gortschakoff to order the troops of our right flank to fall back on the chain of heights. Lieutenant-General Kvizinsky, having strengthened the line of skirmishers, began to retire with the remains of the Wladimir Regiment and of the Regiment of the Grand Duke Michael.

In the former there was not one field-officer left, and only two captains and seven lieutenants, many of whom, though wounded, would not quit the ranks. At the moment when he gave the order to retreat, the General had a horse killed under him, and was wounded in the foot. That did not prevent his continuing to fight and to take all the measures the occasion demanded. Soon a rifle-ball broke his left wrist and hip, and he fell under his heavy wounds. Our troops retired with regularity and good order, so that the artillery, notwithstanding the losses it had experienced, brought off all its pieces except the two of the battery of position No. 1 of the 16th Brigade, which remained on the field and fell into the hands of the enemy, as they could not be dragged up the heights. The English, having succeeded in carrying several guns to the spot lately occupied by the left wing of the Regiment of Souzdal, opened against the Regiments of Souzdal and of Ouglitch a fire of artillery and rifles which caused a loss of nearly 100 men to the latter before they could gain the top of the ridge. To cover the retreat, Major-General Kischinsky, by the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, caused to be placed on a trifling eminence not far from the old position of the reserve

the troop of Horse Artillery No. 12 and the light batteries Nos. 3 and 4 of the 11th Brigade. Behind them and on the left of the road to Sebastopol, the Regiment of Volhynia was stationed, and on the right of the road the Brigade of Hussars was posted, with the Cossacks on its right flank. The English, having occupied the ground of the right wing and the centre of our old position, began to pursue our retreating soldiers. Lord Cardigan's Brigade, together with the Horse Artillery, advanced, resting on the right of Colin Campbell's Brigade, and was sustained by the Brigade of the Guard Bentinck and by a part of the Divisions De Lacy Evans and Cathcart, which marched in the rear. The enemy's artillery opened fire, but our troops were already out of range, and suffered no loss. Having approached our rear within cannon shot the enemy were received by the fire of our artillery, which caused them to halt, and to desist from further pursuit. Thus our rearguard secured to the bulk of our army the possibility of arriving without impediment at the Katcha, which they reached about nine p.m. At seven p.m. the enemy, reinforced by Torrens from Old Fort, bivouacked on the very ground occupied by our troops during the battle. The motives which prevented the enemy pushing the

pursuit further were:—First, that their troops were harassed with fatigue from the heroic opposition of the Russians; second, that they had not enough of cavalry; third, that they were afraid the Russians might halt behind the Katcha, which presented the same facilities for resistance as the Alma; fourth, the illness of Marshal St. Arnaud, which prevented the operations after the action receiving the impress of the necessary activity."

So far we have translated almost literally M. de Todleben's account of the battle of the Alma, at the risk of wearying all, and of surprising and irritating many, of our readers; but the book is very dear and scarce, and it will probably be some time before it appears in an English form. It will be observed that in the main the Russian general confirms the French accounts as to the progress of the great events of the action, and the manner in which the troops were engaged. He quite ignores Lord Raglan's "scarlet arch on the knoll," and the effect of the white plumes of his staff; but he also omits the advance of the Guards, and does not agree with Mr. Kinglake as to the value of Sir Colin Campbell's demonstration on the left. It would trench too largely on our space to analyze his statement, but we may observe that the

very story of the fight at the epaulement and the capture of the guns, as well as the disposition of the troops, proves that if the English army was not the first to move, it had the hardest fighting and the hottest part of the struggle. The table of losses furnished by Todleben is conclusive on this point. In killed, wounded, and missing, the Russian army lost 5,709 men. Of these, the regiments defending the position to the right of the high road to Eupatoria —those of Wladimir, Grand Duke Michael, Souzdal, and Ouglitch—opposed to the English left, lost 3,028. Some of the regiments on the left of the road were opposed to the English also, and if we put their loss at 500, which is very low, we shall leave a balance of 2,200 as the share of the work done by our allies. It would be absurd, after the testimony which has been adduced, to which is now added that of Todleben, to deny that the French did their work admirably well. National prejudice, morbid feeling, and personal dislike to the Emperor can no longer assert that his soldiers belied the ancient reputation of the French army on the heights of Alma, and we of all people can best afford to concede them the high praise their activity and gallantry deserve.

In accounting for the defeat of the Russians,

Todleben assigns a high place to the superior armament of the Allies, but he also asserts that the Russians were inferior in manœuvring. It may be useful to point out to those officers who declaim against the Hythe school for its supposed tendency to make the soldier too independent of his officer, that Todleben distinctly assigns as an advantage the greater confidence, skill, and mobility, which soldiers left to themselves as skirmishers are sure to acquire. "They will not hesitate," he says, "in action, nor will they require the continual direction and surveillance of their immediate officers." The opponents of musketry instruction may say that English soldier nature is different from human nature anywhere else in the world. We do not believe them. Certainly the Russian is not fit for freedom of action in the field if an Englishman is not. Todleben praises, also, the sword-bayonet exercise, and the *pas gymnastique*, which serve as the complement to the advantages obtained by the rifled arms. The Russian army, remembering the traditions bequeathed by Suwaroff, preferred the shock of the charge to precision of fire at long range; and, while the soldier of the West was taught to develope his presence of mind and individual quality, the Russians were, above all things,

trained to act in masses. No army could equal them in manœuvres by masses, but on difficult ground, where straight lines and precision of movement were no longer possible, and where presence of mind was required in the face of an enemy, the Russians, who did not yield to any army in the world in bravery and devotion, had to suffer great losses and to forfeit the chance of victory. At the Alma their infantry, armed with smooth-bores, could not hit anything beyond 300 paces, while the Allies reached them at 1,200 paces and more. When they got near enough to equalise the disadvantages, their battalions were disorganized by the allied fire. The artillery, exposed to the fire of riflemen, who were out of range of grape, could only make their fire effective by using shrapnel, of which they had only fifteen rounds in each light battery. Ordinary shells were almost useless. Even when the Allies had become disorganized by the united efforts of artillery and infantry, and when it was only necessary to complete their defeat by a cannonade, it was impossible to act in consequence of the loss in guns and horses caused by rifle fire, and the same cause obliged the artillery to quit its position prematurely at times, for fear of being captured by the Allies. The allied artillery caused the

Russians very little loss in comparison with the small arms of precision. But among the most important causes of their defeat was the neglect to fortify their position, though they had both time and means for the purpose. The tardy opposition to Bosquet also contributed to their disaster. Finally, the abandonment of his post by Kiriakoff* had a fatal influence on the regiments fighting on the right, as it permitted Napoleon and Canrobert to ascend the heights, and was the cause of the losses to Gortschakoff's men.

In fact, an ill-armed Russian force, placed in a position which was not fortified, ill-commanded and manœuvred, was attacked by an enemy superior in numbers and equipment, and was, as the Americans say, "pretty badly beaten."

* Those who are familiar with Mr. Kinglake's glittering pictures of this important battle, will remember that he places great reliance on General Kiriakoff. The truth is, that the officer in question was felt by the army to have acted so badly that, in self-defence, he wrote an account of his part in it, which was received with general distrust, and did not at all tend to produce a reaction in his favour. In ignorance of General Kiriakoff's character, and of the circumstances under which his narrative was produced, Mr. Kinglake, to the great amusement of General Todleben and of the Russians, has accepted his statements as of undoubted authenticity, though Hodasevich's remarks might have excited suspicion in his mind concerning the General's conduct, which was attributed to "Bacchic influences."

The Allies have thus won a great victory. What will they do with it? The apologist of Lord Raglan, trusting to the statement of General Kiriakoff, which Todleben altogether ignores, gives that officer the credit of covering the retreat of the Russians, gives to General Martimprey the discredit of not pressing the pursuit, and to General Airey the credit of proposing it. Mr. Kinglake thinks diplomacy interfered, and that Lord Raglan, whom he charges with having deceived St. Arnaud early in the day, began to think at the close of it that he was specially charged with the care of the French alliance. How it would have been endangered by a pursuit of the Russians we confess we cannot perceive. His lordship had those 1000 sabres, of which we read so often, a magnificent force of artillery almost untouched, and the 1st Battalion of Royals, the 4th, 20th, 21st, 28th, 38th, 42nd, 44th, 49th, 50th, 77th, 79th, 88th Regiments, and 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade, in all fourteen battalions, some of which had not been engaged at all, and others of which had suffered no loss, all ready to his hand, to pursue, had he been so minded. A staff officer, whose "Letters from Head-Quarters" are principally quoted by Todleben in relation to the English army and operations, says Lord Raglan desired that those of

the French, who had not been engaged, the Turks, some of our cavalry, and two or three batteries, should follow the Russians, but that the French replied they could send no infantry, and that the artillery had exhausted their ammunition. Mr. Kinglake says that the reason assigned by the French for refusing to cooperate that evening was that they must get their knapsacks, which they had left behind them on the ground in the morning before they went into action. When the French proposed next day to continue their march in pursuit, Lord Raglan was not prepared to leave the wounded, though he was ready to leave them the night before. The Russians, having halted on the night of the battle at the Katcha, continued their retreat, covered by a rearguard of 6500 men and 16 guns the following morning, and halted at midday on the Belbeck. The same night, Prince Menschikoff resolved on a most energetic and decisive measure equal to the occasion. He sent orders to Aide-de-camp General Korniloff to sink all the old men-of-war at the entrance of the Grand Bay, and at the same time commissioned Colonel de Todleben to choose a position on the heights of Inkerman to menace the enemy in their advance against the north side. The garrison of Sebastopol,

on the 14th of September, consisted of 4 Battalions and 8 guns on the north side, and of 6 Battalions and 8 guns on the south side, independently of sailors and detachments. Four Battalions of sailors from the fleet did duty on shore.

The following is the account of the measures taken to put Sebastopol in a state of defence:—

"Prince Menschikoff," says Todleben, "when he concentrated his army in the Alma, left, as we have seen, but a very weak garrison at Sebastopol, composed exclusively of some troops belonging to the fleet of 4 Battalions of Reserve of the Light Infantry Regiments of Vilna and Luthuania; of 4 Battalions of troops of descent, and of two light batteries of the marines of 16 guns. It is evident these troops were insufficient, not only for the defence of the city, but for the numerous works which it was indispensable to execute on the line of defence; thus, immediately after the landing of the enemy, in order to reinforce the garrison, the crews of some of the ships were formed into 4 Battalions for service on shore. After the formation of these troops, the garrison of Sebastopol was, on the 14th of September, distributed in

such a manner that the north side was occupied by 4 Battalions with 8 guns, and the south side by 6 Battalions with 8 guns; independently of the sailors placed at the three sections of the line of defence, and of the Admiralty and Hospital Detachments.

"Four battalions of descent remained on board the ships, and descended in turns, two by two, on the north side of the Roads, whilst the 2 other Battalions remained on board, and could in case of need be directed, without delay, on any point where their presence was considered necessary. Whilst these preparations were made with regard to the fleet and the garrison, the Russians applied themselves also to strengthen the defences of the land side. At this epoch, important works were going on in the North Fort, on such a scale that it would have required many months to finish them. As the Allies were coming from the side of Eupatoria, an attack against the north side was to be expected, and it was necessary, on that account, to render that side capable of resisting any endeavour of the enemy as speedily as possible. Perceiving the weakness of the North Fort in general, and particularly that of the northern front,

Lieut.-Colonel Todleben saw the necessity of erecting field-works on both sides of the Fort, to give it a larger extent, which permitted him to put a battery on this position, the greatest possible number of guns, and to sweep by musketry and artillery the ravines and other inequalities of ground, close to the Fort, which could shelter the enemy.

"At the same time, to guarantee the city against the Allies on the south, above all in the direction of Balaklava, Colonel Todleben commenced to strengthen with field-works that part of the southern side of Sebastopol which lay between Bastion No. 4 and Bastion No. 5; but to execute all these works with the briefest possible delay, it was necessary to increase the number of workmen at night as well as at day. In the enumeration of the forces and of the resources of which Prince Menschikoff could dispose in the Crimea at the moment of the descent of the enemy, we have seen that the *matériel* of the engineers was altogether insignificant. It was necessary then, in the first place, above all things to provide for the collection of tools necessary to the works, in proportion to the number of men that the garrison could furnish in regard to its numerical strength. Lieut.-Colonel

Todleben stated his ideas upon that point in a note which he presented to the Vice-Admiral Korniloff. The Admiral approved his project, and immediately the troops, understanding all the gravity of the situation, and the necessity of rapid measures, applied themselves with energy to the execution of the works.

"Let us, for the moment, confine our narrative to an account of the works undertaken at Sebastopol relative to the other branches of the service, with regard to the defence of the city. Whilst steps were taken to procure indispensable tools, and that the number of workmen was determined, thirty pieces of artillery were removed from the ships of war to strengthen the batteries of Sebastopol, of which number twenty were intended for the north and ten for the south side. In order to communicate with greater celerity, and at all times with Prince Menschikoff, a line of semaphores was established between the position on the Alma and the city. We have now arrived at the 20th of September. Towards two o'clock in the afternoon, the Telegraph of Cape Loukoul signalled that the enemy was advancing, and soon afterwards the cannonade, which we heard, announced the commencement of the combat. At half-past four the cannonade

became silent; at seven o'clock it was already confusedly known that the issue of the battle was unfavourable to us, and at nine o'clock the news was carried to Vice-Admiral Korniloff by a courier of Prince Menschikoff."

Fourteen ships of the line and seven frigates were prepared to take the sea, and meantime efforts were made to increase the height and thickness of the walls, and to protect the interior of the North Fort. Todleben at once suspended those attempts, and directed all his energies to cover the side of the forts with field works, in order to sweep the ravines with musketry and shot. At the same time he set about covering the south side by field works near the Bastion du Mât. While engaged in these preliminary steps, the defeated Russians appeared on the left bank of the Belbeck. Owing to the nature of the ground the position was not favourable for defence, and the Russians, if beaten, would have had to retreat towards the North Fort, or towards Inkerman. In the former case they would have been compressed into a narrow space, and exposed to enormous losses from the fire of the fleet, while the enemy might follow them into the fort itself, and occupy the battery on the north

side. In the latter case they would have to pass along a narrow causeway between the sea and a deep marsh under the fire of the enemy. Seeing the dangers of the position, Prince Menschikoff sought to take up ground on the east of the post road between Belbeck and the Tchernaya; but the country was very uneven and covered with dense brushwood, presenting no favourable position for defence, and in case of defeat it would have been impossible to conduct an orderly retreat to Baktchiserai. The Prince was, therefore, obliged to give up all attempts to meet the Allies on the north side, and resolved to move his army to the south of the city. Accordingly, on the evening of the 21st of September the Russians crossed the causeway at Inkerman, ascended Mount Sapoune, and arrived at Sebastopol, leaving the Taroutino Regiment to reinforce the garrison of the North Fort. On the receipt of Prince Menschikoff's order, Vice-Admiral Korniloff assembled a council of the admirals and captains of the fleet. He explained that the enemy having gained the day at the Alma, could occupy the north-east of the roads, force the fleet to abandon its position, and burn the vessels moored in the Grand Bay. In a burst of heroic or Tartaric despair, Korniloff proposed to sail out of the harbour,

and attack the allied fleet off Cape Loukoul. If successful the expedition was doomed. If, on the other hand, the attack failed, he recommended that the Russian fleet should grapple with the enemy and blow up their ships alongside them. The army thus deprived of its support would fall an easy prey to the Russian forces on land, and the Russian fleet would perish gloriously. This project of a heroic audacity did not obtain the approbation of the council of war, and very few members adhered to it. Indeed, Todleben points out how little chance of success there would have been in an encounter between a sailing fleet and a steam navy, but he does not trouble himself to inquire what might have been the effect of the terrible alternative. Korniloff dismissed the council. But he made one more effort to keep his ships above water. He made a strenuous attempt to gain the support of Prince Menschikoff himself, but in reply he only obtained from the Prince a reiterated order to sink the ships at once. Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd of September, five of the oldest men-of-war and two frigates were sunk, with their guns, in the channel, at the entrance to the roads, and the ten remaining men-of-war were moored along the south side, from Artillery Bay to Careening Bay, to sweep the north side.

All the other vessels, except the steamers, were placed in the South Bay to be sunk in case the city should be taken. Todleben's account of the sinking of the ships is not destitute of a certain pathos. He says:—

"In consequence of the pressing and positive injunctions of Prince Menschikoff, Admiral Korniloff took the following measures in relation to the fleet. He ordered:—

"1. To sink in the passage, at the entry of the Roads, the five oldest line-of-battle ships and two frigates, and to moor the ten remaining vessels along the south side of the road, from Artillery Bay to Careening Bay, that in case of attack they might be employed to sweep the north side by their artillery.

"2. To place all the other vessels of the fleet, except the steamers, on the South Bay, and to get them ready to be sunk in case we saw ourselves forced to yield the city and the harbour to the enemy." Towards four o'clock of the afternoon of the 21st September, the vessels commenced to move towards the posts assigned to them, and at half-past ten they were placed comformably to the order: the line-of-battle ships and frigates intended to be sunk were

brought to the entry of the road across the channel between the Constantine and Alexander batteries. The other vessels were placed along the shore in the following order :—

"At the entrance of Artillery Bay,—

1. The Robislau, 90 gun ship.

"At the entrance of the Southern Bay,—

2. The Grand Duke Constantine, 124 gun ship.
3. The Jagoudiil, 88 gun ship.
4. The Twelve Apostles, 124 gun ship.

"Along the side from Paul's Promontory to Careening Bay,—

5. The Paris, 126 gun ship.
6. Swatislow, 90 gun ship.
7. The Empress Maria, 84 gun ship.
8. The Tchesmé, 84 gun ship.
9. The Khabri, 88 gun ship.
10. The Gavrill, 96 gun ship.

"On the morning of the 22nd September, the vessels doomed to bar the channel were anchored at the entry of the Road, deprived of their yards and sails, but still

armed with their guns. The enemy seeing them supposed that the Russian fleet had the intention of fighting a battle; in truth, Vice-Admiral Korniloff ordered the landing of the artillery of the ships intended to be sunk to be deferred, counting on the power of the guns in case of an attack by the enemy; but at six o'clock in the evening, the Russian national flag was hoisted above the city. This was the signal of the final order to sink the ships.

"In obedience to this instruction, it would have been requisite in the course of the night to land all the *matériel* which could be transported, and at the point of day to lower the masts and sink the ships to the bottom. The sailors displayed, in the execution of these orders, extraordinary activity. During the evening and the course of the night, however, they were unable to land the artillery, as it would have taken too much time. At the dawn of day on 23rd September, where before had been anchored the 'Sizopol,' 'Varna,' and 'Silistria' line-of-battle ships, only some *débris* of their masts were seen floating; after them the 'Owrul' and the 'Selaphaïl' were engulphed, and at eight o'clock the 'Flora' frigate disappeared also under the water. The line-of-battle ship, 'Tri-Sviatitelia,' alone sank very

slowly, notwithstanding that the water flowed through all the holes pierced in her side. The sailors, with sorrowful countenances and hearts full of poignant anguish, regarded in silence the unreasonable waves which swallowed up these noble ships to which so many glorious souvenirs of the Black Sea fleet were attached, but their emotion was at its height when the steamer 'Gromonossetz' was ordered to fire some round shot into the 'Tri-Sviatitelia' to quicken her immersion. Tears, till then restrained, ran down the bronzed cheeks of our brave sailors. It was thus that the excellent and celebrated road of Sebastopol was transformed for a time into a sterile lake, and the sailors of the Black Sea fleet forced to abandon their original destination, engaged in a conflict altogether novel to them, in a military life on shore. Having many a time given proofs of their intelligence and intrepidity at sea, they were about to give their aid to the defence of their natal city menaced by a powerful adversary.

"The crews of the fleet moored in the Roads, together with those of the sunken vessels, were formed into 12 Battalions of marines, making 17 Battalions of sailors, 11 independent Battalions formed of re-

serves of regiments, 1 Battalion of recruits, 1 special Battalion formed of the crew of two transports, and 4 Battalions of sailors, of which 2 remained on board the men-of-war, and 2 did duty on land by turns. By the time these measures were completed, the Allies had made their appearance on the Belbeck, and their bivouac fires were visible from the North Fort on the night of the 24th of September. Every moment the garrison expected to see their feeble intrenchments carried. Their situation was the more critical, inasmuch as Prince Menschikoff had that very night left Sebastopol, and led his army by Mackenzie's Farm to Baktchiserai. The Prince confided the command of the troops in the city to Lieut.-General de Moller, of the North side, and of the Fort to Korniloff, of the sailors, and of the South side to Nakhimoff. He left as garrison, besides the sailors on the south side, and the artillerymen in the batteries, 17 Battalions of sailors, 8 Battalions of the reserve of 13 Regiments of Infantry, the 6th Battalion of Sappers—in all, 16,569 men. The allied army, 60,000 strong, was three miles and one-third from the city. Working night and day in the interval between the 14th and 25th of September, the Russians, under Todleben's directions, could only run up some field works, of which

there is a detailed description in the work under review. On the crest of the shore he constructed a battery of 8 guns, and another of 6 guns, to keep off the shipping and to sweep the coast towards Belbeck, where the ground was entirely hidden from the fire of the North Fort. They were connected by trenches for musketry, with the left flank of the fort. On the right was constructed a battery armed with 12 guns to sweep the plateau on the front and flank. Of the 47 guns in the Fort only 12 could be pointed towards the country, and 16 were small pieces to flank the ditches. The walls actually tumbled down in the attempt to repair them, and all along a front of a mile in extent there were only 29 guns to oppose the enemy. Korniloff, however, resolved to defend it to the last extremity, though the Allies were advancing in perfect order towards the Belbeck, and the fleet was coasting towards the south. At six o'clock on the morning of the 24th of September, six men-of-war opened fire against Fort Constantine and the Wasp Battery, but the demonstration was insignificant. Next morning, Korniloff was prepared for the attack of his position, but all the men he could muster were 11,350, nearly all sailors. In fact, his case was desperate. The fort, commanded from

the surrounding heights, was crumbling to pieces, a breach was actually formed in the parapet by the wall giving way under the sacks of earth hastily placed on them to cover the artillerymen as the enemy came in sight. The parapets were not high enough to protect the heads of the garrison. A body of sailors, armed with flint-muskets, boarding-pistols, and the like, placed behind a wretched work, and exposed to the bombardment of an enormous fleet, were to be pitted against 60,000 men flushed with victory! In the event of defeat, retreat would have been impossible —the Russian fleet could not aid them by its fire till they had got away. ' No doubt, the establishment of batteries to intercept the communications with the north side would have been difficult under the guns of the Russian fleet, but it would have been possible, as is proved by the fact that the Allies raised batteries on the south side, which forced the Russian ships to withdraw. It may be objected also that it would have been very difficult for the Allies to have landed their artillery, and that the communication with the fleet would have been interrupted, as there was no port. That would have been a grave matter if the troops were obliged to prolong their attack of the North Fort; but, considering its power of resistance and

the strength of the fleet, the Allies would have had complete success in very little time.

That the attack could not have detained the Allies long, Todleben seeks to demonstrate by a rigid analysis of the ground, and of the means of defence possessed by the garrison. On the right of the work the Allies would have been exposed, he states, to the fire of 7 guns, at long range, from which they would very soon get into cover. In a movement direct on the front they would have been under the fire of 6 guns. On the left they would have had to encounter the effect of 7 guns, which ought to have been very soon demolished by the fleet. The success of an assault, if preceded by a bombardment of the works, and of the uncovered garrison, both of which were commanded by the guns of the fleets, must have been certain and inevitable. If such was the state of affairs after so many days of vigorous preparation, which the delay of the Allies permitted the Russians to make, it may easily be conceived what must have occurred if the enemy had marched on the place immediately after the battle, when one-half even of these miserable defences were not in existence.

It was "not without astonishment," then, that the garrison, on the morning of the 26th of September, heard the Allies were actually marching round towards the south of the city. There was some disquietude caused by the movement, in consequence of its cutting off the communication between the garrison and the army, but the sensation of relief from immediate danger was far greater, although the south side was exceedingly weak, and was garrisoned by only 5,000 men.

"Whilst every one at Sebastopol was persuaded that the enemy would immediately attack the north side, the allied army, as we have stated in the preceding chapter, suddenly quitted its position upon the heights of the left bank of the Belbeck, and bore towards the east, in the direction of Mackenzie's Farm. The garrison, being deficient in cavalry, could not observe the ulterior march of the enemy. They supposed that the Allies had come to the resolution of moving upon the Chersonese Peninsula; and that they intended, after having changed the base of their operations, to attack the south side of Sebastopol. The fortifications of this part of the city, scattered over an extent of nearly seven versts, were still almost as weak as they were on the day of dis-

embarkation; because after the invasion of the Allies, our efforts were exclusively concentrated upon the north side, which it was wished to shelter as much as possible from the enemy's attacks. The garrison of the south side was only composed of 6 Battalions of the Reserve of the 13th Division of Infantry, and the 44th Battalion of the fleet. These forces when united did not exceed 5,000 men. Nachimoff having recognised the impossibility of preventing the Allies from invading the southern side, made all necessary arrangements to sink the ships of his squadron, so that they might not be taken by the enemy in the event of the fall of Sebastopol. In accordance with these arrangements, Nachimoff, on the 26th of September, issued the following important order:—

"'The enemy is advancing towards the city, which has but a weak garrison to defend it. I behold myself obliged to sink the ships of the squadron which have been intrusted to me, and to unite the crews, boarding arms in hand, with the garrison. I am convinced that each commander, officer, and sailor, will fight like a hero. We will number about 3,000; the rallying spot is the Place du Théâtre,

"'Que l'escadre se tienne pour avertie.'"

Nachimoff disembarked 2 Battalions of the crews of his squadron, which he prepared to sink in case of necessity, and in the course of the day Korniloff crossed to his assistance with 13 Battalions of sailors and two batteries. It would be difficult to paint the general uneasiness of the people when the news arrived in the evening that the enemy had succeeded in seizing some of the baggage of the army, and that communication with Menschikoff was cut off. Next day they learnt that the enemy had occupied Balaklava, and it was not long before they saw their outposts on the hills over the city.

Todleben examines the reasons, we had nearly said the excuses, for the celebrated flank march. He contends that the argument in favour of that movement, which is founded on the absence of a port on the north shore; has no solid basis. Unless the Allies, he says, having originally resolved to land on the north side, found out when they had done so that an attack *de vive force* was impossible, and that it would be necessary to undertake a siege of the north side, they could not have needed a port. Did they not know, he asks, beforehand that the north shore had no port, and did not they nevertheless effect a descent on the

north side? The inference is clear that the Allies intended to operate against that side of the grand Bay of Sebastopol. They had no reason whatever to think the north side impregnable. Their fleet looked into the place. If they had made a few reconnaissances, they would, no doubt, have been satisfied of the possibility of taking the works. It has been argued by the advocates for the flank march that the Allies might have taken the north side, and yet have failed to destroy the Russian ships and arsenals. Todleben is of a different opinion: he asserts that the fleet and arsenals could have been really destroyed from the north side. Weighing all the facts of the case, he arrives at the conviction that there was a change in the councils of the Allies, and an uncertainty which, in spite of Mr. Kinglake, he ascribes to St. Arnaud's illness, and also to the impression produced by the sinking of the ships in the harbour.

The flank march of Menschikoff had, he considers, a far better reason. It was only natural to suppose the Allies would attack the north side, and that they would occupy the Mackenzie Farm and the heights of Inkerman. Once there, they would cut off

the Russian army and force them to remain on Mount Sapoune, which was far too extended a position for them to occupy. At the same time they would be cut off from all their bases of supply and reinforcements. In case of another action, the army, the fleet, and the city would have all been lost at one blow, if the Russians were beaten. Troops were marching into the Crimea. It was above all things desirable to get into communication with them. In the hope, therefore, that the garrison would be able to hold out till he could come back to help them, Menschikoff marched away from his dangerous position, and was able to get at his supplies of food and men. On the night of September 24th, he put his columns in march, and occupied Mackenzie's Farm. Part of his army crossed over by the Traktir Bridge, which was very soon afterwards crossed by the Allies on their way to Balaklava.

The arguments on these points are, of course, set forth at greater length in the book itself. There may be exceptions taken to them. So far as the authority of the Russian Engineer can weigh, the question is decided with respect to the certainty with which the north side would have fallen into the hands of the Allies,

and to the ease with which they could have destroyed the ships and arsenals of the south side afterwards. For better or for worse, however, there were the Allies pouring down the slopes of Mackenzie's Farm across the line of Menschikoff's retreat, and taking up the ground from which for a long twelvemonth they thundered in vain at the gates of Sebastopol for admitance When General Mansfield was at Warsaw he held some interesting conversations with Prince Gortschakoff concerning the events in the early part of the war in the Crimea which he reported to the authorities, or to his friends at home. In the valuable "Military Opinions" of the veteran Engineer and soldier, Sir John Burgoyne, some comments are made on these remarks of the Russian General respecting the very question at issue. Prince Gortschakoff maintained "there was nothing to stop the Allies marching into the town." Sir John argues that the north side was very strong. Todleben asserts it was very weak. The impression made by the look of the works was, no doubt, due to the remoteness and imperfection of the reconnaissances of the place. The officers of the fleet did not throw much light on the defences. Sir John evidently did not know that the garrison was so weak, the works

so slight, that there was a breach in them, and, above all, that the covering army under Menschikoff, to which he alludes, had marched away and left the garrison to its fate. Again, Sir John states, the fort was not commanded in any way, and quotes the authority of Major, now Lieutenant-Colonel, Graham, R.E., to show it was a culminating point of a ridge. Todleben, who must know the ground at least as well, says, "Le Fort du Nord, n'étant pas défilé des hauteurs environnantes, ne mettait à l'abri que les soldats placés immédiatement derrière les parapets," and alludes in several places to its uncovered position, while he insists on its openness to a cannonade over and over again.

We give Sir John's remarks *in extenso*.

AN ANSWER TO SOME RUSSIAN CRITICISMS ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALLIES IN THE CRIMEA.

"The conversation which our consul* reports that he had with * * * * † relative to the late war in the Crimea, is not without interest, but must be taken with caution.

* General Mansfield, now Sir William Mansfield, consul at Warsaw.
† * * * Prince Gortschakoff.

"It is not surprising that * * * * should be so communicative, and *apparently* "without reserve," when his remarks were precisely what he would wish to have disseminated, their whole tenor being to laud the proceedings of the Russians, and to decry those of the Allies.

"He has great advantages in his arguments, inasmuch as, while almost every particular of the forces and of the circumstances of the Allies is open to him, we are quite in the dark as to those of the Russians having no guide, but their own statements, to which, of course, it is impossible to attach implicit faith.

* * * * describes very truly the advantages the enemy possessed by the familiarity of the Russians with the language of the Allies, while the Russian was almost a closed book to us, and the readiness with which information could be obtained by an artful course of inquiry from French and British deserters; and to this he might have added, the state of ignorance in which the Russian troops must be on system studiously kept with regard to the condition of their own army, which rendered it very

rare that the slightest useful information could be obtained from their deserters.

"At the same time, I fully believe, and constantly urged, at the time, that we always greatly overestimated the force of the Russians in the Crimea; and the firmness they displayed, the bold front shown on every side, considering the probable strength of their army, are most creditable to them and to their general.

"There was, in my mind, clearly, on some occasions, a want of enterprise in the proceedings of the Allies; I do not, in this remark, advert to the senseless outcry against them, for not having assaulted Sebastopol as soon as they came before it, by which desperate attempt they would have given the enemy every advantage, and where a check would have been ruin—in short, where they would have taken him in his greatest strength; but I allude to the many opportunities of taking advantage of his weakness —such as at Balaklava; on the heights of Inkerman during the winter of 1854; and after the capture of the town; but such a want of decisive energy is inseparable from a combination of forces of different

countries in one army, unless where one has clearly the acknowledged predominance in force and in command, and the others are entirely dependent.

"As regards the *specific* remarks of * * * * they will admit of an interpretation of a different tendency to that which he would enforce.

"He states, to the credit of the Russian general, and apparently as a slur on the Allies, that 'on the 18th June the former was obliged to leave his left on the Mackenzie Heights unguarded, &c., &c., to concentrate his divisions for the defence of the town,' a very natural and proper measure, because it was evident that at the town the great contest was to take place; and because he no doubt considered, and probably justly, that the Allies were not in sufficient strength to detach any force adequate to make an effective impression in both directions, hampered as they were with all the works, batteries, and business of the siege, and that in the event (as occurred) of failure in the assaults on the place, they could not have retained their ground on the Mackenzie Heights.

"With reference to the historical value of his

observations, he hardly does justice to Omar Pacha and the Turks. It may be true that the Turkish troops were little to be dreaded in the open field, but by the defensive and prudent policy adopted by them at Silistria on the Danube, and at Kars, they were at times a formidable and very damaging enemy, and did not deserve the insulting terms of '*canaille*' and '*ce bon M. Omar Pacha*.

"It is stated that the force in front of Kertsch and under General Wrangel never exceeded 3,000 men, and this is treated as a kind of triumph, but on no grounds.

"The object of the occupation of Kertsch was not with a view to any immediate advance into the country, although it was a threatening basis for such a proceeding, if subsequently thought advisable; but, by retaining it defensively, to obtain command of the entrance into the sea of Azoff. General Vivian's force was chiefly composed of a new levy (the Turkish contingent) in progress of organization, and consequently unfit at that time, while it was also unprovided, for taking the field; every desirable object therefore was gained, and a most important

one it was, by the maintenance of their position. That they should have prepared themselves to resist 30,000 men, which is sneered at, is to their credit: there was no sacrifice made by their doing so, and it is a maxim in war, when time and means are available, always to make defensive measures doubly sure; and even supposing General Wrangel's force to have been *bonâ fide* only 3,000 men, who could say what reinforcements might not have joined him at any time for the temporary purpose of a specific attack upon Kertsch? And in the same way, as regards the weakness of places on the sea of Azoff, of which the 300 men of Arabat is given as a specimen; no troops were sent up that sea, nor was there any reason for the Allies to attempt to establish themselves on its shores: the operation was purely naval, and the flotilla employed did everything required of it, in interrupting communications and means of supply, by which it must have caused much inconvenience to the enemy.

"* * * * chimes in readily with what he is aware is a popular impression against the Allies, namely, that they should have stormed Sebastopol at once; and then somewhat unaccountably, just after it is stated that '*he would not admit for a*

moment that Sebastopol should have been abandoned,' followed by strong reasons.

"Now, the Russian army, after the battle of the Alma, retired rapidly on Sebastopol, where they appear to have remained entire till the 25th September, that is, for three or four days, during which time, had the Allies presented themselves before the place, they would have found the whole force collected there to oppose the assault, which he says they ought to have made the day after the battle of the Alma.

"Considering that there could not, at that time, have been any very great disparity in numerical forces, for the Russians had retired upon resources, and that the positions round Sebastopol were, by nature, exceedingly strong, the flanks of the defenders perfectly secure, while those of the Allies would be exposed in the greatest degree, it is an extraordinary falling off from his boldness on other occasions to say, that '*there was nothing to stop the Allies from marching into the town.*'

"But the circumstances of the Allies were such, that

they could not have accelerated their advance upon Sebastopol by much.

"On the 24th (the fourth day after the Alma) they crossed the Belbeck, and were, consequently, in front of the north side. The first question then is, whether they ought at that time to have attacked the north side by a *coup de main*.

"A look at the plan of the place will show how strong that front was: in extent about 2,400 yards, across a ridge of bold rocky heights, intersected by steep ravines, with a fort conspicuously situated on a commanding feature of the ground; the approach to the whole front subject to enfilade by heavy guns and the right of the position open in flank, and even in rear, not only to the fire of several men-of-war, including steamers in the harbour, but to the heights on the side of the town, as far as the valley of the Tchernaya; and defended by an *army* which, although recently defeated, was still very powerful, as it showed itself to be very shortly after.

"It could hardly be said that such a position was assailable by an army but little superior to the de-

fenders, with nothing but its field pieces in aid, and which had no retreat.

"To be sure it is said that '*these forts are not even now tenable, although they have been working at them for a year, and they never can be made so as they are commanded,*' all which is specious, but quite inapplicable to the question of immediate assault.

"In the first place, the expression of not being '*tenable*' is indefinite; a work which, left to itself, may be deemed untenable, may be of great importance and strength, when forming part of a defensive position, as in this case. The particular fort alluded to, although of a very inferior character as a permanent work, was revetted and flanked, and, at all times, superior to the Malakoff, Redan, or Mamelon, at their best, and they were found tenable enough, till after the most enormous siege operations.

"That '*they are not now tenable, although they have been working at them for a year, and they never can be made so as they are commanded,*' is the confession that they have been continuing to work for a year on an object that is unattainable, and not very compli-

mentary to the Russian engineers, nor to their commanding generals; but in this, in fact, introduced for the sake of criticising the Allies, he does not do justice to his own side.

"That they are '*commanded*,' must have peculiar reference to the sea batteries and forts, for, by using the plural number, they are all included; whereas, as regards the centre fort, which would have the principal influence on an assault, it clearly was not commanded in a sense bearing upon such an attack, even if it be partially so (which may, however, be doubted) against formal siege operations, and a cannonading from heavy guns.*

"On the 25th, the Allies commenced what has been called 'the flank march,' and just touched upon the baggage of a corps of the enemy, which apparently had left Sebastopol that morning, and was on its way to the interior, and which appeared, on a slight reconnaissance, to consist of from 15,000 to 18,000 men, from which it might be inferred that from

* Major Graham, of the Royal Engineers, who inspected these works after the peace, confirms the views of Sir John Burgoyne upon these points. The centre fort occupied a culminating point of the ridge, and was not commanded in any way.—EDITOR.

20,000 to 25,000 had been left in the place, including seamen from the fleet, who are known to be, in the Russian service, well drilled as soldiers, and able artillerymen; not only might this be inferred from appearances, but would seem to be a natural arrangement, as the best chance of saving so important a place—an object the magnitude of which is confirmed by the expressions of * * * *. But he says, '*after reaching Balaklava, the Allies ought to have marched straight into the town, where there was nothing to stop them.*'

"Now we will see of what this *nothing* consisted.

"1. A series of very strong positions, whose flanks were perfectly secure round a common centre (the town), from which each was easily accessible, and the mutual communication not difficult; whereas, the attacks were to be from a much more extended and diverging circumference, which was broken by deep and, in part, almost impracticable ravines, some of the most important of which were raked by men-of-war in the harbour.

"2. These positions were greatly strengthened in

parts by old line walls, towers, and strong buildings, affording, even in their dilapidated state, formidable obstacles against a *coup de main*, and to them the enemy were adding earthern redoubts on the most influential points, and on which, even then, some heavy guns were mounted.

"3. A garrison, or rather a *corps d'armée*, as above described, to defend these positions.

"4. The attack to be made by an army of no very great superiority of strength to the aggregate amount of that of the Russians, to be supported only by field artillery of a peculiarly light nature, and without any retreat in case of a reverse.

"That such a garrison was in the place (the other advantages for defence being indisputable) cannot be doubted from the circumstances above mentioned, and from the firmness and activity shown by the garrison on our appearance.

"The immense importance of preventing the capture Sebastopol was such, and the means so manifestly available, that it would totally belie the character of the Russians for the firmness which they uni-

formly displayed, and the principles of which are so strongly enforced by * * * * himself, not to feel assured that they acted up to it on that occasion, and with far greater prospects of success, than during many other emergencies in which they were placed. This display of contempt for the want of energy on the part of the Allies in not at once entering the town, '*which there was nothing to prevent,*' must be therefore clearly imputed to the desire of * * * * to depreciate the conduct of the Allies, not perceiving that in doing so, he is greatly impeaching that of his own side.

"'*After the fall of the south side,*' * * * * says, '*an advance in force from Eupatoria, or the Katcha, would have put the Russian general in great difficulty.*' Any such advance in force, however, would have been by a widely-dispersed system and unconnected attacks, and would have given the enemy all the known advantages of a central position, from which he might have concentrated his forces to act against any one corps as he pleased, with the additional advantage of very strong positions of defence against that part which he might have to keep in check, while he made his great effort on any other.

"Such wide movements would be most dangerous, and precisely reverse the admirable manœuvres that a study of the campaigns of Frederick the Great and Napoleon Buonaparte, in Italy, show to have been the cause of their successes. Nor would it be considered a case for taking great liberties, when the very preceding paragraph mentions coolly having received, about the same period, a reinforcement *of* 30,000 *grenadiers.*

"Independent, however, of those considerations, there were other difficulties in the way of these particular operations.

"An advance from Eupatoria into the interior would have been over a country without resources, and, it is believed, without even water for any considerable body of men and animals; and if by an advance from the Katcha is meant a new landing there, in the very face of the enemy, such an attempt would have been too wild for a moment's consideration, as it would have been defeated with much loss by any small corps detached for the purpose.

"The occupation of Eupatoria by Omar Pacha and

his Turks, and that of Kertsch by General Vivian's corps, bodies well adapted to the objects of retaining those threatening and somewhat harassing positions, while they were not the best for manœuvring in the field, were judicious measures, and were all that could reasonably be applied at the time.

"But he adds, if the advances, which he assumes might have been made from Eupatoria or the Katcha, would have been so damaging to the enemy after the fall of Sebastopol, '*how much more so would they have been if they had been made while they were compelled to hold the town.*'

"But he seems to forget that while the enemy were compelled to hold the town, the Allies were compelled to hold their trenches and batteries, and to present a powerful front towards the town, which occasioned a more urgent need for keeping their forces together.

"On the whole, it has always appeared to me, that the true course for the Allies was, as early as possible after the fall of the town, to have concentrated their forces along the Tchernaya, with their right on the

sea in front of Balaklava, and from thence to have made advances upon the enemy. The army was large, and from a central position could have made their attacks where they found them most advantageous, all their resources at hand, and with a power of affording to any part ready mutual support.

"It is said that the enemy's position was very strong; it was, however, at the same time, very extensive, and they could not have had the force to guard it all effectively. Indeed it is so admitted, and credit is taken for having on one occasion checked the advance of the French by a display of a force which it seems clear could not have been available in many parts at the same time."

The Allies, as we say, hastened away from the place they had fought a battle to get at, and were marching round it, while Prince Menschikoff, in order to save it, was marching away from it. We were now in front of Balaklava. In his account of the defence of the old Genoese Fort, the Russian general has been misled by the Greek heroes of the garrison. To their excited imaginations it appeared they were bombarded by twenty men-of-war, and that they made a most

desperate resistance to the whole British fleet and army. There were 110 of the Greek battalion, commanded by Makaroff and Manto, in the fort, who fired feebly out of their little mortars, and scarcely ventured to pull a trigger. Yet Todleben says that when they surrendered there were only six officers and sixty men, all covered with many wounds! Those who were there saw a very different state of things, and good Colonel Manto will scarcely be more surprised than his friends are to find his name embalmed in the pages of Todleben as that of a blood-stained hero. The Allies were now on the south side, safely established in communication with the fleet, and with a harbour and base of operations. They had avoided the north side because they did not like the look of the place. They found the look of the south side was not much more attractive. Let us go over, side by side with Todleben himself, each of the works and all the means of resistance which would have been presented to the enemy, had they attacked at once, in the hope that the task will not try the patience of our readers too severely. The defences had been planned to meet an enemy landing from the sea creeks on the south, and to cover the west and south-west. Commencing on the left, we

find that Bastion No. 6 (Quarantine), the most important of all, was armed with 16 guns. The crenellated wall to Bastion No. 5 (Central) was armed with 11 guns of small calibre. The Schwartz Redoubt was armed with 12 guns. Between it and Bastion No. 4 (du Mât) some barricades were erected which contained 14 field-pieces and light guns. The Bastion du Mât was armed with 17 guns, next to which was the Gribock Battery with 2 carronades. Four barricades closing the space at the bottom of the Peressep up to the height on the right flank of the Redan were armed with 14 12-pounder carronades. On the site of the Redan was a battery of 7 short 18-pounder guns. A barricade armed with 3 shell 10-pounder guns closed the proper left flank of the Redan, and next to it was the Hospital Battery, armed with 6 18-pounder carronades. The Malakoff Tower on the next height was twenty-eight feet high, had walls five feet thick, and a glacis six feet deep. On its right was a battery on the site of the intended Bastion No. 2, armed with 6 18-pounder and 24-pounder guns, and a battery on the site of No. 1 Bastion was armed with 4 carronades, to which we have only to add the 9 shell guns in the rear and the barricades extending from the hospital to the

docks, to complete the list of guns and defences. These works were all weak. The total number of guns available for the defence on the south side was 145 pieces, which were spread over a space of nearly five miles.

To these were added 27 guns in different places, after the news of the loss of the Alma. The only part of the whole line capable of resisting an assault was at the 6th and 7th Bastions. Field-works of the feeblest profile, the open spaces and unfinished works armed with light guns, were all that could be said to defend a city, garrisoned by only 16,000 men and 32 field guns. Neither the exultation of the troops nor their resolution to fight to the last extremity could have saved Sebastopol, if the enemy had attacked it immediately after the passage of the Tchernaya. To this Sir John Burgoyne, in the work already quoted, says there was a series of very strong positions much strengthened by walls, towers, and strong buildings, with a *corps d'armée* to defend it, almost equal to the assailants, who had only field artillery.

Let us now see what the Russians did on the south side whilst we were waiting. Previous to the 14th of

September, the armament of the works on the line of defence from Careening Bay to the sea consisted, as we have seen, of 145 guns, many of which were carronades and pieces of twenty-four, eighteen, and twelve pounds. On the 27th of September, when the Allies made their appearance, there were 16,000 men and 32 guns on the south side, there were 3,500 men on the north side, and 3,000 sailors on board the ships. Todleben, availing himself of the delay which took place on the part of the Allies, proceeded to fortify the place. The principle on which he proceeded, was to occupy the least extended position, and the nearest to the city, which would satisfy the necessary conditions, to arm the principal points of the line so selected with the most formidable artillery which could be procured from the fleet, to connect those points with trenches for musketry, and to enable the separate batteries to concentrate a powerful fire on the front and flanks, to sweep the sinuosities of the ground as much as possible. One obstacle to the choice of the best line was presented by the works already constructed, to the line of which he was obliged to conform, as there was no time to rectify the errors in trace which they presented. The besieged had only time to throw up the soft earth, as they could not excavate the rock,

and the guns were put in position before the batteries were ready to receive them. Men, women, and children, laboured at the defences. Even the convicts and felons took their share. It was rarely they could dig as deep as two-and-a-half feet, without coming on the stony subsoil.

The following instructions were issued for the guidance of the commanders on the different sections :—

"In case of the enemy advancing on Sebastopol, each commander on the line must adopt the following measures :—

"1. Concentrate his troops and move the reserves towards the points threatened with an attack, striving, at the same time, so to dispose the troops that they might be sheltered as much as possible from the fire of the enemy's artillery.

"2. Order the artillery to open fire with round shot and shells at a distance at which it can effectively tell upon the enemy, and on his coming within grape-shot range, to fire as rapidly as possible. That the fire of the artillery might be sure to pace the ground beforehand, and mark out the distances of the sur-

rounding objects on the ground in front of the batteries, as well as the range of the grape.

"3. The infantry, thickly dispersed along the trenches in two or more files, must keep up a rapid fire from a distance of 200 yards. The first to fire through the loopholes, the others to charge and hand the muskets.

"4. If the enemy should succeed in breaking through our trenches at any point, the battalions, in columns of attack, are to meet him with the bayonet. At the same time, the scattered companies are to form rapidly in columns of companies, and also to fall on him with the bayonet. The artillerymen are to collect in groups on their batteries, and to defend their guns at the point of the bayonet.*

"5. On the repulse of the assault on no account to follow the enemy beyond the line of our intrenchments, so as not to hinder the fire of our artillery and infantry.

"The companies formed for the bayonet attack will

* The greater part of the artillerymen consisted of sailors armed with muskets.

again disperse and direct a powerful musketry fire on the enemy. The artillery will follow him with grape-shot, and then with round shot and shells."

On the 2nd of October Prince Menschikoff inspected the line of defence. The English on the same day were establishing a camp on the heights extending from the Sarandinaki ravine to the declivities of Mount Sapoun. The 3rd and 4th bastions, the Malakoff, Mamelon, and the steamer 'Vladimir,' stationed in the Careening Bay, opened fire on them, compelling the English to retire further back.

On the 30th of September, to the inexpressible joy of the garrison, Prince Menschikoff appeared with his army on the north side, and next day the troops for the defence received reinforcements of 8,000 men, field guns, and Cossacks. Column after column streamed into the Crimea, and each day the garrison was strengthened by accessions from the army, till on the 5th of October there were 32,000 men ready to receive the assault of the Allies. Todleben, however, thinks that the assault could scarcely fail to have been successful. He applies himself to show that the chances were, the Allies would certainly get possession of some

part or other of the lines, as the Russians were so placed that they could not concentrate more than 2,500 to oppose the storming columns, and he demonstrates that the occupation of any one would have been fatal to the besieged. The Allies, too, could have distracted the garrison by false attacks, and burst in on the real point of assault. They could have assaulted just at daybreak, before the artillery of the place could make them out and disorganize their columns. Again and again the Russian engineer insists that success was quite certain.

Korniloff, riding round the line of defence with his staff at least once a day, personally watched over the progress of the engineering works, the strict fulfilment of the outpost duty, the order in the distribution of the troops; and at night, on the least alarm or firing, he instantly appeared on the line. He always conversed with the soldiers, endeavouring to sustain their energy, and to impress on them the idea of the absolute necessity of fighting to the last extremity.

On one occasion, turning to the Moscow Regiment, he said: "Men of the Moscow Regiment, you are here on the frontiers of Russia; you are defending a pre-

'cious corner of the Russian Empire. The Czar and all Russia have their eyes upon you. If you do not fulfil your duty to the utmost, Moscow will not receive you as her sons."

Such words from Korniloff produced a deep impression on the soldiers; for, from his energetic disposition, he had already gained their confidence.

By their indecision, the Allies had lost the most favourable opportunity of attacking Sebastopol. A few days more delay gave the Russians such an advantage that they began to breathe freely. The dark hour was overpast. The enemy, indeed, was at hand, but so dubious, slow, and uncertain were his movements, that when the first signs of his purpose were made manifest, in the shape of certain lines which grew up by night in the clay soil, those trenches which were to grow into batteries, were at first supposed by the Russians to be defensive works, covering the front of the allied armies. Their generals "poked about" in front of the place. Mr. Kinglake tells us Lord Raglan disliked to disturb his mind by plans. St. Arnaud was dead. Canrobert his successor was not a man who liked to disturb his mind by anything

in particular except fighting. The result of the remote examinations of the Russian works which the allied generals made was the begetting of an idea that it would be imprudent to make an assault till the works had been bombarded. Todleben evidently thinks that if the reconnaissances had been closely pushed and properly made they would have arrived at a very different conclusion. The garrison, wasted and worn and anxious, waited hour after hour for the supreme moment, scarcely daring to hope for more than a creditable defence. With joy inexpressible they saw one fine morning long lines of earth which unmistakably revealed the purpose of the Allies. They were going to besiege Sebastopol. Here was, indeed, a hope of safety—nay, more, a guarantee of success. From the front occupied by the French engineers, the Russians calculated that they were to be attacked by forty guns.

The Russians immediately resolved to overwhelm their fire by the weight of metal, and while the Allies, working with great slowness, laboured to throw up their batteries, the Russians, confident that if they could only resist the first attack, they must receive powerful reinforcements, exerted themselves to the

utmost. On the 2nd of October the guns in position had been increased to no less than 341, of which 216 were heavy pieces lately mounted. Todleben says:—

"The night of the 9th to 10th of October was dark and gloomy. The French, taking advantage of this, laid a trench of about 470 yards in length on Mount Rodolph, at a distance of 1,050 yards from the 5th bastion. The progress of this work was entirely unknown to us. A fresh wind, which blew during the whole night in a direction from the town, contributed to keep the enemy's proceedings a secret from us; so that it was only at dawn we became aware of them. It may easily be imagined what a joyful impression this sight produced on every one who was acquainted with siege operations.

"It now became evident to us that the Allies had rejected the idea of an immediate assault, and that they intended first to establish batteries for the purpose of dismounting our artillery: thus we could gain a few days more.

"All in Sebastopol congratulated each other on this circumstance; all saw in it an important guarantee that the town might yet be saved.

"We immediately proceeded to strengthen our artillery on that part of the line of defence which faced the French trenches, as it was evident enough that the enemy intended to erect batteries there.

"Judging by the extent of the work, about 40 guns could be placed in it. On our side measures were immediately taken to oppose a superior artillery to the enemy's batteries, and for that purpose it was resolved to pierce embrasures in the 4th, 5th, and 6th bastions towards the enemy's trench, while favourable positions were chosen for the construction of new batteries.

"To support the right face of the 4th bastion, from which only 8 guns could be brought to bear against the siege works, while the 4 pieces nearest to the salient, were left to sweep the plateau in front of the bastion, two new batteries were to be erected: the one, No. 22 (Ivashkin's), for 6 guns, at the right flank of the 4th bastion in the adjacent trench, and the other, No. 23 (Lazareff's), for 4 guns, behind this bastion, to the right of the barracks.

"To strengthen the 5th bastion, the breastwork at

its left flank was converted into two batteries: No. 24 (Boortsoff's), and No. 25 (Titoff's).

"On an eminence, at a distance of 230 yards in front of the 6th bastion, was constructed the counter-approach battery No. 26 (Shèmiakin's), consisting of two faces, each for 3 guns; the left face was to enfilade the right return of the French trench and command the Cemetery ravine, while the left overlooked the slopes between Rodolph's Farm and the Quarantine Bay.

"That the left face of the 4th bastion might not be enfiladed from the Rudolph Hill, we began to erect traverses on it, each for sheltering 2 guns. At the same time arrangements were made for placing heavy mortars and shell guns on the line of defence.

"The latter were to be taken from the Nicholas battery and the ships of the line, the 'Grand Duke Constantine' and 'Khrabri.' Special detachments were organized to extinguish fires on the batteries, and in order that the gunners might not be wearied by being constantly at their pieces, they were appointed to do duty at the guns by turns.

"The whole day and night the fire of our artillery was directed on the French trenches, and in places did considerable damage and overset the gabions.

"In spite of this, on the following day {the 29*th of September* / 11th of October,} the thickening of the embankment of their trench showed us that the French were beginning to construct five batteries in it. The English had also during that night, opened a semi-circular trench on the top of the Green Hill, on the other side of Shebedeff's Farm, at a distance of 1,400 yards from the 3rd, and 1,635 yards from the 4th bastion.

"The English battery first observed on the heights at Mikriukoff's Farm, on the left side of the Careening ravine, seemed to be already finished; five embrasures could be plainly distinguished in it, whence it received among us the name of the Five-eyed Battery (Piatiglazaia).

"To increase our fire against the English trench on the Green Hill battery, No. 20 (Shikhmatoff's), behind the 4th bastion, was lengthened for 4 guns more, so that its armament now consisted of 6 guns,

while on the right face of the 3rd bastion, the 18-pound guns were exchanged for 36-pounders.

"To protect the left face of the 3rd bastion and the right face of the 4th against an enfilading fire from the Green Hill, traverses were constructed between every 2 guns.

"Meanwhile, the batteries commenced the day before on the right flank of the 4th, the left flank of the 5th, and the counter-approach in front of the 6th bastion, were almost finished and partly armed.

"Our artillery continued to fire occasionally a few shots on the enemy's works; and the sharpshooters, dispersed in front of the line of defence, concealing themselves in pits and behind stones, evidently caused considerable annoyance to the enemy.

In the day time, a detachment consisting of the 2nd Battalion of the Taroutino Regiment, numbering 760 men, with 10 sappers and 24 sharpshooters, under the command of Captain Goreff, was ordered to destroy the slaughter-house on the spur between the Boulevard and Sarandinaki ravines. In the night another detachment, under the command of Captain Skorobogatoff, consisting of the 38th Battalion of

sailors, the 2nd landing Battalion, and 100 Sappers, was sent to demolish the buildings on the Green Hill. An officer of the Sappers, accompanying this detachment, observed by the moonlight the tracing of a redoubt; and supposing that it had been done by the English, sketched a detailed plan of it. It proved, however, to be one of our own, which had been traced by Lieut-Colonel Todleben before the landing of the Allies.

"During the night of {*30th of September* / 12th of October} the English opened a new trench, about 350 yards in length, on the Woronzoff Hill, between the Laboratory and Dockyard ravine, on this side the Woronzoff road, at 1,400 yards from the 3rd bastion. Its left portion faced that bastion, and its right the Malakoff Mamelon. In the trenches, on the Green and Rodolph Hills, we could plainly distinguish the batteries that the enemy was raising.

"In order to strengthen our fire against the Woronzoff Heights, a new battery, No. 27 (Artukhoff's), for 4 guns, was commenced in the trench at the right flank of the 3rd bastion. This battery was also designed to command the slopes between the 3rd

bastion and the Laboratary ravine; these slopes not being at all protected by the artillery of the right face of the 3rd bastion and battery No. 10 (Nikonoff's), at the Naval artillery barracks.

"With the same object, a Crémaillière battery, No. 28 (Stanislaffsky's), for 5 guns, was commenced at the right extremity of the Malakoff Mamelon, behind the battery on the right wing.

"On the same day the erection of a 4 gun battery, No. 19 (Krassoffky's), was commenced, it having been already traced on the height of the Oushakoff ravine on the { *24th of September.* / 6th of October.

"As the English works were at a great distance from us, it was impossible to observe them during the night, notwithstanding the moonlight and the vigilance of the advanced posts.

"Thus there now remained no doubt whatever that the Allies had decided on making no direct attack on Sebastopol, but preferred resorting to the slower process of constructing batteries, in order, first of all, to weaken or silence our artillery."

With a detailed account of the various changes and

improvements in the armament, and an abstract of the daily work up to the evening of the 16th, when the garrison saw the fleet laying down buoys, and perceived that the batteries were all ready for the next day's bombardment, the first part of the first volume of this elaborate work is brought to a close.

We have so far followed the Russian engineer very closely over the ground in his first volume; the second will not admit of such constant companionship. We have seen the movements of the Allies, the change in plan, if plan there was at all, in the mode of attack, and the diffusion of such strength, quite adequate for a *coup de main*, into the devious channels of the trenches and toilsome operations of a siege—and such a siege! The calculations of French and English engineers must have been made in ignorance of every fact connected with Sebastopol. They set to work as if they thought the Russians must remain idle. One of the reasons assigned for not attacking the place was that there was a large covering army. Was it not certain a portion of that army, having free access to the town would be available to work at the fortifications and to garrison the place? Large men-of-war had been sunk, others were moored in harbour

—would not their guns be made available, and become more formidable in the earthworks, which rose much faster than our own, than they were on board the ships? Was not the attack of the Allies directed against Sebastopol because it was, among other things, a vast arsenal? With guns, powder, ammunition, and the soldiers, sailors, and labourers at hand, what earthly reason was there for supposing the Russians would not maintain in a siege the relative superiority in all those particulars which prevented our assaulting them till we had tried a bombardment? The Allies had a siege-train manifestly little heavier than the main-deck guns of three or four of the line-of-battle ships. But the engineers prevailed, and they challenged the Russians to meet them in the trenches. The principle on which Todleben acted was to watch the works of the enemy, and to establish against them on every point a superiority of fire, by multiplying the number and increasing the calibre of his guns. Nevertheless, the fire of the Allies, principally of the English, at the great bombardment on the 17th of October, caused terrible losses to the troops destined to resist the assault.

The embrasures were filled up by the loose earth

of the parapets which fell down from the fire of the pieces behind them, the revetments crumbled away—those made of sacks and planks caught fire from the guns' muzzles and fell in. Through the thick smoke, again and again, the Russians fancied they saw columns advancing to the assault, and opened with grape on the imaginary enemy.

Suddenly, at half-past nine in the morning, one of the French magazines blew up. In half-an-hour afterwards a second magazine exploded in the French trenches. Gradually the French fire became weaker. At half-past ten it ceased all along their line. Such was not the result of the Russian contest with the English batteries. Let us be proud of Todleben's admission that our artillery was not long in establishing a great relative superiority. The Redan and Malakoff suffered above all. In the latter, Korniloff, the soul of the defence, received his mortal wound. By the explosion of a magazine, caused by our fire, the whole of the salient of the Redan was thrown into the ditch, with more than a hundred men. The Russians there, at all events, only waited for the assault. Only 2 guns remained intact out of the 22 with which the work was armed, and there were

only 5 artillerymen left, who fired these guns at rare intervals. The fire of the allied fleet that day produced but little effect, although they had 1,244 guns in broadside against the 152 with which the Russian works were armed. It was from that fleet, however, arose the cry, "For God's sake, keep out the shells." And, in fact, the men inside stone and earth had the best of the men inside the wood, and the Russians lost only an eighth of the number killed and wounded in the allied fleet. In estimating the number of guns in the Russian trenches and the allied trenches, General de Todleben seems to us to leave out of account the guns on board the two-deckers and the steamers, which made very considerable play on our works that day. The Russians lost 1,112 men on the 17th of October, of whom more than one-half were put *hors de combat* in the section of works in front of the English. The latter lost only 144; the French lost 204. The general conclusion at which De Todleben arrives is, that the object of the allied bombardment having been to dismount the Russian artillery and prepare the way for an assault, it was only the English batteries which obtained a complete success in annihilating the enemy's works and guns, but that such a partial success altogether

answered the end in view, and that after the Allies had obtained it they ought to have assaulted under cover of the smoke, and have advanced before the Russians could have come out of cover to resist them. The ditch was filled, the parapet beaten down, and the Russians could only have collected 8,000 men to resist our taking the Karabelnaia.

"This partial success responded fully to the object which the Allies had in view; after having achieved it, they ought to have immediately ordered the assault on the 3rd bastion. Taking advantage of the smoke which masked the ground, they might, with impunity, have pushed forward their attacking columns and have occupied the summit of the 3rd bastion before our troops, obliged momentarily to fall back towards the Naval Hospital and behind the steep coast of the South Bay, could have arrived in sufficient numbers on the point attacked. The Allies would probably not have met with any material difficulty in taking the 3rd bastion; the moat was filled up, the parapet razed—there was not on this point any obstacle, either natural or artificial. After having occupied the summit of the 3rd bastion in superior numbers, and driven back our advanced troops, who could not have

been concentrated except upon a ground quite unprotected and most unfavourable to us, the enemy would have taken up a position more advantageous than ours, as our soldiers, to retake the bastion, would have had to concentrate on the sloping ground, with the Southern Bay in their back."

As they did not profit by this favourable occasion to make the assault, it is evident that all their preparations and hopes of speedy victory were doomed to have no result. By a natural reaction, the disappointment which followed was severe. The Allies discovered that the measures they had taken were not sufficient to overcome the strength of a defence which developed itself with as much perseverance as energy. Let us see how the Russians worked:—

"It was determined that not only on the following day no traces of the bombardment should be visible, but that a more imposing force than before should appear, so as to upset, on the very first day, all the calculations of the enemy. During that night attention was especially given to the re-establishment of the 3rd bastion, which had been nearly annihilated. The most prodigious activity was displayed upon this

point; guns and gun-carriages were dug up, platforms were reconstructed, pieces of artillery were conveyed to the bastion and placed in position, while that portion of the bastion which had been destroyed by the explosion was cleared of the rubbish; the embrasures were traced and cleared, the moat which had been filled up was cleaned out and powder magazines established. It is due alone to the unexampled zeal of all the troops of the garrison that the bastion was restored to its normal state in such guise that in the morning it was quite ready to reply to the English batteries. The armament of the bastion now consisted of nineteen pieces of artillery. The armament on the right front, destined to keep in check the powerful English batteries established upon the Green Hill, had been notably strengthened as regards calibre. With the same object, that is to say, to strengthen the fire directed against the batteries on the Green Hill, all the guns dismounted from battery No. 5 (Nikonoff), and from the left face of bastion 4, were replaced by new pieces of heavier calibre and of longer range. The damages along the whole line of defence were also made good, and the number of traverses was increased on the front of the 3rd and 4th bastions, which were exposed to a flank fire from the enemy's

batteries. Thus, on the very morning of the following day we were prepared to repel the enemy's attacks with still greater vigour than on the preceding day."

The French had no reason to complain of their Allies at the first bombardment, at all events. So far as we know, their Allies never imputed blame to the French for their conspicuous failure, and expressed no feeling but that of regret for a common misfortune. Next day, when the English opened a tremendous cannonade, the French were silent; but the English did not obtain so decisive a result as on the first day. When the French ventured to unmask their pieces on the 19th—

"Our artillery established its superiority over the French artillery. The artillery of the 5th bastion caused explosions in the French batteries Nos. 6 and 7; battery No. 5 was obliged to stop firing about ten a.m., and all the other batteries were reduced to silence about three p.m."

The Russians worked on, adding guns to the existing batteries and creating new ones, so that each morning was marked by some unexpected ricochet,

or direct shot or shell into trench and battery. In the record before us every day's, or rather every night's, labour is stated in detail, and the damage done each day is indicated, but all we gather from it is, that the defence was rapidly asserting a superiority over the attack, and that, in other words, "the more the Allies looked at Sebastopol the less they would like it." On the 24th of October the French sharpshooters, for the first time, began to make the enemy feel the effects of the rifle fire, from which they were doomed to suffer so much. It became necessary for the besieged to organize advanced posts:—

"These posts were occupied by Cossack riflemen, who from their special services in the wars in the Kouban and against the Caucasian mountaineers, had acquired great skill in watching an enemy. Each post in ambuscade comprised a sapper to keep an ear to the enemy's workings, and a sailor taken from our gunners to watch the efficiency and precision of our fire. These measures responded to the object in view. On the first intimation sent from the posts they were withdrawn, and a heavy fire of grape and musketry was opened against the point

indicated by our outposts, near the upper portion of the ravine of the town. The cannonade and musketry only lasted for a quarter of an hour, and when they ceased, the men were again sent back to their former positions."

Every step was taken to economize ammunition, projectiles, and food, and to secure the health of the garrison; and the details of those measures show that under the Russian system men are educated who are not inferior in administrative capacity even to the free, self-reliant Briton. As it was now evident that the Allies had abandoned any intention of assault, and were about to undertake a regular siege, it became important to strengthen the Russian army in the Crimea sufficiently to enable it to operate against the besiegers from outside the city. The Allies had received reinforcements which raised their strength on the 18th of October to 85,000 men. Between the 19th of September and the 22nd of October the Russians received 24 Battalions, 8 Squadrons, 56 guns, and 12 sotnias of Cossacks; but Menschikoff had been obliged to send 31 Battalions and 28 guns to strengthen the garrison, so that he could not well carry out any offensive operations till he was well

assured of an increase to his army. These, however, were rapidly arriving, and on the 22nd of October Prince Menschikoff organized the corps of Tchorgoune under Lieut.-General Liprandi, consisting of 17 Battalions, 20 Squadrons, 64 guns, a total of 18,354 men on paper, which was not more than 16,000 men effective. Having occupied Tchorgoune on the 14th of October, General Prince Menschikoff made several reconnaissances of the English position before Balaklava, and the Russian General resolved to attack it on the morning of the 25th of October.

"The unskilful measures taken by the English Commander-in-Chief naturally could not fail to contribute to the success of the Russian arms. Lord Raglan had, in fact, established a vast entrenched camp, which was by no means in proportion with the number of his troops, destined at the same time to carry on the siege of Sebastopol, to cover the ridge of hills between Inkerman and Balaklava, and finally to defend the latter town itself."

The attack was made in three columns. The column of the left, under General-Major de Gribbé, consisting of 3¼ Battalions, 4 Squadrons, 1 sotnia, and 10 guns issuing from Baidar, was to occupy Komari;

the column of the centre, under General-Major Semiakine, intended to take the heights on which our camp was pitched, was to take the road to Kadikoi. It was divided into two corps, one on the left, under Semiakine in person, of 5¼ Battalions and 10 guns, that of the left under General-Major Levoutzky, of 3 Battalions and 8 guns. The column of the right, under Colonel Scudéry, was composed of 4¼ Battalions and 8 guns, and 3 sotnias, and was to act against Redoubt No. 3, occupied by the Turks. Sixteen squadrons, 6 sotnias, and 2 horse batteries, were to cross the Tchernaya and form in columns of attack to wait Liprandi's orders. One Battalion of the Light Infantry Regiment of the Ukraine, one company of the 4th Battalion of Tirailleurs, and Battery No. 8 formed the reserve. A detachment, under General-Major Jabokritsky, of 7¾ Battalions, 2 Squadrons, 2 sotnias, and 14 guns, covered the right flank of the corps operating from Tchorgoune. This is Todleben's account of the Battle of Balaklava:—

"At five o'clock on the 25th of October, in obedience to the order given the preceding day, the troops of the detachment of Tchernaya began to march towards the Redoubts. General-Major Levoutzky,

having approached the heights of Kadikoi, advanced his artillery and opened fire on Redoubts No. 1 and No. 2. General-Major Gribbé, marching on Komari, drove out the enemy's advanced posts and established himself there. A sotnia of Cossacks, which had been despatched along the road which led to Baidon, at once occupied St. John's Chapel. After this first success he established his artillery on the heights, and opened a cannonade against Redoubt No. 1. By the occupation of Komari our left flank was protected from the attacks of the enemy, General Semiakine, following Levoutzky's column, and, protected by the fire of the artillery and a line of skirmishers, advanced rapidly and took up his ground on the left of the column. Having arrived at 150 paces from the hillock on which Redoubt No. 1 was placed, he ordered the Regiment of Azoff to begin the attack. Notwithstanding the obstinate resistance of the Turks who held the redoubt, it was carried by assault, and at half-past seven a.m. the Regiment of Azoff planted its standards upon it. The camp and three pieces of artillery fell into our hands. Struck by the brilliant attack executed by our troops against the principal hill, and by the rapid occupation which was the result, and perceiving also the bat-

talions of the Regiment of Ouglitch which advanced towards Redoubts Nos. 2 and 3, the Turks charged with the defence of the works abandoned them, leaving five guns, which fell into our hands. Meanwhile the Light Infantry Regiment of Odessa advanced with eight guns against Redoubt No. 4. But the enemy, terrified by our success, did not want to fight at that point either. Abandoning the three pieces of artillery which defended the redoubt, the Turks retired towards Kadikoi. Besides the eleven guns we found also in the intrenchments tents, powder, and pioneers' tools, which the enemy had left. The Redoubt No. 4, which was situated too much in front, was at once levelled, the guns which remained were spiked, the wheels of the carriages broken, and the pieces thrown down the hill. After this expedition, the Regiment of Odessa came with eight guns to join the right wing of the line of battle. The cannonade which sounded through the hills of Balaklava was heard in the allied camp, and created an alarm. At the first news of the Russian attack, the garrison of Balaklava got under arms. The English and French troops which occupied the town ranged themselves in order of battle between the fortifications of Balaklava and the ad-

vanced redoubts halfway between them. The Turks retreated in the same direction, and placed themselves on the right of the English. The Division Bosquet, on learning the attack of the Russians, took up a position on the slope of Mount Sapoune, with its left flank resting on the telegraph of the Woronzow railroad. At the same time the batteries of the line of circumvallation opened fire. Lord Raglan sent immediately to find the 1st and 4th Divisions. While awaiting their arrival, he ordered Cardigan's Brigade to proceed towards the heights on which the redoubts were established, and Scarlett's Brigade to mass on the left of the 93rd Highlanders. General Canrobert also arrived in all haste on the field of battle. Perceiving the Russian standards on the redoubts, he at once ordered the cavalry and the Brigades Espinasse and Vinoy to march. The first, forming in line of columns, took up a position on the slope of Mount Sapoune, to the right of the Division Bosquet, and the second placed itself to the left of Kadikoi, parallel to the road to Kamiche. The division of Turks and the cavalry of D'Allonville occupied the space between the Brigades Espinasse and Vinoy. After the capture of the redoubts, General Liprandi advanced the Brigade of Hussars, nine sotnias of

Cossacks, and two horse artillery troops on the slope of hills looking towards the enemy's camp, and ordered General-Major Rijow to make an attempt to destroy the park of artillery placed near Kadikoi. The two horse batteries, and the Light Battery No. 12, and the Battery of Position No. 3 of the division advanced rapidly, took up a position, and opened fire. Immediately afterwards six squadrons of hussars of the Grand Duke of Saxe Weimar, and 3 sotnias of Don Cossacks, charged the 93rd Highlanders, while eight squadrons of the hussars of the Duke of Leuchtenberg and the Cossacks of Oural advanced to the right against Scarlett's Brigade. The Highlanders, having allowed our hussars to approach within musket shot, received their attack by a fire of grape and many salvoes of musketry. Our hussars, nevertheless, penetrated as far as the park of the enemy placed in the middle of the camp, and intrenched with ditches.* In face of this unexpected obstacle our hussars, as well as our Cossacks, already tried by a cross-fire of the enemy, were obliged to retire. At this moment the hussars of the Duke of Leuchtenberg and the Oural Cossacks, met by a charge of the English Dragoons and the grape of a troop of horse artillery of Scarlett's Bri-

* This statement is incorrect.

gade, were also compelled to retreat. All our cavalry fell back to re-form its ranks behind the right wing of our line of battle. Scarlett, encouraged by his first success, tried to pursue our hussars, but having fallen between the cross fire of our batteries placed near the redoubts No. 2 and 3, he suffered great loss,* and, forced to retire, came to take ground on the left flank of Cardigan's Brigade, which had taken up a position at the foot of Mount Sapoune. It was at that moment General-Major Jabokritsky arrived, and advancing his artillery, drew up on the Fediukhine Heights. At ten o'clock, at the same time that General Jabokritsky appeared, the English also began to receive their reinforcements—the Division of the Duke of Cambridge and the French cavalry. The English Division placed itself on the left flank of the 93rd Highlanders, forming an angle with it. The French cavalry placed itself on the left of the English cavalry. Half an hour later arrived the Division Cathcart, which massed itself in the left rear of the English infantry, and soon afterwards appeared the Brigade Espinasse, which occupied the ground near Redoubt No. 5. The Brigade Vinoy was also directed towards the same point. During this period our

* This statement is incorrect.

cavalry continued to re-form behind the left wing of the infantry. Four squadrons of the combined Regiment of Lancers on the left wing were sent to the right wing. Towards noon Lord Raglan thought he saw that the Russians had an intention to retire, and that they were taking with them the artillery they had taken. He sent, in consequence, to Earl Lucan, who commanded the English cavalry, an order to advance and to seize the heights. The Division Cathcart was to support Earl Lucan. But this last officer made no haste to execute this order. About twelve o'clock, however, he received a letter from the Quartermaster-General Airey, in which the latter repeated the order to advance to pursue the Russians, and to prevent them, as far as possible, from carrying away the guns they had taken in the redoubt. A troop of horse artillery was to support the movement. After this reiterated order, and the injunction to execute it immediately, Lucan commanded Cardigan to deploy the cavalry in two lines. Cardigan in turn showed some slowness in the execution of the order, but at last he commenced to deploy his cavalry, taking care to place in the first line two squadrons of dragoons and two of lancers, and in the second line two squadrons of dra-

goons and two of hussars. One squadron of hussars was left in reserve. Scarcely had our cavalry succeeded in re-forming, when the English cavalry issued from behind the hill which had concealed it from our sight. Without stopping for the well-directed fire of eight guns of the light battery No. 7, and of the artillery of General-Major Jabokritsky, or that of the riflemen of the Regiment of Odessa, and of a company of the Battalion of Rifles, Cardigan dashed at the battery of Don Cossacks, which was in front, cut down the gunners, then charged our cavalry, overthrew it, and swept on as far as the line of the redoubts in pursuit of our horse, which 'fled towards Tchorgoune.' But this brilliant charge of the English cavalry had no decisive advantage on the fortune of the day, and cost the English dear. While their cavalry charged the battery, the Cossacks attacked them on the flank, but were overthrown by a squadron of the 8th Hussars, which had been left in reserve. However, at the same time, three squadrons of the combined regiment of Lancers were placed in such a manner as to be able to attack the enemy in flank once more. Meanwhile, the English cavalry, drawn along by the dash of its first success, went in hot pursuit of our cavalry, but, at the moment when

it least expected to be attacked, the three squadrons of the combined Regiment of Lancers, of which we have spoken, rushed on its left flank. The manœuvre had a decided success. The English cavalry, stopped in pursuit, was '*ecrasé*.' Unexpectedly attacked in flank, finding itself at the same time under a cross-fire of artillery and musketry, it broke its ranks, turned, and, pursued by our Lancers and the fire of our batteries, was plunged into total rout. The field of battle was strewn with the dead bodies of men and horses. The defeat of Cardigan's Brigade made such an impression on the enemy, that Scarlett's Brigade, which advanced to sustain it, suddenly suspended the movement and wheeled round.* To alleviate in some degree the disastrous retreat of the English, two squadrons of Chasseurs threw themselves on the detachment of Major-General Gribbé, swept along the line of our skirmishers, turned the left flank of the battery of position which enfiladed the squadrons of Cardigan, and began to sabre the gunners. These two squadrons were about to be followed by others.† To check them 2 Battalions of the Wladimir Regiment advanced rapidly to the

* They retired slowly, covering the retreat.

† That's not the fact.

front. The French cavalry began to give way, and effected its retreat under the fire of our sharpshooters, which followed them to the very foot of the hill. After these several affairs the enemy opened a cannonade along the line, and commenced to direct fresh troops to its left wing. It was then that Liprandi also began to reinforce his right. Nevertheless, the Generals-in-Chief of the allied army did not decide to take the offensive. Lord Raglan calculated that to support the attack he would be obliged to descend from the plateau he occupied, and submit to the concentrated fire of our batteries. General Liprandi, on his side, judged it right to confine himself to the defence of the heights and works of which he had made himself master that day, and for that purpose placed his troops in the position he had won in the following manner."

Here follows a description of the formation of the Russian troops, which has no particular interest for our readers. He goes on :—

"At four o'clock the cannonade ceased. Our loss on the day was 7 officers and 124 men killed, 32 officers and 448 soldiers killed or contused, and 15

missing. Our trophies consisted of one flag, taken on the redoubt No. 1, eleven cast-iron guns, all the *matériel* of the Turkish camp, sixty caissons, and some pioneers' tools. The Allies reckoned their loss at 598—French 38, English 300, and Turks 260. The capture of the Turkish redoubts seriously alarmed the Generals-in-Chief of the allied armies. By this feat of arms, and the occupation by the Russians of the left bank of the Tchernaya, at 1¼ mile from Balaklava, the base of communication of the English was menaced. If the corps of General Liprandi had received some support that day, Balaklava would have fallen into our hands. But the superiority of the enemy's forces, the rapid advance of the works in front of the Bastion du Mât, and the incessant action of the siege batteries, did not permit our Commander-in-Chief to weaken the garrison of Sebastopol to reinforce the corps at Tchorgoune. The corps of General Liprandi, which had concentrated on the Tchernaya, was joined at a later period by all the reinforcements which arrived to Prince Menschikoff, and on the 30th of October the head-quarters was moved there also. We acquired the conviction by means of reconnaissances that it was only by means of heavy siege guns, and only on the east side of Balaklava, we could inflict

injury on the troops encamped near the city, and to the ships anchored in the bay. But the ground presented in that place such great difficulty that we could not even dream of carrying up heavy guns. It was that which principally prevented Prince Menschikoff undertaking any important movement after the affair of Balaklava till the 5th of November."

Those who are at all familiar with the events of the day will not require to be told that there are many inaccuracies in this account of the actions of Balaklava, and that the Russian cavalry did not penetrate to our park, nor did they very closely approach the 93rd Highlanders, nor did they actually charge our cavalry home during the retreat, nor did the French Chasseurs charge to alleviate our retreat. In fact, according to what we know to have taken place, we have many more grounds of exception to the statements of General Todleben; but we must admit the great danger in which we were placed, and express our agreement with him, that if Liprandi had been powerfully reinforced he might have taken Balaklava. Todleben informs us that the news of the success obtained by the Russian troops—the taking of the Turkish redoubts, the annihilation of the large mass of the

English cavalry, and the occupation of an advanced position at Komari—produced a most favourable impression on the garrison of Sebastopol, which had not had a single day of repose, had indeed been harassed by increasing labour ever since the landing of the Allies, and had been kept ceaselessly in a state of suspense by the expectation of an assault.

"The catastrophe of the Alma was forgotten; unlimited confidence was again placed in the superiority of Russian arms, and the moral tone of the garrison being completely restored, it returned to the display of the greatest energy. The principal object of the defence was henceforth not to allow the artillery of the besiegers to achieve an advantage over ours. Most special attention was, therefore, directed to meet the fire of the new batteries, which the French evidently had the intention of establishing at the right extremity of the first parallel before the capital and left front of bastion No. 4."

The measures which were taken for that purpose are set forth at length, but are only to be understood by reference to the plans. On the 26th of October, in order to distract the attention of the enemy from Liprandi, Prince Menschikoff ordered a sortie against

Mount Sapoune, consisting of six battalions of the Regiments of Bontirsk, and Borodino, and of four guns of the Light Battery, No. 5 of the 17th Brigade, under Colonel Fedorow. At one o'clock p.m., having crossed Careening Bay Ravine, the riflemen of the two regiments, supported by a battalion in columns of companies, advanced, and having ascended the heights, formed with the rest of the troops a second line in columns of attack, the artillery in intervals, and marched on the post of the English, which was about two miles from the mouth of Careening Creek.

"At the sight of the approaching troops the English skirmishers retreated rapidly, and the *générale* was beaten in the English camp. The enemy concentrated 16 Battalions and 18 guns on the post road; but without regarding their superiority, and the evident danger of seeing their retreat cut off, our weak detachment advanced courageously, with drums beating, under a cross-fire of artillery and musketry, against one of the works of the besiegers, on ground altogether unknown, covered with thick brushwood, and cut up with deep ravines. A few soldiers of the Regiment of Bontirsk, under Ensign Koudriawzew, advancing in front of the column,

rushed upon the enemy's intrenchments, and were engaged in a hand-to-hand combat, in which the ensign was killed, when suddenly, to the general consternation, Colonel Fedorow was grievously wounded."

Then the Russians retired with the loss of twenty-five officers and 245 killed and wounded. This is General Todleben's account of Little Inkerman. Those who were there will be surprised to learn how few were the enemy, and how close they were to the intrenchments, for on both these points a very different impression prevailed among us. Sir De Lacy Evans estimated their loss at 600, and he had some reason, for he took eighty prisoners, and had about 130 of their dead left in or near his position. The General's account of the action is as follows:—

"Yesterday the enemy attacked this division with several columns of infantry supported by artillery. Their cavalry did not come to the front. Their masses, covered by large bodies of skirmishers, advanced with much apparent confidence. The division immediately formed line in advance of our camp, the left under Major-General Pennefather, the right

under Brigadier-General Adams. Lieut.-Colonel Fitzmayer and the Captains of batteries (Turner and Yates) promptly posted their guns and opened fire upon the enemy.

"Immediately on the cannonade being heard, the Duke of Cambridge brought up to our support the Brigade of Guards under Major-General Bentinck, with a battery under Lieut.-Colonel Dacres. His Royal Highness took post in advance of our right to secure that flank, and rendered me throughout the most effective and important assistance. General Bosquet, with similar promptitude and from a greater distance, approached our position with 5 French Battalions. Sir G. Cathcart hastened to us with a Regiment of Rifles, and Sir G. Brown pushed forward 2 guns in co-operation by our left.

"The enemy came on at first rapidly, assisted by their guns on the Mound Hill. Our pickets, then chiefly of the 49th and 30th Regiments, resisted them with remarkable determination and firmness. Lieutenant Conolly, of the 49th, greatly distinguished himself, as did Captain Bayley, of the 30th, and Captain Atcherley, all of whom, I regret to say, were

severely wounded. Serjeant Sullivan also displayed at this point great bravery.

"In the meantime our 18 guns in position, including those of the 1st Division, were served with the utmost energy. In half-an-hour they forced the enemy's artillery to abandon the field. Our batteries were then directed with equal accuracy and vigour upon the enemy's columns, which (exposed also to the close fire of our advanced infantry) soon fell into complete disorder and flight. They were then literally chased by the 30th and 95th Regiments over the ridges and down towards the head of the bay. So eager was the pursuit, that it was with difficulty Major-General Pennefather eventually effected the recall of our men. These regiments and the pickets were led gallantly by Major Mauleverer, Major Champion, Major Eman, and Major Hume. They were similarly pursued further towards our left by 4 companies of the 41st, led gallantly by Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. P. Herbert, A.Q.M.G. The 47th also contributed. The 55th were held in reserve.

"Above 80 prisoners fell into our hands, and about 130 of the enemy's dead were left within or near our

position. It is computed that their total loss could scarcely be less than 600.

"Our loss, I am sorry to say, has been above 80, of whom 12 killed, 5 officers wounded. I am happy to say, hopes are entertained that Lieutenant Conolly will recover, but his wound is dangerous.

"I will have the honour of transmitting to your Lordship a list of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, whose conduct attracted special notice. That of the pickets excited general admiration.

"To Major-General Pennefather and Brigadier-General Adams I was as usual, greatly indebted. To Lieut.-Colonel Dacres, Lieut.-Colonel Fitzmayer, Captains Turner, Yates, Woodhouse, and Hamley, and the whole of the Royal Artillery, we are under the greatest obligation.

"Lieut.-Colonel Herbert, A.Q.M.G., rendered the division, as he always does, highly distinguished and energetic services. Lieut.-Colonel Wilbraham, A.A.G., while serving most actively, I regret to say, had a very severe fall from his horse. I beg leave also to

recommend to your Lordship's favourable consideration, the excellent services of Captains Glasbrook and Thompson, of the Quartermaster-General's Department, the Brigade-Majors Captains Armstrong and Thackwell, and my personal staff, Captains Allix, Gubbins, and the Honourable W. Boyle."

While these affairs went on outside, both Russians and besiegers worked away with vigour; and the increasing numbers of the French permitted them to open new trenches, and to push the approaches towards the Bastion du Mât in such a way as to cause serious disquietude to the enemy. . The account of what was done reads like the description of a game of chess, in which new pieces are continually added to instead of taken from the board. On the 1st of November the French had so far gained ground that they opened thirty guns and fourteen mortars from new batteries against the Bastion du Mât (No. 4), in addition to the thirty pieces already directed against it, and it appeared as if the Russian artillery on that point would have been completely annihilated, but the heroism of the defence enabled it to triumph over the tremendous fire. Still the bastion was in peril, and if an assault had been made it would have gone hard

with the garrison. Prince Menschikoff took the most energetic measures to meet the danger. Houses were loopholed, barricades thrown up, special organizations of troops made to resist and drive out the enemy, in case they succeeded in gaining a footing in the interior of the bastion; but, after all, the Russians could only concentrate there about 12,000 men. They had, however, a reserve of 14 Battalions and 12 field-pieces, and in the Karabelnaia there were 21 Battalions and 8 field-pieces. Prince Menschikoff having completed his interior line of defence, set to work once more to suspend the siege works and give a death-blow to the besiegers. The French had increased the force of their batteries to 91 guns. The English had only been able to keep 67 guns in position. Deserters informed the Russians that an assault was imminent. The French trenches were within eighty yards of the Bastion du Mât.

As to the danger, Todleben says:—

"Placed under advantageous circumstances, and supposing that the fire of grape had done its work in proper time, this small garrison might, doubtless, have offered some resistance to the besieger, but it

evidently could not have stopped a vigorous attack of the enemy's columns. We were not certain of being always prepared to the minute to repulse the enemy, even supposing our vigilance pushed to its extreme limits; for the continual and prolonged expectation of an assault, and the imminence of an incessant danger, nearly always lead to exhaustion of strength, and create, to a certain degree, a sort of carelessness. If the French, after having occupied Bastion No. 4, had intrenched themselves behind its gorge, and had established a communication between its moat and their advanced parallel, they would have been in a position to concentrate in the bastion itself and in its moat, as also in their trenches, a considerable number of troops, even 20,000 men or more. To drive the French from Bastion No. 4, the troops of our general reserve would have had to climb the very sharp incline of the Boulevard height covered with felled trunks of trees and stones, and they would have had to stand the fire of the French batteries established on Mount Rodolph, and near the upper portions of the city ravine, and also that of the English batteries on Green Hill. Having no chance of preserving their order of battle, and thrown into disorder by the enemy's fire, our troops, after having scaled the heights, would have

met the superior forces of the assailant on a ground where all the advantages would have been in favour of the latter. . . .

"After having entrenched themselves in Bastion No. 4, there was no necessity for the enemy to give an assault to the town, which would, doubtless, have been repulsed with great loss to him. Nevertheless, our line of defence would have been forced, divided, mutilated, and the interior defence of Sebastopol would have become almost impossible; for the enemy would not have failed to establish heavy batteries on the crest of the height of Bastion No. 4; he might then have played upon Bastions 6, 5, and 3, and swept the town and South Bay, and thus forced us to evacuate Sebastopol. The internal line of defence which we had raised in the town itself could only serve us usefully to assure our retreat."

The French had with much energy pushed their approaches to within sixty-five sagenes of the salient of the Bastion du Mât, "*il faut reconnaître que les forces de la défense touchaient à leur agonie.*" This was on the eve of the Battle of Inkerman. The Allies were assembling reinforcements, which could

be transported to the Crimea by sea with much more facility than the Russians could march down their troops by roads rendered almost impassable as the season advanced. Such a state of things necessarily called on the Russian army to undertake some decisive action, and the moment appeared well chosen, as the 4th Infantry Corps had arrived at Sebastopol in the latter half of October. Todleben says:—

"From the account we have given of the progress of the defence of Sebastopol, it is evident that, notwithstanding all the efforts of the defenders, they could expect no favourable issue should the enemy assault the town. The energetic attack of the 4th bastion by the Allies had brought the French approaches to within 150 yards of the salient angle. The concentrated action of their artillery did great damage to this bastion, and though all the mischief done by the enemy was immediately repaired, even under his heaviest fire, though the dismounted guns were constantly replaced by new ones, and the lessening ranks of the defenders filled up by fresh troops, yet the means of defending the 4th bastion were, at this period, evidently failing.

"It should be mentioned here, that at this time

France, England, and Turkey, wishing to increase their forces in the Crimea, were preparing to send off additional troops to the theatre of war. In consequence of the convenience and rapidity of communication by sea, with the help of the enormous steam fleet in the hands of the Allies, these troops could reach the Crimea sooner than the Russian reinforcements, which, at that late portion of the year, had to march by the bad roads which formed the only means of communication between the Crimea and the other parts of the empire.

"In such a state of matters there was an imperative necessity for the Russian army to act decisively. This was the more practicable, as the number of our troops in the Crimea had been greatly increased in the second half of the month of October, by the newly-arrived detachments of the 4th Infantry Corps.

"In case of any offensive measures on our part proving successful, the Allies would be forced to raise the siege of Sebastopol, or our success would, at least, ward off the assault with which the 4th bastion was threatened: this would greatly impede the progress of the enemy's attack, and might, in conjunction with

other measures, bring the struggle to a favourable issue.

The 10th Division appeared on the 2nd of November, and entered the place; the 11th Division arrived on the 3rd of November, and thus raised the effective force in and around Sebastopol under Menschikoff to 100,000 men, without counting the crews of the ships. To oppose this force the French mustered 53 battalions, 12 squadrons, 72 field and 86 siege guns—total, 41,700 men; the English, 31 battalions, 20 squadrons, 96 field and 93 siege guns—total, 24,530 men; the Turks, 8 battalions, 6 field guns and 16 siege guns—total, 4,700. These forces were divided into a besieging and a covering army. Of the former, the English had taken up their ground on the space from the abrupt crests of the Mount Sapoune, looking down the Tchernaya, opposite Inkerman, to the Sarandinaki Ravine, at about two and a third miles from Sebastopol, and the French extended from the English left as far as the road from Sebastopol to Kamiche, at a distance of from one mile and a third to one mile and three-quarters from the city. Todleben proceeds to describe the position occupied by the respective corps, and gives the disposition

and numbers of the covering army and corps of observation under Bosquet, which, including the small force of English cavalry on the heights and of infantry at Balaklava, he computes at 26,791 men. The General then explains, in detail, the nature of the ground on which the Allies were encamped.

1. "Between the slopes of Mount Sapoune and the head of the Careening Ravine, was situated the 2nd Division (Evans's), consisting of 6 Battalions, making a force of 3,427 men.

2. "Between the head of the Careening Ravine and the Woronzoff Road, was situated the Light Division (Brown's), consisting of 7 Battalions, making a force of 3,722 men.

3. "Between the Woronzoff Road and the Delagardie Ravine, was the 4th Division (Cathcart's), consiting of 6 Battalions, making a force of 3,958 men.

4. "Between the Delagardie and the Sarandinaki Ravines were 6 Battalions of the 3rd Division (England's), making a force of 3,929 men

5. "Between Evans's and Brown's Divisions, and

behind them, near the mill, stood the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division (Duke of Cambridge's) consisting of 3 Battalions, and constituting a force of 1,711 men.

6. "To the left of the Sarandinaki Ravine stood Prince Napoleon's 3rd Division, consisting of 9 Battalions, constituting a force of 6,532 men.

7. "Still farther to the left, along the Quarantine Ravine, stood the 4th Division (Forey's), consisting of 9 Battalions, constituting a force of 5,907 men.

8. "Behind the left flank of this Division stood the 5th Division (La Vaillant's) consisting of 14 Battalions, constituting a force of 6,129 men.

"Therefore, there were in the besieging corps 60 Battalions, constituting a force of 35,015 men. Of this number 28 Battalions, a force of 16,447 men, were English, and 32 Battalions, or 18,568 men, were French.

"The rest of the troops constituted the corps of observation, and were appointed to guard Mount Sapoune from the rear. Part of these troops had likewise to defend Balaklava.

"The troops of the corps of observation, under the command of Bosquet, were arranged in the following manner:—

1. "One Battalion of the *Tirailleurs Algeriens** was placed on the extreme left flank, by Canrobert's Redoubt.

2. "One Battalion† occupied the posts on the slope of Mount Sapoune from Canrobert's Redoubt to the Woronzoff Road.

3. "Four companies‡ were posted by Battery No. 11.

4. "Between the Woronzoff and Balaklava Roads were all the remaining troops of Bosquet's Division and Espinasse's Brigade, consisting of 16 Battalions, numbering 12,409 men.

5. "More to the right, and at an angle, was the Turkish Division of 8 Battalions, a force of 4,907 men.

* The 1st Battalion; it constituted part of d'Autemarre's Brigade.

† The 1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment of the Line, from Bourbaki's Brigade.

‡ The 3rd Battalion of the Chasseurs à Pied of the same brigade.

6. "In front, near the village of Kadikoi, were the 5 Battalions of Vinoy, a force of 2,778 men.

7. "Twelve squadrons of French cavalry, and part of the English, were placed behind the Turks and Espinasse's Brigade: the rest of the English cavalry was at the head of the Laboratory Ravine, behind Bentinck's Brigade. The total of the cavalry was 3,942 men, of which 1,976 were English.

8. "Balaklava was defended by Sir Colin Campbell's Brigade, consisting of 3 Battalions, a force of about 1,912 men.

"Therefore, in the corps of observation, there were in all 32 Battalions, and 32 Squadrons, making a total of 26,791 men.

"The head-quarters of the English army were near the ascent of the Chersonese plateau, on the road from Balaklava to Kamiesch; the French head-quarters were a little further behind the right flank of the French corps.

"The artillery and engineer parks were situated near their head-quarters.

"We shall now say a few words about the ground occupied by the Allies.

"The eastern portion of the Chersonese plateau has the shape of an irregular triangle, bounded by the Sarandinaki Ravine, the South Bay, the harbour, and the abrupt and irregular slopes of Mount Sapoune. All this part of the plateau is intersected by several long, deep ravines with steep banks, running from the south-east to the north-west. Next to the Sarandinaki Ravine, towards the east, is the Delagardie Ravine; beyond it the Laboratory and Dockyard Ravines; then the Careening Ravine, the banks of which are very steep, and in some places rocky and precipitous, and intersected by irregular hollows. The whole space between the Dockyard Ravine and the irregular slopes forming the boundary of Mount Sapoune on the side of the Tchernaya, is divided by the Careening Ravine, for the length of about two miles, into two parts, completely separated one from the other, and having no intercommunication, except by a single road at the very mouth of the Careening Ravine.

"As to the high ground between the Careening Ravine and the Tchernaya, it forms a plateau, whose

greatest breadth does not exceed 815 yards, its least is only 140 yards. The slopes of this plateau are very irregular, covered with brushwood, and cut up by ravines, running in the direction of the Careening Ravine and of the Tchernaya. The most remarkable of the ravines leading towards the Tchernaya are the Quarry, the Volovia, the Soushilnaia, and the St. George Ravines. The nature of the ground of the part of the plateau we are describing, offers the most disadvantageous conditions for the movement and action of troops.

Between the head of the Careening Ravine and the declivity of Mount Sapoune lies the highest point. This high ground forms an excellent defensive position, having a length of two-thirds of a mile. From the Sebastopol side it is defended by two ravines; to the left is a deep hollow falling into the Careening Ravine, and to the right lies the Quarry Ravine, which has steep and almost precipitous banks. The only part of the whole position which can be easily approached is the narrow interval between the heads of these two ravines.

In this almost impregnable position was situated

the English 2nd Division, protected in front by three works of a very weak profile. One of them, No. 1 (the Sandbag Battery), was situated on the right flank of the position, beyond the Quarry Ravine, and near the slope of Mount Sapoune; the second, No. 2, was to the right of the road, behind No. 1; and lastly, the very road was cut across by a ditch. Battery No. 1 was unfinished and unarmed, but No. 2 had two guns.

"The summit of the north-east portion of Mount Sapoune is approached by a few very difficult roads. From the Inkerman dam across the Tchernaya, near the end of the Great Harbour, lead two roads; the one to the right is called the Sapper Road; it ascends the St. George Ravine, then descends into the Careening Ravine, and crossing the stone bridge it enters Sebastopol. The other road from the Inkerman bridge turns to the left, runs up Mount Sapoune along the Inkerman quarry, and further on joins the Woronzoff Road, which leads to Sebastopol through the Laboratory Ravine. Both these roads are very winding, and have steep ascents.

"From the Quarry Ravine to the Balaklava Road,

for a distance of about seven miles, the position of the Allies was almost unapproachable, on account of the steep slopes and deep hollows of Mount Sapoune, which, rising to a considerable height above the Fedukhine Hills and the Balaklava Valley, has on this side only three ascents, all most difficult of approach. One of them, leading from the ford of the Tchernay, and crossing the aqueduct, rises by a very steep slope, and farther on joins the Woronzoff Road. This path, practicable only for beasts of burden, it is almost impossible to ascend, on account of the steepness of the slopes of Mount Sapoune, and besides, the French had built the Canrobert redoubt near this road. Another ascent is on the Woronzoff Road. It passed between the works of the line of circumvallation, and was, besides, at that time defended by the advanced work, Battery No. 11. The third ascent is by the road leading from Balaklava through Kadikoi to Sebastopol. Though this ascent is not steep, yet the mountain sides form a re-entering angle, one side of which was constituted by the fortified slopes of Mount Sapoune, and the other by the fortified heights which covered Balaklava."

An attack on the plateau from either side of Bala-

klava, or from the Tchernaya could have no hope of success, on account of the difficulties of access, and of the strong fortifications. The narrow space between Careening Ravine and the Quarries Ravine, although offering the only point of attack, was nearly inaccessible. Here were encamped the English 2nd Division, covered in front by three works, of very weak profile—one, the Sandbag Battery, unarmed; on the right flank another, with two guns, on the right of the road; the third behind the first. Across the road was cut a trench. The right flank of the besiegers offered the best hope, and although the nature of the ground rendered the position strong, it was to be remembered that the number of troops which defended it was very weak. Prince Menschikoff decided to attack at that point. In case of success his object was to occupy all the eastern side of the plateau, or at all events to establish himself on the heights over Careening Ravine, which would have the effect of placing the east side of the city out of reach of attack, of uniting the garrison with the army outside, and probably of raising the siege itself. At five o'clock p.m., on the 4th of November, the definite dispositions made by Dannenberg, under Prince Menschikoff's direction, were communicated to

the Generals, and an order of the day was published announcing the attack on the English next morning. Lieutenant-General Soïmonoff, at the head of twenty-nine battalions, a sotnia of Cossacks—in all, 18,920 men—and 38 guns, was to march from Bastion No. 2 at four a.m., to traverse Careening Ravine, and commence the attack at six a.m., formed in order of battle. The sappers were to follow the directions of Colonel Todleben, and to entrench the position to be occupied after the expulsion of the English. A column of 15,806 men, under Lieutenant-General Pavloff, with ninety-six guns, marching at half-past two a.m. to the bridge of Inkerman, was to advance briskly and effect a junction with the column of Soïmonoff; General Prince Gortschakoff commanding, the corps of Tchorgoune, consisting of 20,000 men and eighty-eight guns, comprising fifty-two squadrons and ten sotnias, was to operate so as to attract the attention of part of the enemy and not permit the English at Kadikoi to lend assistance to the troops on the plateau during the grand attack. Lieutenant-General de Moller, in command of the garrison of the city, having made the necessary dispositions for supplying the void caused by Soïmonoff's departure, issued orders to the artillery along the line opposed to the English

to direct their fire exclusively against the columns of the enemy, and held the Regiments of Minsk and Tobolsk, with twelve guns under General Timoféieff, in readiness to make a sortie from the extreme right against the French and seize their batteries. A detachment of 3,800 men and thirty-six guns was detached to watch the road to Baktchiserai.

Such were the dispositions for making this tremendous attack. Man proposes but God disposes. Inkerman ought to be a standing example to every general of the danger, nay, the folly of touching an order once given for the execution of a plan by masses of troops. Before we proceed to give Todleben's account of the battle, let us set forth in detail this illustration. It was General Dannenberg, as we have stated, who made the arrangements for the march of Soïmonoff and Pavloff's columns. According to the original plan, the Regiments of Kolivansk, Tomsk, and Ekaterinebourg were to leave Sebastopol at two a.m., and march to the point at which Pavloff's column would find it easiest to cross the Tchernaya, where they were to form in order of battle on the right of the 10th Division of infantry. It was not till that division had succeeded in covering the

passage that Pavloff was to commence crossing over. The Regiments of Okhotsk, of Jakoutsk, and of Selinghinsk, were to follow the "Sappers-road," lately made by Careening Bay from Inkerman, and form in order of reserve in rear of the space left open between the 10th and 16th Divisions of Soïmonoff. Soon afterwards Dannenberg found it necessary to change his dispositions and to modify some of the directions of Prince Menschikoff. He explained to the Prince that the Careening Ravine would separate his column from that of Soïmonoff at the commencement of the attack, and prevent the double action of both, which seemed necessary. On the right of the ravine the ground was difficult, the forces of the enemy incompletely known, and the roads from the river so narrow that any retrogade move from unforeseen causes could only be effected with great difficulty and loss of time. He, therefore, ordered Pavloff's column to be at Inkerman-bridge at five a.m., and when the sappers had repaired it, the column was to march over in order, the leading Regiment of Okhotsk and of Borodino taking the right by the "Sappers-road," the Regiment of Borodino taking the old "Post-road." These twelve battalions were to halt when they reached the crest of the hills. Thus the original dispositions

of Soïmonoff were completely changed. Dannenberg ordered him to march at five a.m., instead of six a.m., and added, among other things, "I think it useful, also, that you should keep the principal reserves of your detachment behind your right wing, for its left flank will be perfectly guaranteed by Careening Ravine, and by the co-operation of the troops which will cross the Tchernaya." While he did not precisely annul his first arrangements, he had now in view to make Soïmonoff's column act on the west side of Careening Ravine. All these changes could be easily made in Pavloff's column, where General Dannenberg had his head-quarters, but it was very difficult for Soïmonoff, who was at Sebastopol, to execute these new orders. As Dannenberg had not distinctly annulled the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, in which Soïmonoff was directed to advance from the Careening Ravine in order to unite with Pavloff, and as he had in the first instance been ordered to cover the passage of the Tchernaya, which would have obliged him to follow the right bank of the ravine; and, finally, as Dannenberg's language did not appear to him sufficiently explicit, Soïmonoff decided to take his own measures. He sent a copy of his orders to the Head-quarter Staff

of Prince Menschikoff and of Dannenberg. If they had been found defective, it was natural Soïmonoff should expect to receive other orders, or that the necessary changes would have been communicated to him with clearness and precision. While he was uncertain whether his arrangements were annulled or approved, he received an order of which the sense, it is true, was directly opposed to them, but which was simply confined to an obscure announcement that his detachment was *not* to traverse Careening Ravine. It was not said if by this order the original dispositions of General Soïmonoff as well as those of General Dannenberg himself were revoked or not. Under these circumstances the General, considering himself as personally responsible, and to a certain point independent, instead of acting on an order which expressed but confusedly the intentions of General Dannenberg, preferred to execute the plan he had himself drawn up, the basis of which was the original idea of Prince Menschikoff, which he perfectly understood, and which neither Prince Menschikoff nor Dannenberg himself had positively rejected. Now comes Todleben's description of the great battle of Inkerman:—

THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN.

"The night was still dark when our troops quitted their bivouacs. The English, without the least suspicion of the danger to which they were about to be exposed, were sleeping peaceably in their camps. Their outposts, soaked in rain, shivered at the cold blast of an icy wind, and half stupid with fatigue and inanition, did not lend much attention to what passed in our camp. Some sentinels, indeed, had heard in the distance a dull sound and a creaking of wheels, but they had not attached any importance to it, persuaded that the noise came from some Tartar arabas. At four o'clock a.m. they heard the sound of a church bell, which roused the attention of the enemy, but did not attract it long. The 5th of November fell on a Sunday, and the English outposts took the ringing of the bells to be the call to morning prayers. In accordance with the disposition which had been made, the detachment of Lieutenant-General Soïmonoff assembled near Bastion No. 2, and began its march at five o'clock in the direction of Careening Ravine, descended it, and began to mount up the right bank of the ravine, following the rude ascent

of the 'Sappers-road,' which the rains had injured. To repair it as much as possible, and facilitate the passage of the artillery, sappers were sent on at the head of the column. At six o'clock Soïmonoff had already gained the plateau, where he began to form in order of battle. . . .

"At six o'clock General Soïmonoff's detachment had mounted on the plateau and began to form in order of battle. In the first line were two regiments, the Tomsk on the right flank, and the Kolivansk on the left; the Ekaterinburg was in reserve. Twenty two guns of position* were placed in line of battle and two companies of the 6th Rifle Battalion were thrown out as skirmishers. The troops of the combined division, under the command of General Jabokritsky, formed the main reserves.

"Having done so, General Soïmonoff began to advance parallel with Careening Ravine. A thick fog and the gray colour of our soldiers' greatcoats concealed their line from the view of the enemy's outposts, and permitted them to advance, without being remarked, almost up to them. A picket of the Light Division of General Brown was almost

* 12 guns of heavy battery, No. 2 of the 10th Brigade.
10 „ „ No. 1 „ 16th „

immediately surrounded and taken. Then commenced a musketry fire, which was the signal of a general *alerte* in the enemy's camp. At the dawn of day General Codrington had left the camp to visit his outposts. After having made his rounds, he was preparing to return when he heard suddenly some musket shots in the direction of the heights of the ravine, and immediately afterwards some sentries ran in with the news of the Russian attack. Codrington returned immediately to camp and communicated the intelligence to General Brown, who put his division under arms, and directed it towards the upper part of Careening Ravine. Scarcely had the first volleys rung through the camp ere the alarm spread through the 2nd Division. General Pennefather, who commanded it in the absence of Sir de Lacy Evans, caused by illness, immediately advanced his troops on the position, placing them with twelve guns on the ground between the Sandbag Battery and the ravine Mickriukoff. Adams's Brigade occupied the right and Pennefather's Brigade the left. Almost at the same time the troops of the Light Division reached the upper part of the ravine. Codrington's Brigade with six guns occupied the western ridge of the ravine, and rested its left on the right

Lancaster Battery, while Buller's Brigade, with six guns, having turned the end of the ravine, placed itself in the rear of Pennefather's Brigade. Without loss of time the Brigade of Guards, the 4th Division, and the Brigade John Campbell were also led to the scene of action. The Brigades Airey and Torrens and the Rifles remained in the trenches. The troops of the right column under Soïmonoff, supported by their batteries, attacked Sir de Lacy Evans's Division briskly, and drove back the English skirmishers. The assault was conducted under great difficulty, as much owing to the peculiar nature of the ground as to the losses which our troops suffered from the excellent arms of the English. But neither the difficulty of the ground nor the fire of the enemy could stop the battalions of the 10th Division. The battalions of Tomsk and Kolivansk, supported by the 2nd and 4th battalions of the Ekaterinebourg Regiment, attacked Pennefather's Brigade. Two battalions of Tomsk and two of Kolivansk overthrew the English, seized the little entrenchment No. 2, before the camp of the 2nd Division, spiked the guns in it, and broke the carriages. At the same time the regiments of Taroutino and Borodino, which formed part of the left column of General Pavloff,

also began a fusillade with the enemy. At half-past two a.m. the left column quitted its position, as had been ordered, marched towards the Valley of Inkerman, and reached the Bridge at five a.m. There it was obliged to wait till the repairs were made, and could not pass till seven o'clock, when it was already broad day. After the passage the troops were divided into two bodies. The battalions of the 11th Division and all the artillery turned to the right and followed the 'Sapper's-road,' while the 17th Division began to climb the hill side—the regiment of Borrodino to the left, along the ravine Valovia, and that of Taroutino to the right, along the old Post-road to Baktchiserai. The Regiment of Borodino and two battalions of Taroutino, having gained the plateau without much difficulty, hastened to join the troops of Soïmonoff, which were at the very height of their attack against Pennefather's Brigade. The two other battalions of the Taroutino Regiment were, however, received with a very close and accurate fire of rifles by the skirmishers of Adams's Brigade. Without caring either for the fire or the steepness of the hill, the battalions of Taroutino, holding on by rocks and bushes, in a quarter of an hour climbed the right bank of the

Quarries Ravine, although it was very slippery owing to the rain. At the top of the plateau they formed in columns of companies, and, supported by the artillery fire of Soïmonow's column, attacked the right of Adams's Brigade, while the two other battalions of the same regiment and the Regiment of Borodino hastened to join them. The violent shock given to Adams's Brigade by the light infantry of the 17th Division caused it to recoil. Immediately two battalions of Taroutino went at Battery No. 1. The English let them approach within a short distance and received them with a salvo of artillery. But the terrible losses this tremendous fire occasioned did not succeed in driving them back. Closing their ranks, they pushed at the battery and carried it, but Adams at once advanced, and beat back our Chasseurs. It was then that the Regiments of Borodino and Taroutino, having reformed their ranks a little, threw themselves again on the remains of Adams's Brigade, already exhausted by the fight, and hurled them back principally on their right wing, which was concentrated near Battery No. 1. Our troops were all ready to continue the attack when they were suddenly arrested by the fresh troops of Bentinck's Brigade, which had succeeded in arriving

with six guns on the field of battle. Meanwhile the fortune of the fight had also decided the fate of the battalion of the 10th Division, which gave to Buller's Brigade and Pennefather's Brigade the possibility of joining with the brigade of Adams to crush the regiment of Borodino. We have already said that the regiments of Borodino and of Taroutino commenced the action when the regiments of the 10th Division, having overthrown Pennefather's Brigade, had taken the fortified work situate in front of the 2nd Division's camp. Driving the brigades of Pennefather and Buller before them, the Chasseurs of the 10th Division had penetrated as far as the very camp of De Lacy Evans. At the same moment, the first and second battalions of Ekaterinebourg crossed the upper part of the ravine and threw themselves upon Codrington's Brigade. Their energetic attack was crowned with complete success. With the rapidity of lightning our troops dashed at a field battery of six guns; four fell into their hands, and were immediately spiked, the other two succeeded in getting off. But after this valiant exploit, the Regiment Ekaterinebourg, always advancing, were in their turn overwhelmed in the ravine by the English. They abandoned their trophies, suffered terrible losses, and, to

avoid still greater, were obliged to retire to the bottom of the ravine. Almost at the same time the battalions of Chasseurs of the 10th Division were arrested in their progressive movement. The troops of Pennefather, repulsed from their position, and briskly pressed by the impetuosity of our soldiers, only retired very slowly, defending the ground step by step, and directing against us a fire excessively murderous and of extraordinary precision. The English riflemen caused us terrible loss; in a short time the greater part of the senior officers were put *hors de combat*. Among them was the brave Soïmonoff himself. The gallant general who, paying for it by his life, inflamed the troops by his own example, and who was sure to be seen wherever his presence was necessary or the combat offered the greatest danger, was struck dead. The loss of this courageous and worthy chief brought about disastrous consequences, and had a fatal influence on the ulterior progress of the battle. Seeing themselves deprived of the greater part of their senior and other officers, overcome by the terrible losses which had decimated their ranks, the battalions of the 10th Division halted. Profiting by this moment of indecision, the English redoubled their efforts. Their fire, of extreme precision, augmented in vigour

and intensity in proportion as our losses became more sensible. The powerful fire of twenty-two guns did not suffice to equalize the chances of the fight, and the light batteries of the 10th Division, which followed the column, were still too far from the field to support the efforts of our soldiers. The Chasseurs of the 10th Division began to fall back, and to save themselves from the fire of the English they descended into the ravine. This retreat was covered by the combined Division of Jabokritsky, who advanced sixteen light guns, and the Regiments of Boutirsk and Ouglitch, to cover the movement. The Regiments of Wladimir and of Souzdal remained in reserve in rear of the right wing. Thirty-eight guns placed on the heights arrested the enemy, and permitted the disorganized battalions of the 10th Division to get out of the fire of the English. Then the battalions, exchanging fire with the English, began to reform. Thus, while the Regiments of Borodino and Taroutino fought obstinately with Adams's and Bentinck's Brigades, and whilst their heroic efforts to overcome the energy and tenacity of the English were already on the point of being crowned with success, they suddenly saw before them the Brigades of Pennefather and Buller which had been occupied in a hot engage-

ment with the regiments of the 10th Division. The Chasseurs of the 17th Division, already disorganized by a series of reiterated attacks, and by the fire of the English artillery and rifles, were overthrown in their turn, and retired towards the Quarries Ravine, to reorganize, with the firm intention of renewing the fight.

"But it appeared that the want of officers, and the terrible losses which the ranks had sustained were so great, that it was necessary to give up the intention of leading into action the remains of the Borodino and Taroutino regiments. Therefore, the light troops of the 17th Division descended into the Inkerman valley and returned no more to the field of battle.

"After recovering the rude blows which the Russians had given them, the English troops advanced again. Codrington's Brigade remained as before on the left ridge of the Careening Ravine, Buller's Brigade, occupying an advanced position, formed the left, and the Brigades of Pennefather and Adams, which had suffered greatly, were placed in the centre; on the upper part of the ravine the Guards were posted, with the Coldstreams in the Battery No. 1 (Sand-bag). Thirty 9-pounders on the crest of the heights, which formed

the English front, opened fire against our artillery; thirty-eight of our guns on Cossack Hill replied to them. The hand-to-hand engagement had ceased, to give place to a lively cannonade. Our artillery, separated from that of the English by two ravines, could not, having regard to the ground, answer the English batteries otherwise than by a direct fire by shot and shell at the distance of from 920 to 1000 yards Notwithstanding the range, which was particularly great for light artillery, our guns caused considerable damage to the English artillery. But these injuries very imperfectly compensated the enormous losses which the enemy's riflemen inflicted on the Russian artillery. A perfect cloud of riflemen, hid in thick brushwood, opened a very violent and very accurate fire against our artillery at the distance of 800 paces. Some of our guns, from time to time, rained grape upon them; but the discharge only checked the fire of the enemy's riflemen for a moment, for, after their momentary fright, they only commenced to decimate our ranks more energetically. At the same time the English artillery hurled shrapnel on our artillery and infantry; but it was more the fire of rifled small arms than that of the artillery of the enemy which reached our artillerymen, of whom the greater part were killed or

wounded. Many foreign works attribute a great numerical superiority to us; but it was far from being what they supposed. At the beginning of the battle the English had engaged the Division De Lacy Evans, of which the effective force is stated by the English themselves to be 4,389; the Division Brown 4,385; brigade of Guards, 2,811; total, 11,585. On our side we had against the five brigades the Ekaterinebourg Regiment, 3,298; Tomsk, 3,124; Kolivansk, 2,875; Taroutino, 3,335; Borodino, 2,509: total, 15,141 men. If we take into consideration the nature of the ground occupied by the enemy, which presented extreme difficulties for the attack, and very great advantages for the defence, and observe that the English position was defended by field works, and that the armament of our adversaries was incomparably better than our own, we shall be convinced that the numerical superiority of our troops could not play a very important part in the engagement. It was not yet eight o'clock in the morning, and already the head of our columns had retired. Thus, of all the battalions which were to have attacked the English position, twenty had already quitted the field. Notwithstanding the ardour of the troops of the 10th and 17th Divisions, the impetuosity of their brilliant attacks, and their heroic bravery, the

enterprise was already *une affaire perdue*. Our soldiers, repulsed after suffering frightful loss, were harassed with fatigue."

Todleben then goes back to describe how Lord Raglan and his staff arrived on the field at seven o'clock a.m., when the battle was at its height; and how his lordship sent for Cathcart and England to come as fast as possible to the aid of the exhausted English, just as Dannenberg was bringing up his fresh troops. Bosquet in person, hastening to the English camp, had met Brown and Cathcart, and proposed to co-operate with his corps, but the English generals, who did not appreciate the magnitude of the danger, declined the offer, and begged him only to secure the rear near the redoubt Canrobert. Bosquet, who was satisfied that the movements of Prince Gortschakoff's corps in the valley below him indicated a false attack, waited till the moment when the English right would send to demand the co-operation of the French. The combat raged fiercely. Dannenberg had two horses killed under him. Projectiles of all kinds reached even to the Ravine of St. George, where were the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael at the side of Prince Menschikoff.

"A little after eight o'clock the battalion of the 11th Division, with the greatest difficulty, reached the plateau of Careening Ravine, passing through the Ravine St. George. The march of the detachment of General Pavloff had been greatly hampered by the nature of the ground. The artillery were obliged to put an extraordinary number of horses to the guns to ascend the hill, and the transport of the guns of position was still more difficult. The infantry of Pavloff's column had scarcely reached the plateau when Dannenberg ordered his battalions to attack the right wing of the English army. . . . . To reinforce our artillery and insure the success of the attack, thirty-two guns of position were ordered to advance on our left. The Okhotsk Regiment, braving the fatigues of its march, crossed a fold of the ground near the upper part of Careening Ravine, and forcing its passage through the thick brushwood, dashed upon the enemy. At first, the skirmishers were repulsed by the English, but, supported by the Sappers of the 4th Battalion, they soon overthrew the English Tirailleurs, and made way for the battalions at the head of their column. These then attacked with impetuosity the Sandbag Battery, which was occupied by the worthy rivals of the Regiment of

Okhotsk, the intrepid Coldstreams. In spite of the concentrated fire of the Russian artillery, and of the left wing of our army, the Coldstreams received the attack with firm foot. A bloody and obstinate combat ensued around the battery. Although still unfinished, the Coldstreams defended it, nevertheless, with as much tenacity as courage. The soldiers of Okhotsk scaled the parapets again and again, and even reached the interior of the work, but they were repulsed every time, and could not establish themselves solidly. The combat at this point soon assumed the character of a hand-to-hand engagement. In the midst of the sanguinary *mêlée*, these intrepid soldiers carried on one against the other a terrible, merciless struggle. Whatever came to hand, whatever could injure an enemy, seemed fit for the combat. The soldiers exchanged shots with muzzles touching, struck each other with the butts, fought bayonet to bayonet, and even threw stones and fragments of arms at each other. At last, after unheard-of efforts to conquer such an energetic resistance, the soldiers of Okhotsk succeeded in expelling the Coldstreams from the battery and seizing it. Nine guns were the reward of this brilliant feat of arms. Three were immediately taken away down the ravine, and the

others were spiked. Of 600 Coldstreams who defended the battery, 200 were *hors de combat*, but the Regiment of Okhotsk bought the brilliant victory dearly. It lost its commander, Colonel Bibikoff, who was mortally wounded, the greater part of its officers, a very great number of soldiers, and had only before it the prospect of a new struggle not less fierce, and quite as bloody as the last. In the midst of the fight in the battery, the English were reinforced by fresh troops. Cathcart's Division, with a fresh battery, and John Campbell's Brigade arrived on the field. Torrens' and Goldie's Brigades took up position on the right ridge of Careening Ravine. Campbell's Brigade moved to the left bank behind Codrington's Brigade. Inflamed with new ardour by the sight of the reinforcements, the English formed rapidly in order of battle, and recommenced the attack. The remains of the Guards, having the Coldstreams at their head, supported by Adams's Brigade, rushed on the Regiment of Okhotsk to snatch from it the intrenchment it had won. At the same time Cathcart, with Torrens' Brigade, set about turning its left flank, while Goldie's Brigade threw itself on its right. The cannonade and the musketry then raged louder than ever along the English line. The

attack of the English Guards was so impetuous that the Regiment of Okhotsk, which occupied the battery, could not maintain themselves. But at the same time our reinforcements also became engaged. General Dannenberg advanced the Regiments of Jakoutsk and Selenghinsk. The first supported the Regiment of Okhotsk, which had been obliged to retire, and attacked the enemy resolutely. A part stormed the battery, and, finally, thrust out of it the English Guards, already disorganized. The other part of the same regiment having met Goldie's Brigade, overthrew it with a charge of the bayonet. The Regiment of Jakoutsk having secured the success of the attack of the Regiment of Okhotsk, was thus enabled to maintain its ground on the left flank of the English position, having in its front Buller's Brigade, and that of Goldie, which it had disposed of in one charge. Torrens' attack, directed by Catheart himself, was a most complete failure. The Brigade commenced by turning the left flank of the Regiment of Okhotsk and descended then into a fold of the ground before the battery No. 1, but at the same moment appeared the Regiment Selenghinsk, and General Dannenberg placed in position sixteen horse-artillery guns along the Quarry Ravine, parallel to the Post

Road. The Regiment Selenghinsk made a charge with the bayonet. Cathcart, repulsed, was obliged to fall back, and thinking No. 1 battery was occupied by Bentinck's Brigade, began to retire in the direction of the work. When he had got pretty near to it, he was suddenly received by a murderous fire. Persuaded that he had English troops before him, and that they had opened fire by mistake, Cathcart ordered his men to throw away their great-coats. At the sight of the red uniforms the Jakoutsk soldiers doubled the intensity of their fire. Surrounded on all sides by the battalions of Okhotsk, Jakoutsk, and Selenghinsk, Cathcart found himself in a very critical position. Musketry decimated the ranks of Torrens's Brigade. The English troops began to be demoralized; confusion spread through their ranks; their fire became hasty and disorderly; and soon the soldiers were heard to complain of want of cartridges. All they possessed had been used in a very short time. Cathcart alone, one of the most skilful of the English Generals, did not lose his presence of mind. Applying himself to animate the courage of his wavering troops, he reformed the ranks, and placing himself at their head, he rushed against the Regiment of Selenghinsk, which barred the way.

This attack being repulsed, Torrens put himself at the head of the brigade, and advanced resolutely against the Russians. But the second attempt was not more successful than the first, and Torrens himself was wounded. Cathcart, feeling the full danger of the situation, and convinced beforehand that he had no chance of prevailing in the attacks against the regiments which had already repulsed him twice, threw his troops in another direction. Closing up the ranks of his disordered brigade, he led them on the flank of the English line of battle. But he encountered then the Regiment of Jakoutsk, which received him with a very violent fire. Cathcart, who was at the head of the brigade, was mortally wounded. At the moment confusion arose in the ranks, but these brave troops soon rallied, made a supreme effort, and throwing themselves on the Regiment of Jakoutsk, succeeded at last in forcing the ranks, and breaking a passage through the midst of our soldiers. Such was the issue of the attacks of Torrens's Brigade. The right flank of the English, who were endeavouring to concentrate between the battery No. 2 and the upper part of the Careening Ravine, was left quite uncovered. Having taken position on this ground, the English opened a very brisk fire of musketry. The cannonade

continued without interruption. The English then brought up with great difficulty, in addition to their field artillery, two 18-pounders of the siege train. These guns were placed in the battery No. 2, whence they acted with much success till the end of the battle. It must be remarked that the English artillery in general sustained its infantry perfectly. It followed them everywhere, and opened fire at sufficiently close distances against the assailing columns of the Russians. On one side the artillery of Codrington's Brigade, established on the Careening Ravine left bank, battered our reserves, and took in flank those troops of ours which attacked the left wing of the English army. On the other hand, our artillery rested always on the same spot in its primitive position, on the slope of Cossack Hill, and did not sustain the attack of our battalions. These batteries had, however, at the commencement of the action, supported the infantry and prepared our first success; but that did not last long. In proportion as the infantry advanced, the action of the artillery became almost null, as the batteries persisted in keeping their original position. With a progressive increase of distance the fire of the light batteries became less and less efficacious, and the battalions of the 11th Division

were obliged on many occasions to open the road in front by the balls of their smooth-bore guns, and by means of their bayonets, without being in any way supported by the artillery."

Todleben, having related how the Russian guns were increased from eighty-six to ninety-four, and how, after having overwhelmed the right wing of the enemy, the battalions of the 11th Division were preparing to attack the English army once more, arrives at the time when the English were reinforced by the French. He says:—

"The English remained a long time before they resolved to demand help from the French. Long they fought obstinately, against the Russians, but finally they had no more strength. Having exhausted his soldiers, and engaged all his reserves in the battle, Lord Raglan was obliged to resign himself to pray General Bosquet to come to his help. Bosquet replied immediately by sending, without delay, upon the field of battle, 2½ Battalions and 12 guns. Soon after, to support these troops, 2 Battalions and 4 Squadrons were directed to the same point, and, finally, Canrobert himself sent towards the mill 3 Battalions

of the besieging army under General de Monet. At the same time, Prince Napoleon was informed that it might be necessary to ask him for reinforcements. Thus, at the first requisition of the English Commander-in-Chief, Canrobert and Bosquet directed to the scene of the fight seven and a half battalions, four squadrons, and twelve guns; in addition, the three remaining battalions of D'Autemarre's Brigade set out for the field of battle. The first reinforcements took up ground to the right of battery No. 2, and put in position twelve guns. They had scarcely begun to advance when they were received by such a violent fire that they broke and fled precipitately to the rear. They re-formed, however, and came back to the charge, but they were obliged to retire before the battalions of the 11th Division. Meanwhile, the fire of the French batteries made terrible ravages among the Russian columns; but the ardour of our soldiers attained its highest degree of exaltation. Exalted by their success, the regiments of the 11th Division pushed back before them the French battalions. One effort and the issue of the combat would have been decided in favour of the Russians; but, unhappily, the fatigue of our soldiers had arrived at its height. It was a decisive moment for the two armies. Having sur-

mounted enormous difficulties, and triumphing over the tenacity of the enemy, the Russians, receiving no reinforcements, were exhausting their energy in a last effort; and the English, exhausted by fatigue, deprived of the greater part of their Generals and officers, felt that it was impossible for them to hold out much longer, the French, themselves the last upon the field of battle, awaiting with anxiety the reinforcements which had been announced to them, and without which they could not continue to hold the ground against the Russians. A little after ten o'clock the reinforcements, so impatiently awaited by the French, arrived to them at last. In the steps of General Bosquet rushed the Zouaves, the Chasseurs Indegênes and the Chasseurs d'Afrique, followed closely by three battalions and a field battery, commanded by General d'Autemarre. These troops ought to decide the issue of the combat, but the Russians did not yield at the first blow. Halting for a moment, they began again to advance: the Regiments of Takutsk and Okhotsk attacked the French in front, while the Regiment of Selinghinsk turned their right flank, but the Zouaves and the Africans were already engaged with the Russians. Worn out by a struggle so long and so murderous, without strength or ammunition, the Regiment

of Selinghinsk, attacked by two battalions of fresh troops, was hurled into the ravine, and commenced its retreat. It was then that the fate of the battle was definitely decided, and nothing more remained for us than to effect our retrograde movement.

"This was accomplished with great order and extraordinary obstinacy. The Russians now sustained new and enormous losses from the fire of the French batteries, which approaching to within 350 yards of the retreating columns, poured a fire of grape on the Takutsk and Okhotsk Regiments.

"As the French troops continued their successful attack, the English, having recovered and being supplied with cartridges, joined their allies. At the same time, about midday, D'Autemarre's troops came into action, stationing themselves on the hill at Battery No. 1, while Monet's troops stood by Battery No. 2.

"General Dannenberg seeing the approach of fresh troops to the enemy, and having lost all hope of holding the position, took measures for retreat. Having behind him very inconvenient descents along

the steep slopes of the hill, he was well aware of all the difficulties of a retreat in sight of the enemy, and besides with a great number of guns much injured in the battle. He understood all the danger of the situation of the regiments of the 11th Division, which were exhausted by the battle and hard pressed by a powerful enemy, who had just been reinforced by fresh troops.

"In consequence of this, at one o'clock, p.m., General Dannenberg, in order to cover the retreat, brought forward the Wladimir Regiment, and ordered the heavy batteries, which had suffered most, to be transported through the Careening Ravine to Sebastopol. The light batteries remained in position under cover of the combined division.

"The Wladimir Regiment, having formed its front battalions into columns of companies, advanced to meet the retreating regiments of the 11th Division, and took up a position on the Cossack Hill.

"By keeping the enemy in check for a while, the Wladimir battalions gave the regiments of the 11th Division an opportunity of retreating unmolested; but

they themselves suffered severely. When Bosquet, supported by d'Autemarre's brigade, began a decided and steady attack, the Wladimir Regiment began also to retire. At the same time, the remaining three regiments of the combined division and the artillery were ordered to retreat towards the Inkerman dam.

"Bosquet, seeing the dangerous condition of our retreating troops, began to press on our rear-guard still more hotly. At half-past two o'clock, the last of our batteries had left the position; and about three o'clock, Bosquet placed a battery on a height situated opposite the head of the Volovia Ravine, in order to act against our troops which were at that time crossing the long Inkerman bridge and causeway; but the steamers 'Wladimir' and 'Chersonese,' anchored in the roads opposite the mouth of the Soushilnaia Ravine, opened such a rapid and well-aimed fire on the French, that they were immediately obliged to retreat.

"Our troops retreated in two directions. Those of the Inkerman camp marched towards the bridge of the Tchernaya, and those which had been stationed in Sebastopol before the battle crossed the bridge and mouth of the Careening Ravine.

"The enemy contented himself with bringing forward his riflemen and batteries. But the guns acting from behind Battery No. 1, and from behind the Mikriukoff Ravine, could not do much damage to our troops at such a great distance. The fire of the riflemen was far more successful.

"While the greater part of the infantry had already crossed the bridge of the Tchernaya and the mouth of the Careening Ravine, our artillery, wearied by the long-continued fight, and weakened by loss of men, was moving slowly along the Sapper Road."

Todleben then describes the retreat, which he justly says was executed in good order and with extreme tenacity, under the cruel losses caused by the concentrated fire of artillery and rifles. To Bosquet he assigns the credit of pressing their rearguard with artillery, which, however, was obliged to withdraw by the fire of the steamers. The Russians fell back in two different directions. Those from Inkerman made for the bridge over the Tchernaya, and those from Sebastopol returned by the mouth of Careening Ravine. The artillery slowly crawled away down the "Sappers' Road." What a prize lay within our grasp!

"At this moment the enemy's artillery succeeded in disabling some waggons of the train which blocked up the way, and while the infantry were already entering Sebastopol by the shore, the artillery stopped, filling up the whole space between the mouth of Careening Ravine and the Ravine of St. George. Profiting by this delay, the enemy's sharpshooters, hid in brushwood, came so close to our guns that they were on the point of taking them. Colonel de Todleben, who by chance was on the spot, seeing the danger which menaced our artillery, immediately took a company of the Regiment of Ouglitch, which was near at hand, and deployed them as skirmishers, halted the Regiment of Bontirsk, which closed the march of the column, and placed two battalions of the regiment on two lines in columns of company, keeping the two other battalions in reserve. At the same time, to reanimate the *morale* of our troops and stop the enemy, Colonel de Todleben caused four guns which he found by him to advance and open fire, and they were soon joined by others. . . . It was only at eight o'clock at night that all our artillery had succeeded in passing the line of defence."

There is no doubt considerable censure veiled under

the dry phrases in which Todleben next alludes to the inactivity of Prince Gortschakoff down in the valley of Balaklava, who contented himself with a futile cannonade, and let Bosquet see at once that he meant nothing serious, and he points out how, at eleven o'clock, there were only 3,288 men of the enemy spread over the space between the Woronzoff Road to the Balaklava Road, in face of a force of nine battalions, twenty squadrons, and forty guns, which did nothing. Next he describes Timoféieff's sortie on the French and its repulse, followed by De Lourmel's pursuit and charge on the Russian works, in which he lost his life and that of many men. There were spectators that day who, looking from the right where the two 18-pounders were beginning to assert their superiority over the Russian guns, saw for a moment on the left great explosions near the Bastion du Mât, and plainly discerned through the glass the red trousers of the French infantry, who seemed to have got quite inside the enemy's batteries, but many incidents of that tremendous day's fighting will never be known clearly for long years to come.

Todleben affirms that out of 34,835 men who took part in the action, six Generals, 256 officers, and

10,467 soldiers were killed, wounded, and contusioned. Timoféieff lost twenty-three officers and 1,071 men. Lord Raglan estimated the forces of the Russians and their loss at a much higher number. The loss of the Allies was eleven Generals, 263 officers, and 4,109 rank and file, of which 147 officers, and 2,465 soldiers were English. The difference in the losses Todleben ascribes to the conditions of attack and to the difference of armament.

"If self-denial, enthusiasm, and courage are enough to insure victory, assuredly it would have been on the side of the Russians, although it is only just to recognise the fact that in valour and in tenacity they encountered worthy rivals in the English. But for war these conditions alone do not suffice. There must be others not less necessary, and the Russians did not possess them."

In his usual elaborate engineering way, in which every word is used like a gabion, Todleben sets to work to show—first, that the ground prevented the Russians acting in masses together, which was the sole mode of guaranteeing success; second, that the superiority of armament on the side of the English

prevented any approach to a charge, and caused enormous losses at a distance; third, that the English infantry was helped always at the proper time by its artillery, and that the Russians were not.

"First of all, it should be said, that the narrowness of the field of battle paralyzed the movements of our troops. The ground between the Careening Ravine and the Tchernaya did not allow us to bring out all our forces at once, and so to take advantage of the numerical superiority of the Russian army. We had to bring our troops into action by piecemeal, thus losing the advantages of the simultaneous action of a great mass, which alone could insure the success of our enterprise. On beginning the battle, our infantry immediately felt the superior manner in which the English were armed. The English troops, armed with rifles, opened fire at long range and did great mischief to our troops, before the latter could approach the enemy near enough to use their muskets. Even before we came up to the enemy, our troops had already lost a great number of their officers, which naturally weakened their energy and disturbed the unity of action. When our troops did at last approach to such a distance from the enemy as equalized

the difference in their arms, they were already weakened by the losses they had sustained, and besides could not always count on success. Not being able to cope with the enemy at a great distance by the use of fire-arms, our troops could not feel fully assured that, even after having got up to the enemy through a murderous fire, they would measure their strength with him in a hand-to-hand fight. Very often the English, having opened fire at long range, allowed our troops to come up very near to them; and when our men reached them, after having passed through a galling fire, the English would begin to retreat, increasing their fire as they did so. Without regarding all the disadvantages of their position, heedless of losses and despising death, our troops pressed on the retreating enemy, pursuing him under the concentrated fire of the English artillery, and only when quite exhausted and enfeebled they withdrew, suffering all the disadvantages of a retreat in view of a well-armed enemy.

"The English artillery always came to the assistance of their infantry, mowing down the Russian columns and skirmishers with a fire of grape. But our troops were deprived of the support of their artillery.

"Having taken up a position on the Cossack Hill, our artillery, considered by itself, acted at Inkerman with great art and coolness against the artillery of the enemy; but it scarcely gave any assistance to our infantry. At the beginning it opened fire, and in some degree prepared for the success of the battle; but afterwards, when the infantry advanced to the attack, the artillery, though it did not cease firing, yet continued to keep its former position, from which it acted until such time as its own troops came between it and the batteries."

But, though the Allies had repulsed the attack, its results made themselves felt on the siege. The battle produced a profound impression on them. At first, indeed, they even thought of raising the siege. The assault against Bastion No. 4 was put off, and from that time the operations of the Allies gradually assumed a defensive character. How great the change was, and what important issues were introduced into the struggle between the besieger and besieged, will be best described in an analysis of the remaining portion of the second part, which is the last of the first volume.

As we have now arrived at a most important

period in the history of the Crimean campaign, let us follow Todleben in a retrospect of what occurred during the time preceding the battle of Inkerman, which, according to the plan of his work, he calls the "First Period of the Defence." The Allies, by their occupation of the peninsula of the Chersonese, had, in the first place, obtained an excellent military position, covered in the rear by the sea and the heights of Mount Sapoune, and provided with sheltering bays for their fleets, where they could establish depôts in full security protected by their guns. It was by the flank march those advantages were afforded.

When the Allies made their appearance on the peninsula, the works on the south side were almost null, had a very feeble armament, and presented great gaps destitute of any sort of defence. The garrison was very weak, and Menschikoff, to save his communications, had been forced to fall back on Baktchiseraï. These various circumstances gave the Allies the power of attacking the city by storm, and it can be affirmed with certainty—these are Todleben's views and words—that they would have succeeded in taking it, notwithstanding the heroic resistance the garrison would have opposed to them.

The reconnaissances had been made at too great a distance to enable the Allies to calculate exactly the resistance which could be made by the line of defence, and probably on that account the Russian works appeared much stronger than they really were. That was one of the causes which determined the Allies to prepare for the assault by a cannonade of short duration, but extreme violence. They were about three weeks in landing their siege train and arming their batteries. Profiting by the delay, the besieged placed a formidable artillery on the line of defence, and took care to concentrate on the batteries such a strong fire as enabled them to sustain the contest with the besiegers. Thus the Allies saw their projects for the assault miscarry. The French batteries were entirely disorganized. The English batteries succeeded in annihilating, completely, the Grand Redan, and there was in consequence a perfectly open space in that part of the line of defence. Although the army was quite ready for the assault, the influence of the grave check sustained by the French batteries acted so strongly on the Allies, that they made no use of the advantage they had gained, and set about to repair the damage done to their batteries, in order to begin soon after a regular siege. With that aim they chose for the

principal point of attack, bastion No. 4 (du Mât, or Flagstaff bastion). The French pushed their way with remarkable rapidity, considering the nature of the soil, so that on the night of the 2nd of November, after fifteen days from the opening of their trenches, they had already opened their third parallel, and were within sixty-five sagenes of the capital of the bastion. The besieged used every means in their power to strengthen the point attacked, and to impede the French by concentrated fire. If the Russians did not succeed in checking the French approaches, it was because it was difficult in dark nights and at considerable distances to ascertain the exact spot where the enemy was working. Experience has proved that even the most powerful artillery cannot arrest the progress of approaches beyond the distance of 200 paces. At shorter distances, by means of continuous watching, the garrison can find out all the enemy is doing. To overcome the difficulty, permanent posts were established, to watch the enemy as closely as possible. Having shut up the French batteries on the 17th of October, the Russians concentrated their efforts on the re-establishment of an equilibrium in the contest of bastion No. 3 (Grand Redan), with the powerful English batteries. They soon succeeded in

reinforcing their artillery at that point, while the English did almost nothing to augment the power of their batteries. From that time forward, Bastion No. 3 yielded nothing to the English batteries, and the struggle at that point was continued with success. Meanwhile, all the efforts of the besiegers were directed to crush bastion No. 4, against which they raised new batteries. As soon as the Russians saw any place where the parapets appeared to have been thickened, they concluded the enemy was about to establish batteries there, and proceeded at once to throw up new works or modified the embrasures of existing batteries, to paralyze the efforts of the besiegers to acquire a superiority of fire over the line of defence. On the 1st of November, the besiegers opened their new batteries, and succeeded in obtaining a decisive advantage over the Flagstaff Bastion. Its artillery was crushed again and again, and the work was rendered perfectly accessible to an attack. Recognizing the greatness of the danger, and the absolute insufficiency of the means of defence of the bastion, the Russians established batteries behind it, and at the same time took measures to blow up, at a given moment, both it and the Grand Redan—as well as to secure the retreat of the troops by constructing

barricades in the city and converting the Sailors' Barracks at the Karabelnaia into a central redoubt. From the beginning of the siege, Prince Menschikoff had been impatiently expecting reinforcements to create a diversion and relieve the besieged city. After the action of Balaklava on the 25th of October, where the Russians were victorious, although their success had little influence on the ulterior progress of the regular attack, Prince Menschikoff assumed the offensive, but unfortunately the Russians lost the Battle of Inkerman, and it was to be presumed the situation of Sebastopol was about to become more critical than ever.

It soon, however, became evident that the influence of that battle on the Allies was quite different from what the Russians had thought. Although the Russians had sustained a check and had lost three times as many men as the Allies, the battle had, nevertheless, produced on the latter a profound impression, for it had shown them the numbers of the Russians, and proved they were ready to take the offensive on the first favourable occasion. The definite result of the battle was that the Allies, abandoning their offensive operations, changed their

plans and thought no longer of doing more than defend themselves against the attacks of the Russians. It is a fact that after the 5th of November the besiegers continued the violence of their artillery fire for only a few days, and that from the day in question the gradual decrease of the bombardment could be remarked. The approach of the French to bastion No. 4 did not advance a step after they had opened their third parallel. On the contrary, they took steps to secure the two flanks of their attack, while the English set to work actively to fortify their position on the heights of Careening Bay. On their side the Russians, profiting by the increasing weakness of the besiegers' fire, were enabled to undertake vast works to give the greatest liberty of action to the line of defence. On the 14th of November occurred the tempest which caused such dreadful losses to the Allies by sea and by land. Todleben says that "the oldest inhabitants" of the peninsula never had seen the like of it. From the town they could see an extraordinary agitation in the allied camp, trees torn up, and men running in all directions. Soon they heard guns of distress from ships ashore at the Katcha. The waves rose to a prodigious height. All communication across the roads of Sebastopol

became almost impossible, and many of the vessels stationed there were dashed against the quays. The 'Silistria,' one of the sunken liners which barred the entrance, had its deck carried away, and received severe damage. All along the line of defence the trenches and the shell holes were filled with water, which threatened to drown the magazines. An extract from the journal of the Grand Duke Constantine indicates how the Russian fleet, sheltered as it was in Sebastopol, suffered from that tremendous storm.

And here we must pause for a moment in this abstract of the work to notice one fact. M. de Todleben says that "By order of the Commander-in-Chief we took on our side the necessary measures to save, as far as possible, the crews of the ships" thrown on the coast. In another chapter he describes what these measures were. Off Eupatoria there were, he says, seventeen vessels cast ashore, of which seven grounded at Point Sak. During the hurricane General Korff, rightly supposing the attention of the garrison would be directed to the aid of the shipping, undertook a reconnaissance of Eupatoria. and "s'empressa de profiter de cette circonstance favorable." He accordingly put his corps in motion,

and at 900 yards from the city opened fire and threw shell into the place. The enemy replied with congreve rockets and feeble howitzers, which did no damage, and after a cannonade of an hour General Korff retired. But his troops were taking every means to save the crews of the shipwrecked vessels. Major Jolinsky, with some Cossacks and a peloton of lancers, anxious for the medal of the Humane Society, set off to rescue a great merchantman which was ashore. Scarcely had he got near her before he was received by the fire of artillery from on board, and the benevolent Jolinsky, who received a severe wound in the head, was obliged to retire. They were more fortunate with the crew of an Italian goëlette, twelve in number, who surrendered "without resistance" to the Lancers and Cossacks. Meanwhile another good Samaritan was at work elsewhere. One General Major Terpilewsky, of the Leopold of Austria Lancers, hearing that a third vessel was on shore, took with him a peloton of his regiment and two guns (the latter doubtless to throw hawsers) and proceeded to the spot, but his humane intentions were balked, as there was no one on board. So he opened fire upon the vessel and burnt it. But the Russians had not exhausted all their means of saving life. One Colonel

Roslavlew (one likes to know the names of these good men), of the Regiment of Novoarkhangelsk, having heard of another great transport ashore, set off with four guns and another peloton of Lancers for the spot. The ship was under English colours. "When our Artillery had arrived we shook a white flag. The vessel followed our example, and lowering the English flag, hoisted a white one, but the boats which had been put on shore at first were hoisted up." Could anything be more natural? The English saw the cannon all ready, and, of course, did not like to trust themselves to the boats, perhaps, because they expected every moment to have a line thrown to them by the friendly Artillery. At best the objects of guns were liable to misconstruction under the circumstances. Roslavlew, burning with philanthropy, took his measures at once. "Two round shots were then fired by us so as to pass through the sides of the ship, as, after half an hour's delay, she *had not replied to our signal.* Our artillery fired two more shots, one of which carried away the bulwark of the ship. This demonstration produced its effects, the boats were launched, and the crew, consisting of the captain, two mates, twenty-eight English sailors, and seven Turks succeeded in landing." What fol-

lows is still more interesting. The captain explained that the ship was the Culloden, and that she had 700 pounds of powder, 32,000 shot and shell, and thirty-two Arab horses, "and that there still remained on board twenty-five men of the Turkish cavalry." The captain was asked to take them on shore, but he refused, on the plea that he could not risk his sailors' lives in such a tremendous sea to save the Turks. While the Russians were sending off their prisoners, they saw a large man-of-war making for the Culloden. "This incident, joined to the determination not to permit the enemy to tow off the merchantman, decided the commandant of the 2nd Brigade of Lancers, General Major Prince Radzivill, of the suite of His Majesty the Emperor, to order our four pieces of artillery, placed on the coast, to fire on the ship, so as to sink her." He knew there were seven-and-twenty human beings on board helpless, hopeless, unless he aided them! And this Russian nobleman, who is known in high society for his charming manners, polished air, and pleasant smile, carried out Prince Menschikoff's orders, and took the following means of saving their lives. "The cannonade lasted about an hour, and although the distance was considerable, our artillery set fire to the

Culloden three times, but each time the waves which broke over the ship extinguished the flames. At last the ship, having had its sides much injured, sank altogether. After this the expedition, at five o'clock, returned to their respective posts." Now, where was the great man-of-war coming at all speed to the merchantman all this time? She ought to have stopped the amiable efforts of the Russians, and swept their artillery off the beach—if she was there at all. But she drops mysteriously out of the narrative. Next day, however, Lieut.-General de Korff, taking six shell-guns and two pelotons, returns to the shore, "*se diriger sur le navire submergé dans le dessein de sauver les Turcs.*" This is the first time we ever knew the Turks were amphibious, and that they could live in a ship under water. The Cossacks set off in two boats, and actually found twenty-five Turks on board, of whom one only was wounded by a shell, put them on shore, and fired the vessel. And so ended the labours of the Good Samaritans about Eupatoria.

The storm, however, which inflicted so much damage, determined a crisis in the temperature, and from November the 14th the weather became sombre and cold, frost set in, and rain alternated with snow.

The clay became soft and turned into deep mud, and the communication between the trenches and bastions, and the city itself, became very difficult. We have always been accustomed to think the Russians were much better off there than we were. Todleben, however, says :—

"Their condition was most trying. They wanted altogether shelter and warm clothing. They had for the most part remained night and day in the line of defence since the opening of the siege, and had not been relieved as the troops of the Allies had been. Wounds or death alone had put a term to their sufferings and privations. Cholera began to rage with violence, and dysentery and fevers of various kinds made many victims. The besiegers had less to suffer, for they were only obliged to keep two or three brigades at furthest in the trenches at a time, while those in camp were sheltered in tents. The Russians could only permit the general reserve to go under cover in the houses of the city, and in expectation of an assault, were compelled to keep the greater part of their force in the open works. Notwithstanding the more favourable condition of the Allies, however, deserters began to arrive inside the lines in consider-

able numbers. The Russians learned from them that the *morale* of the besiegers was singularly affected, that they were harassed by fatigue and suffered from cold, that the hospitals were filled with sick, and that the deplorable state of the roads rendered it exceedingly difficult to supply the batteries. And, indeed, after November 14, the embrasures remained for the most part masked, and a shot was rarely heard, though the fire of mortars and musketry was a little more lively. The besieged also diminished their fire on account of the exhaustion of powder and material, but the Russians worked at their defences unceasingly, and began to establish on the principal parts powerful works closed at the gorge. They resolved on that step because the nature of the soil prevented the erection of works equally strong along the whole front of the extended lines of defence. Even if it had been possible to fortify the city equally along all the line, it would have been necessary to spread out the troops and weaken them at all points, and then they could not concentrate on any given point for mutual support, as the ravines rendered the movement of columns along the line very inconvenient. To obtain possession of Sebastopol there was no need to attack the lines in the ravines. It would be enough for the

enemy to get possession of some of the works on the heights. These heights, indeed, indicated the places which should be fortified in preference to others, but in order to prevent the enemy turning the works on these points before the Russian reserves could arrive, it was necessary to close them at the gorge. The defence gained, we were able to make a marked reduction in the number of troops within the works, and a corresponding increase to the reserve; it followed that the loss from the enemy's fire diminished, and that the besieged were strengthened in their means of repelling assaults."

General Todleben insists on this point all the more, perhaps, because some critics have blamed him for closing the gorges of the works, and have insisted that the Malakoff was lost in consequence; and he concludes by saying, "The establishment on the line of defence of works closed at the gorge, was in strict conformity with the rules of tactics and of fortification long known and sanctioned by experience." While they were carrying on these works, the batteries, especially those of the English, fired very rarely, but a new phase in the operations was created by the employment of what Todleben calls "ambuscades,"

or, as we called them, "rifle-pits," which the Russians established in the first instance to enfilade the French approaches towards the Bastion du Mât, at the beginning of November. Finding them very efficacious, the Russians extended them gradually in front of the Greenhill Batteries, and away to the left till they were opposite Gordon's Batteries in front of the Malakoff and Careening Ravine. These rifle-pits gave rise to a series of fights outside the works, in which the besiegers and besieged had various fortune. On the 21st of November the English attacked the ambuscades in front of the Greenhill, drove out the Russians, and occupied the line; but, according to Todleben, the Russians generally had the best of these night encounters and sorties. He repeatedly remarks on the want of vigilance and care of the English, and contrasts us very unfavourably in these respects with the French. One time (the 23rd of November) it is a small body of volunteers who attack us, "*ayant aperçu les avant-postes anglais plongés dans une insouciante sécurité*;" another time (the 2nd of December) sixty volunteers in the dawn approach the English third parallel without being remarked, attack with the bayonet and put to rout 260 men, kill and wound one officer and thirty men, carry

off three prisoners, rifles, and pioneers' tools. The same night sixty volunteers come out at eight o'clock and approach an English picket in the Laboratory Ravine without being observed, suddenly charge our soldiers, kill ten, take one prisoner, the rest fly. In speaking of similar attacks directed against our allies, Todleben says, "It must be admitted, however, that the French *avant-postes* were always exceedingly vigilant, and that they never permitted our scouts to come very near." Although the artillery fire on both sides was much relaxed in the latter part of November, the fusillade and mortar fire became more intense, and the French worked with such energy towards the Schwartz Redoubt, on the Russian right of the lines of defence, where the ground was very favourable, that it became necessary to have recourse to a new system of offensive counter works, which was, in fact, an amplification and improvement of the system of rifle-pits. To this new system Todleben gives the name of "*logements*"—lodgments. He describes them as small portions of detached trenches, executed by flying sap, in advance of the line, and so near to the enemy's trenches that those inside could watch all the works by night, and impede their progress by a close fire. The essential difference

between rifle-pits and lodgments was, that the former were made by the soldiers themselves as they pleased, were constructed without skill, were inconvenient to fire from, and offered no sufficient resistance to artillery, while lodgments were made on plans properly selected by workmen specially assigned for the purpose, and were so constructed as to be able to resist artillery fire, and to be fit for musketry. They were ordinarily made in two lines, and were so open in the rear that they could not afford cover to an enemy. Experience of sieges has shown, Todleben thinks, that the fire of the besieged causes most mischief, not when the besieger has succeeded in covering his working parties, but when he is occupied in distributing them along the trace line to begin the trenches. It is otherwise difficult, if not impossible, for the besieged to seize at night the precise time when besiegers begin their works. The difficulty of knowing when the fire of the besieged will be successful, and of seizing on the precious moment, is one of the principal causes why, in nearly every siege, the enemy are able to work through the space between the first and the third parallel faster than is calculated in the journal of a siege work for practice. It is true the opening of the third parallel does not

necessarily cause the fall of a place, but in the face of the feeble works of Sebastopol it was requisite to use every means to prevent the enemy coming too close, and to impede his approaches as far as possible. As only one twentieth of the Russian infantry had rifles, and the besiegers could in consequence work without danger at any point which was 300 yards from infantry armed with smooth-bores, it was necessary to establish these lodgments as close as possible to the enemy. The occupants had to harass the enemy night and day by musketry fire, and at the same time watch them most closely, and communicate the direction of any unusual movement to the line of defence, so that the latter might open fire on the place, the riflemen at the same time quitting the lodgment in front of the battery by the right and left flanks for the neighbouring lodgments. The front of these works was executed in front of the Schwartz Redoubt (No. 1), on the night of the 3rd of December. In the morning the French saw with astonishment a work thirty feet long, with a parapet five feet thick, formed of barrels and sandbags, within 300 yards of their trenches, from which twenty riflemen immediately opened on their working parties. A second lodgment was thrown up in rear of the

first on the night of the 3rd of December, and on the following nights five lodgments were established on the right of these, which were finally connected, and constituted, in fact, a parallel made by the besieged to attack the works of the besiegers. The approaches of the French on that point were at once arrested, and they proceeded to direct their attention towards the Quarantine Battery. But the Russians were equally active—nay, more so. Between the 7th and 22nd of December they had checkmated the French by establishing no less than fourteen lodgments before Bastion No. 5, and five lodgments between the Cemetery and Quarantine Battery. They also strengthened their right wing with new guns and batteries. The French, checked on the left, then directed their energies to Bastion No. 4, and began to blast the rock to force their approaches. The Russians, between the 6th and 7th of December, made two lodgments on one flank of it, and on the night of the 10th of December threw up two other lodgments on the other flank, of which the most advanced was only 150 yards from the third parallel. Rifle-pits were also established to harass the English in their works, which were further off than those of the French.

"The enemy opposed the construction of the rifle-

pits and lodgments but feebly, while the besieged alarmed them by frequent night attacks. These attacks were most frequently directed against the English, who performed trench duty very negligently. Almost every night our Tirailleurs in small numbers —sometimes one man alone making the attempt— left the rifle-pits, advanced boldly towards the English trenches, fired on the working batteries with the muzzle almost touching, and threw them into trouble and disorder."

Against the French some serious sorties were directed at the same time.

On the night of the 3rd of December a detachment issuing from the left face of bastion No. 4, without being perceived by the French, attacked their third parallel, and caused them sensible loss before they retired. On the night of the 5th of December another sortie was directed against the English near the Pain du Sucre and the Green-hill, drove them out and destroyed their works; and on the night of the 12th of December a sortie of 515 Russians from bastion No. 4 was directed against the French, drove them out of their trench and levelled it, spiked four large mortars, captured and carried off three others, and

retired with a loss of only 64 men. In fact, the Russians now began a war of sorties, which was waged night after night, and the account of which fills many pages of the second part of this history.

Todleben remarks:—

"*Apropos* of those sorties it is indispensable to make the remark here that the French guarded their trenches with much more vigilance, and defended them with incomparably more tenacity than the English. It frequently happened that our volunteers approached the English trenches without being perceived, and without even firing a single shot, and found the soldiers of the guard sitting in the trench in the most perfect security, far from their firelocks, which were stacked in piles. With the French matters were quite different. They were always on the *qui vive*, so that it rarely happened we were able to get near them without having been remarked, and without having to receive beforehand a sharp fire of musketry."

It must be recollected, however, that the period to which he refers comprised the most memorable of the long days during which our troops were in the

"heartrending" condition which excited the pity and indignation of the empire. It was at this very time Osten Sacken inaugurated his rule as Commandant of the garrison of Sebastopol, by important improvements in different branches of the administration, a detailed account of which is given in the work before us. The utmost economy in the various services of the garrison was enjoined and carried out. The rangements for the internal duties of each regiment were revised and amended. The number of men employed as butchers, bakers, &c., was regulated. No duty connected with the external or internal efficiency of the garrison seems to have been neglected, and it is remarkable that while it was the custom with us to employ detachments in working parties, the Russians adopted the opposite system, and employed, as far as possible, the whole of a regiment on any particular work at the same place. The offensive nature of the defence of the place also assumed greater vigour and larger proportions, and the countermines directed against the French, who had now abandoned their sap against the Flagstaff Battery, and were working against it underground, were pushed forward with energy. The description of these works is full of interest for the engineer and

military reader. Both sides displayed intelligence and indefatigable zeal in the approaches and counter-approaches, but the Russians had the best of it as regards information. Now it was a deserter from the Légion Etrangère who gave them such intelligence as enabled them to calculate the day when the French would reach the spot beneath the counterscarp of the bastion. Another time Todleben received from Prince Menschikoff a plan of the mines, *lithographed in Paris*, very imperfect without doubt, but in which there was marked a gallery in the direction of the head of bastion No. 4, with a chamber under the terre-plein of the salient. Such indications gave the Russian engineer the means of disposing his galleries and countermines so as to guard against the impending danger; and the French were astonished from time to time to find their plans defeated by news which, without their knowing of it, was derived from themselves.

As the weather became worse the position of the Russians, as compared with that of our troops, must certainly have improved. Subterranean casemates were constructed to shelter the troops from fire, which must also have kept them from the cold, to a

great extent. The sailors invented those famous rope mantlets for the guns, which served so well to defend their gunners from the riflemen in the pits. Large reinforcements enabled them to lighten the turns of duty in the trenches, and at no time did the army want meat and spirits, as far as we can judge from the remarks on their condition in this work, although they were sometimes short of bread, and were obliged to use other substances in lieu of it. Whilst the Government at home, roused at last to the danger in which the remnants of the British army were placed, by voices which they at first ignored, despised, or contradicted, were taking steps to save, as far as possible, the victims of "the system" from utter destruction, and to avert from their own heads the storm of public indignation, the Emperor Nicholas set every force in his vast empire at work to give his army an overwhelming preponderance in the field, and to force the Allies to retire from the scene to which they adhered with such tenacity. The Czar was aided by the spontaneous contributions of his people. Great supplies were forwarded by private individuals of all that an army could need, and those who read Todleben will see that the people of Great Britain did not monopolize the charity, the

sacrifices, and the devotion which the great struggle on the Crimean Chersonese called forth.

The 25th and last chapter of the Second Part deals with the situation of both armies during the winter, and gives an account of the Russian commissariat up to February, 1855. We shall, as usual, give an abstract of it, nearly in Todleben's words. The Allies, he observes, counted on a speedy termination of the Crimean war, for otherwise it would be impossible to explain the absolute want of foresight which exposed their armies all on a sudden to the inclemencies of winter, without any means of protection. The English and the Turks, deprived of warm clothing, suffered most sensibly. The situation of the French was less painful, but they were by no means provided with all necessaries. They did not, however, expose their sad condition, "as the English were not afraid of doing;" on the contrary, they took great pains to dissemble it, so that it is difficult to determine precisely to what extent they had to suffer from the defects of their arrangements, particularly as by the side of their allies their state appeared much more favourable. It cannot be denied that they showed great energy in lessening the effect

of the rigorous season. Towards the end of November the French army was provided with warm clothing. The English received warm clothing in December, but the coats were not sent in sufficient quantity and did not answer their purpose. All the imperfections of the administration of the English army were brought out to full view during the campaign, and it could be seen also to what an extent their mode of recruiting by voluntary enlistment was defective. There was no harmony between the different branches of the administration. The commandants of the troops took no care of the food or well-being of their soldiers, leaving that duty to the "intendance," which could not know the wants of the men, and had besides no means of satisfying them. The recruit enlists under certain conditions, and does not think it necessary to execute labours not provided for in these conditions. Moreover, the ranks of the English army are filled almost exclusively by men unacquainted with any sort of trade, and who have no other means of subsistence than entering the service. Such a soldier is quite unfit to get on in the more difficult moments of campaigning, and so it was that the greater part of the miseries the English soldiers had to endure arose from the fact

that the army, as a whole, was incapable, without receiving help from abroad, of overcoming obstacles arising from the circumstances in which it was placed. Rains destroyed the roads, and no one thought of repairing them. Transport and saddle horses perished of cold in multitudes, and their dead bodies were left to rot till the fetid atmosphere forced the authorities to order their removal. In March, 1855, the railway was finished by the English, for which not only materials but even workmen and engineers were sent out from England, which proves how unfit the English army is of itself to overcome the difficulties which are so often encountered in a soldier's life. A deplorable confusion reigned in Balaklava. Ships discharged their cargoes whenever they found it convenient. No one knew what had arrived or what was coming. Sometimes the soldiers were in need of the very articles which had been landed in harbour. The same discreditable mismanagement was visible in the treatment of the sick and wounded, and there was as much disorder there as in the administration of the army itself, though the arrival of Miss Nightingale and her nurses in some degree alleviated the situation of the unfortunates in the hospitals in Turkey. As the numbers of the English dimin-

ished those of the French increased, and at last the latter occupied successively the positions which had at first been reserved for the English along the Tchernaya and opposite the Karabelnaia. As to the Turks, the Allies despised them, and the English used them as beasts of burden; in short, they lost 300 men a day, till they almost perished out, and the remains of their army were sent away. Let us now see how the Russian army fared during the winter. The regiments belonging to the garrison, Todleben says, had no shelter. The troops along the Tchernaya were lodged in huts, made from materials found on the spot, which protected them but very poorly against the weather. The rest of the army was encamped in huts or quartered in villages around. Although the Russians were in a more favourable position than the Allies as regards shelter, they were much less fortunate in reference to the carriage of food and provisions. If the Allies felt it difficult to get up their stores from the harbours to their camps, it may be imagined to what extent the Russians experienced similar troubles in the transport of supplies from the interior of the empire, and if they triumphed over them, it was only due to the combined efforts of the military and civil administrations, and to the

empressement with which the Russian people showed itself ready to make any sacrifice to carry on the war. As the Crimea had no resources, everything had to be imported. In ordinary times the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff made amends for the defect of good roads, but these were now closed and the Dnieper, shut up by ice in winter, was of little use. There remained only the road along the south coast, which was soon cut up by rain and constant heavy traffic. Towards the end of November 30,000 great coats were sent to the army, but as they were not enough the soldiers in the trenches had wrappers made of bread-bags served out to them. The small number of troops in the Crimea on the war breaking out was only provisioned to July, 1853, and it was with the utmost difficulty Prince Menschikoff was able to feed the army as reinforcements poured in upon him. There was an absolute want of biscuits, and the peasants of the Crown, the German colonists of the Government of Tauride, and the bakers of the *corps d'armée* outside Sebastopol were set to work to bake them. Commissions of Supply were established at Sebastopol, Simpheropol, and Voronege, which were under Prince Menschikoff's Intendant-General. Contracts were entered into for supplies

for an army of 100,000 infantry and 30,000 cavalry for three months, to be stored at Perekop, Ghenitscheck, and other places; 195,000 tchetverts of flour, meal, &c., and 410,000 pounds of hay, meat, and bacon. The military chest was supplied with 1,825,000 silver roubles, or about 290,000*l.*, to purchase from private individuals. The Governors of New Russia, Bessarabia, Koursk, Voronege, Kharkov, and Ekaterinoslav were directed to use all their energies to obtain and convey provisions to the army. The Intendant-General, Sattler, from whose work Todleben quotes largely, was sent to the Crimea in December, and the whole army was soon apparently provided with supplies to the end of 1855. But in reality it was far otherwise. The depôts near Sebastopol were soon emptied, while those at a distance were untouched. Although the soldiers had butcher's meat they were sometimes left without bread, and it was only by the most prodigal efforts that supplies could be conveyed during the winter. Three demi-brigades of 1,000 waggons each, drawn by oxen and horses, were organized, in addition to seven other demi-brigades of the same strength, in various parts of Southern Russia, and these were strengthened and increased from

time to time, till there were in the Crimea at the beginning of the siege 6,000 waggons and a moveable depôt of 1,000 bât horses. In December, however, only 2,000 waggons were fit for use, and the greater number of the horses had died of hard work on bad roads and of exposure. Their dead bodies were buried at once. The cost of transport became enormous as the winter wore on, and the prices of provisions depended very much on distance and on locality—a tchetvert of barley being worth twelve roubles at Sebastopol, and six roubles at Perekop. As to the hospitals, there was much to complain of at first, when the wounded of Alma and Inkerman came to be provided for; but steps were taken to obtain accommodation and appliances as far as possible, although the want of buildings and of roads created great difficulties. With winter, too, came cholera, dysentery, and fever. The wounded and sick increased from 16,755 in the middle of October, to 25,000 in February, while there was only accommodation for 14,250 in the Crimea. From all parts of the empire, indeed, persons sent lint, bandages, &c., by post to the army. The crown peasants and the German colonists of Melitopol and Berdiansk gave proof of the most sympathetic devotion in offering to take charge of a

certain number of sick and wounded. Those who could not be accommodated were sent away to various places in Southern Russia, in the waggons which had discharged their loads, or in hired vehicles.

Having thus described the condition of the armies in the winter, Todleben reviews the position of each on the opening of the spring campaign. The creation of the new levies of soldiers rendered necessary did not, he observes, present the same difficulty to France that it did to England. The conscription afforded to the former the number of men she needed; while the system adopted in England could not be as successful in time of war as in peace, especially when the disastrous situation of our army was a mystery to no one. Nevertheless, the Government at first resolved to enrol none but English. The Militia were called out to replace the irregular troops, so as to furnish volunteers, but eventually the English Government was obliged to seek for men in Switzerland and Germany. The Swiss only enrolled themselves in very small numbers, and in Germany public opinion and the Governments of some of the States were opposed to enrolment. Russia, on the other hand, prepared to continue the war with all her strength. Indepen-

dently of the new recruits who were summoned to their regiments, the Emperor Nicholas decreed the levy of a Militia of twenty-three in the 1,000 all over the empire. The distance of the theatre of war obliged the Allies to make enormous sacrifices to maintain their army. The augmentation of the public debt of France reached 800,000,000f., and the military budget of England increased by 16,000,000*l.* sterling. On the subject of the Russian debt and expenditure, Todleben makes no remark. His history of that most melancholy winter, contained in the chapters preceding that of which we have just given the substance, is replete with accounts of sorties, new works, new batteries, and the continual strengthening of the armaments of other batteries, which in the middle of December reached "No. 73," each being distinguished by the name of the officer in charge of it or of its construction, as well as by the numeral. The Russians, although principally anxious to check the French attacks towards the Quarantine and the Bastion du Mât, did not neglect to keep a vigilant eye on the English, and to direct a cannonade and sorties on any working parties or new trenches. They established batteries on the heights of Inkerman to fire on our camp and to enfilade our approaches on the

right of the attack. All this they did, although they were exposed to hail, rain, and snow, were harassed with fatigue and want of rest, and destitute of proper warm clothing, while the mud in rear of the trenches became so deep that the soldiers could scarcely march through it. But any comparison of the sufferings of the two armies is disposed of by Todleben's account of their relative condition; and in the passage which bestows no doubt well-merited praise on the devotion of the garrison, he chronicles the arrival of increasing numbers of deserters from the Allies, and principally from the English army, who all gave evidence of the unspeakable calamities which our soldiers endured. It may be imagined how fiercely the Russians had maintained their fire, when it is recorded that they had considerably decreased it at a time when they were firing 1,000 projectiles a day. On the side of the Allies there were few guns now heard in reply. The embrasures of the French batteries were nearly always masked, but mortar and distant ricochet fire was continued, and in front of the long lines of trenches, the outlines of which could be traced through the snow or along the brown, grassless, and shrubless soil, the intermittent rattle of musketry

rang through the wintry air, and the puffs of white smoke marked the site of lodgment and rifle-pit. All during January the Russians directed frequent sorties, sometimes two or three in the night, in the vast majority of instances against the French trenches. Towards the close of the month the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael arrived at the north side, but no remarkable event followed till February 3, when, at nine o'clock in the evening, General Todleben fired his countermine, and blew up the French, who were advancing their gallery towards the capital of the bastion No. 4, in the most perfect ignorance of the Russian operations. From that date began the conflict of mines, countermines, globes of compression, and all the machinery of subterranean war and strategy, which lasted throughout the siege, and has left indelible traces before Sebastopol in the very rocks themselves. In his criticisms Todleben does not spare the French engineers. He remarks on the careless confidence they showed in their mining operations, so that the Russian listeners could hear them plainly, and he dwells on their complete ignorance of the countermines, which they could not have even suspected, otherwise it cannot be explained how the French, he says, could have pushed their gallery

towards the bastion without guarding their flanks in any way, or how they continued the execution of their works without taking any of the precautions usual in such cases. On the 22nd of January, the Russians perceived French soldiers in the two trenches opened by the English across the Careening Ravine-ridge. Prisoners and deserters informed them that the French were charged with the execution of the siege works on the right flank of the English. From that moment it may be considered that our army had been forced by circumstances to give up the chance of playing a very prominent part in the actual siege, whatever reinforcements they might receive. The British were now hemmed in on both flanks by the French, and there was no room for them to undertake new works, no matter what their strength might be. Not only that, but they had abandoned the attack against the site which the sagacity of Sir John Burgoyne had pointed out as the key of the position, a hold of which would enable us to open Sebastopol. What the motives were which induced the English General-in-Chief to allow his army to be enveloped and overlapped, and to be deprived of the ground it had immortalized by its Inkerman, as well as of the only favourable position for advancing

against the Russian works which lay in its front, we shall no doubt learn some time or other. They certainly ought to be cogent. If our Allies had become so strong that they required room, they could have easily extended their right into our works on the left, and have permitted our army to be concentrated from its right towards Inkerman. Such a step might have been taken, so far as we can see, without any loss of *prestige*, though a change in winter of head-quarters, if necessary, might have been inconvenient. Our guns, indeed, might have been left in the Greenhill batteries, but that does not seem an insuperable difficulty, as we had allowed British guns to remain in the hands of the Turks at Balaklava. As to the slight increase of distance from Balaklava of the left wing of our army, there was at least the offset to it that we should have been spared the French traffic across our camp from Kamiesch, and the double use of our roads, and, finally, that we would have avoided the expression of disagreeable feeling manifest between the two armies after the taking of the Malakoff. Be that as it may, the French began to make the most of their new position at once, and in a few days finished and armed the Victoria Redoubt, and opened a trench towards the Malakoff, while we set

about extending our parallel on the right, so as to connect our attack with the new French left.

Notwithstanding the diminution of the fire against the place, the Russians believed the Allies were about to make the assault in the middle of February, and strengthened the garrison in order to meet it. It is at this date Todleben considers the "Second period of the defence" to have terminated, the winter having been employed by the belligerents "in a state, so to speak, of passive activity, principally in making preparations to renew the war in spring. He seizes the occasion to make an *aperçu*, as is his wont, on the organization and operations of the engineers and artillery, as well as to give a review of the whole of the proceedings on both sides during the second period. In this term of "passive activity" the Russians fired about 95,000 projectiles, and lost 2,959 men by the fire of the Allies. They mounted 250 new guns, and they raised the number of pieces in the defence of the south side to no less than 700, without counting mortars and small ordnance; they stored up 40,000 pounds of powder; they constructed innumerable trenches and redoubts, completed the inner line of defence, and secured the north side

against attack by a continuous belt of battery. On the other hand, the Allies had secured their flanks from attack, opening some trenches on Careening Ridge, completing the line of circumvallation, and raising thirty-one new batteries, of which twenty-six were erected by the French, and the remainder by us. From the 5th of November to the 12th of February there were no operations *en rase campagne*, but from the beginning of the siege the Russians had jealously watched Eupatoria, in which a great number of Tartars had taken refuge, and Todleben boasts that the Cossacks from time to time carried away more than 40,000 head of cattle, belonging to these miserable people, from the fields outside the town. It was feared at St. Petersburg that the Allies would make use of their favourable position here to cut off the communications of Prince Menschikoff's army at Sebastopol with Perekop; and the Emperor himself, who seems to have been singularly alive to this danger, expressly ordered three regiments of Dragoons with their batteries, the division of Lancers of reserve, with its artillery, and two regiments of Don Cossacks, to be formed into a corps for the blockade of the place, and the surveillance of all the coast from Alma to Perekop, under Baron de Wrangel.

The Russian authorities were also under the apprehension—a very natural one indeed—that the Allies would attack Perekop, which is certainly the neck of the peninsula, where a strong hand could press the body corporate to death right speedily. Such means of resistance as they had at hand consisted principally of cavalry and light guns, but they were very numerous, and would have given great trouble to troops making a descent on the coast, or to a column on march. Prince Gortschakoff, leaving a small force at Tchorgoune, now retired his corps to Mackenzie's Farm, over the right bank of the Tchernaya, so as to be free to act at once; and every precaution was taken to secure Simpheropol, and the roads leading through it, from hostile occupation by the concentration of an immense force of cavalry and artillery in the Crimea. Troops arrived so rapidly that the Russians had 135,000 men, without including the sailors at Sebastopol, at the commencement of February. Would that Todleben's estimate of our strength at 43,000 about the same date were correct! The French, whom he raises to 80,000, will scarcely claim so high a figure. The Allies had, moreover, the Turkish army under Omar Pacha to draw upon, and it became important to attack Eupatoria before

they could execute their presumed intention of collecting a large force there to effect a fatal diversion in the rear of the garrison of Sebastopol. It is once more to be observed that Todleben gives to the cautious French the credit of imparting valuable information to the Russians, and he expressly states that the conjectures they entertained respecting the number of troops, and the importance of the movement in Eupatoria, were confirmed by no less an authority than the *Moniteur*. On the 17th of February the Russians, consisting of twenty-two battalions, twenty-four squadrons, 500 Cossacks, and 108 guns, 19,000 strong, under General Kroulew, attacked Eupatoria, and it is easy to perceive that Todleben does not approve either the projects or dispositions of Prince Menschikoff, who ordered the assault. The attempt was vigorously resisted, and was altogether unsuccessful. The garrison of Turks and French, assisted by the fire of one French and two English steamers, and by the Tartars, repulsed the enemy with a loss of 769 men killed and wounded, and 365 horses, while the Turks had 364, the French thirteen, and the Tartars twenty-four killed and wounded. Todleben does not mention the English, but, if our memory is right, a detachment of our marine artil-

lery worked its guns with signal success that day. He declares that though the expedition failed, it produced advantageous results, as the Allies were always obliged to be on the alert against attack, and to keep a considerable garrison there in a vast intrenched camp. This enterprise, the failure of which is believed to have caused the Czar intense mortification and disappointment, is the last military movement recorded in the first part of the Russian engineer's account of the invasion of the Crimea.

We have devoted a very large portion of our space to an abstract of the whole work, believing it to be of great general interest, as well as of extraordinary value as a professional history of one of the greatest military operations of modern times. At the very outset we considered it necessary to warn our readers that General de Todleben's statements respecting the part taken by the Allies in the various engagements he describes, are not always accurate or trustworthy. But we are ready to admit that in everything relating to the operations of the Russians, he seems to write with a frankness which conciliates confidence, and, armed as he is with power to obtain information, and possessed of such absolute knowledge, he speaks

of them with a fulness of authority beyond cavil or exception. His errors in matters of fact, as regards the English, are, we believe, more numerous and more grave than those into which he has fallen respecting the French. The circumstance may be accounted for by supposing he consulted French in preference to, or in ignorance of, English authorities, and it is not necessary to conclude that he has a prejudice against our army, or that he has been influenced by a friendly censorship of his sheets at Paris. He is at all times ready to do justice to the tenacity, courage, and intrepidity of our soldiers; and if he condemns the slowness of our movements, and the imperfect manner in which our siege works were carried on, he does no more than such excellent judges as Sir John Burgoyne have done beforehand, and he only indicates defects which had their origin, perhaps, in the very nature of the circumstances under which our soldiers were placed. In his remarks on De Bazancourt's history, the chief of the English engineers admits that our movements are—at all events, were—too slow, though he might be unwilling to exchange that stateliness of march and advance for the more rapid and vivacious tactics of French troops. No one reprehended more severely the negligent service in the trenches than

Sir John Burgoyne. He it was who pressed over and over again on the generals of division the necessity of pushing the troops close up to the place before the trenches were opened, and who insisted on the value of near reconnaissances; and it is in our recollection that very early indeed he issued special instructions for the organized operations of the rifle-pits which played such an important part in the attack of Sebastopol. In the course of the copious summary and of the translations we have given of Todleben's work, we have almost abstained from comment or criticism, but it is only fair to say that the flank march, however it may demonstrate want of settled purpose, or of a fixed idea as to the assault of the place, and however much it may be open to Todleben's animadversions, appeared at the time to those supposed to have the wisest heads, to be the best course we could adopt, and that its execution eventually enabled us (to use Sir John Lawrence's simile in his directions to the General in command at Delhi) "to hold on by the nose" of the Russians till the blood and treasure of the vast empire were almost exhausted in that distant spot. If we are to accept Todleben's testimony, the flank march was an error. According to the same authority, however, the greatest fault we committed

was in delaying the assault when the flank march had been effected, and when the south side was almost defenceless. If the object of our expedition to the Crimea was to do the greatest injury to the Russian Empire, and to concentrate the war in one remote corner of it, we may well congratulate ourselves, notwithstanding the misery and disaster which befell our army on the plateau of Sebastopol, that our generals adopted a policy of procrastination. We do not suppose, however, that any of our leaders will lay claim to any foresight as to the results which ensued from delay. If our object was merely to destroy Sebastopol by a fierce and sudden blow, and get away again, of course the expedition was fraught with disappointment. One great effort had put the place at our mercy. Then we gave time to the stunned and bleeding Russian to recover, and when our second blow was delivered, it found an enemy ready to receive and return it. Then we could not get away if we would, and perforce we were obliged "to hang on by the nose" till the great creature to whom we clung yielded up what it had so long and so gallantly defended. It may be objected to Todleben that, in saying the Allies ought or ought not to have done

certain things, he is bound to follow out the course of events as it would have been, according to all probability, under the altered march of proceedings. The English and French engineers, who are blamed for not attacking the north side, may remark that the Russian fleet was already destroyed—in part, at all events—and that the object of the whole operation being to annihilate Russian supremacy in the Black Sea, it became, in the next place, necessary to demolish the dockyards of Sebastopol, which could only be done by taking possession of the south side in order to blow up the basins. The north, in fact, was but an outwork, and while the Allies were attacking it the Russians would have been fortifying the south side, which was the kernel of the nut. The Allies were not strong enough to attack both sides at once. They could not march into the interior of the country with a strong place in their rear. The answer to all this is contained, perhaps, in the question, "Why did you not calculate on these occurrences before?" Todleben, indeed, asks it in reference to the argument for the flank march founded on the want of a port on the north side. It might easily be supposed the Russians were not going to give up their locks and arsenals

sans coup férir: all their history might have taught us they would, in pursuance of their policy, sink, burn, and destroy fleet and town sooner than surrender them. The site of dock and basin was known, so was the absence of a port on the north side. It was almost certain they would not hesitate to bar the roads by immolating a portion of their fleet on the altar of Sclavonic pride and patriotism. The Russians were seen on the Alma posted to dispute our advance, and we landed to the north of the position in order to fight them. Was there a man who had an idea as to the course the Allies ought to or were to take when that army had been defeated and had fallen back on Sebastopol? If so, where is he, and where were his plans? Fortunately, it was not, under the circumstances, requisite for any one to provide for contingencies in case we were defeated. Although the English army may have been badly administered and inefficiently handled, the wonderful precision and deadly effect of its fire testify, at all events, to the care taken by military reformers, in spite of powerful prejudices at home, to provide our soldiery with a terrible armament, the value of which was soon tested at the Alma, while the brilliant courage and heroic resolu-

tion which burnt so brightly and so steadily in the valley of Balaklava and on the gloomy steeps of Inkerman, extort the respect, and win the ill-disguised admiration of the most unfriendly and able of our censors. General de Todleben may be right in his low estimate of the fitness of our army to struggle against the difficulties created by a rotten civil military organization at home, or an imbecile military administration abroad, but he cannot deny that on the fair field, and in open day, the English soldier has no superior. He may be right in attributing to us a want of aggressive strength by reason of the voluntary system of recruiting and the absence of the conscription; but, at all events, he must confess that with our small armies we have done great things all over the world; that the prowess of our arms has been felt beyond the farthest range of the double-headed eagle's flight: and that our lean and hungry English never, in all that long Crimean fight, gave up one inch of ground to the hosts of Russia. It may, indeed, come to pass that a conscription will become necessary; but so long as an army, enlisted by voluntary enrolment, can hold our Indian empire and Canada, and all the vast and widespread dependencies, "where the tap of British

drum follows the course of the rising sun round the world," we may rest content with a system which has, since the days of Marlborough, secured for our army a splendid reputation, and has enabled it to survive a Walcheren expedition and a Crimean campaign.

At the close of General de Todleben's work there is a large appendix, or "*pièces justificatives*," some of which are in advance of the matter contained in the volume. From one of these we learn that the whole loss of the garrison of Sebastopol, from fire and combat during the siege, was 89,142. In that total the losses at the Alma, at Balaklava, Inkerman, and other places are not included. A number of very minute tables, containing much statistical information, is added to the work, which promises to be still more interesting in the second and concluding volume. In some places there are evidences of excision or unintentional omission, as, for instance, in the description of the Battle of Inkerman, where there is a long account of Dannenberg's changing the disposition of attack for Soïmonoff's column, without any remark on the consequences that ensued, or any reason being assigned for such a long digression. The translation, we may observe occasionally seems tautologous, and

the book is somewhat overladen with reviews and retrospective summaries; but, on the whole, it is by far the most valuable contribution to the History of the Siege of Sebastopol which has yet appeared, and, taken in conjunction with existing French and English publications, General de Todleben's volumes promise to afford the materials for a complete account of the great Russian war in the Crimea.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX, No. I.

Todleben says:—

"At dawn on the { *5th of October*, / 17th of October, } as on the preceding days, our line of defence opened a slack fire on the siege works.

"As the fog cleared away, it was observed that the embrasures of the siege batteries had been unmasked.

"At half-past six all the enemy's batteries simultaneously opened a heavy cannonade.

"The alarm was given on the line of defence, the troops were placed under arms and advanced towards the banquettes, and all the guns appointed to bear against the siege batteries immediately began to reply with a rapid fire like that of a fleet during a naval engagement.

"In a short time the whole ground was covered with so dense a cloud of smoke that it was impossible to distinguish objects even at a short distance, much less was it possible to point the guns; there was nothing to be done but to fire in the direction of the flashes of the enemy's discharges.

"The boom of the first cannon shot had scarcely resounded when Korniloff, accompanied by his staff, rode up to the 4th bastion, and from that spot hurried along the line of defence to the 5th. There he met Nakhimoff, prepared, as usual, to share all the danger with his fellow sailors. Wounded, his face covered with blood, Nakhimoff spared not his life, but in a burst of heroic ardour himself directed the guns, openly standing in the embrasures.

"Orders were several times issued to slacken the fire, so as to allow of the smoke dispersing, and to prevent the bursting of the guns; but the sailors, partly from habit, partly from excitement, continued a very rapid cannonade. The breastworks of our batteries offered a very weak resistance to the enemy's missiles. Being hastily thrown up of dry gravelly earth, they did not hold firmly together, and therefore

easily crumbled when struck by the enemy's shots. The embrasures also were not strong enough, some of them, from the scarcity of brushwood, were revetted with sand-bags, planks, or clay, others had no revetments at all. The clay revetments, from the action of the gases evolved by the powder, for the most part fell down immediately after the first shot; the revetments of sand-bags and boards took fire and also fell in. On our batteries especial attention was directed to keeping the embrasures clear, and this work was performed rapidly, under the heaviest fire of the enemy, whatever might be the loss of men incurred in its execution. The clearing of the embrasures was absolutely necessary to enable us to pour a powerful fire of grape on the storming columns, should they advance. As all the surrounding ground was enveloped in smoke, it more than once appeared as if the enemy's columns were approaching the defences. On this account, from time to time, a fire was opened, even from those guns which were only for the defence of the ground lying in front of our works, or which flanked the ditches.

"Previously, in expectation of the bombardment, the best sheltered places had been chosen for the troops

appointed for the defence; only a small number were left on the fortifications to be the first to encounter the enemy in case of an assault. However, on the opening of the cannonade, it was found impossible to hold even this small number on the works, because the height of the breastworks (from six to nine feet) defiladed the interior of the fortifications generally only for a distance of a few yards. Battering our artillery, the enemy's fire at the same time told heavily on our troops, which, exposed to enormous loss, were for their part obliged to remain perfectly inactive. Thus our soldiers suffering physically, were, from the same influence, in danger of having their *morale* also affected. The position of the men on the 3rd, 4th, and 5th bastions was especially trying, as the interior of these works was exposed to the concentrated fire of the enemy's batteries. On this account, shortly after the opening of the cannonade, most of the men that had been previously stationed on the defences were withdrawn, and only the very smallest number left to meet the storming columns with musketry fire.

"At the same time, the adjutants of battalions were commanded to hold themselves in readiness with their

horses on the bastions, near the chief commanders of the sections, so that in case of the advance of the enemy they might give timely notice to the bodies of troops to which they belonged, and bring them up to the points where their services were needed.

"Meanwhile, after an hour's bombardment, the front walls of the defensible barracks on the 5th and 6th bastions and the Malakoff tower were considerably damaged both by point-blank and vertical firing. By the concentrated fire of the French batteries, the stone parapet of the defensible barrack on the 5th bastion was completely ruined, the 5 guns standing behind it were disabled, and 19 of the 39 artillerymen were put *hors de combat*; the lower part of the wall was also much damaged, and in places even battered through. At the same time, the guns on the Malakoff tower were silenced, and its parapet knocked to pieces, the stone splinters striking the men so severely that they were soon compelled to abandon it.

"The cannonade had already continued for three hours with equal violence on all points, when suddenly, about half-past nine, one of our mortar-shells

exploded a magazine on one of the French batteries on the Rodolph Hill. This event was hailed on our side with a loud and triumphant 'hurrah.' The complete disorder produced on the enemy's battery by this explosion allowed us to strengthen our fire against the remaining French batteries on the Rodolph Hill. In about half-an-hour after the first explosion there followed another.

"The result of these two explosions was that the fire of the French began gradually to slacken, and at length ceased altogether. By about half-past ten all the French batteries had become silent.

"Having in such a short time obtained so signal a success in the contest with the French batteries, we continued to fire occasional shots at them from the 4th and 5th bastions, so as to annoy the working parties, and in the meantime set to work, without delay, repairing the embrasures and powder magazines on that part of the line of defence.

"It appeared that the French batteries had been evacuated by the enemy. To ascertain this, at four o'clock in the afternoon a small detachment of the

42nd crew, under the command of Lieutenant Hilchen, was sent from the first section to the Rodolph Hill. Advancing to within 100 yards of the enemy's batteries this detachment was met by a fire of musketry and grape, which compelled it to return.

"Not such was our position in the struggle with the English batteries; here we soon discovered the great superiority of the calibre of their guns over ours. The 3rd bastion, exposed to a concentrated fire from the Green Hill and the Woronzoff Hill, was especially a sufferer.

"Already, at ten o'clock, as the fog began to clear away at sea, it was observed from the town telegraph that the enemy's ships were approaching from the Katcha. About half-past twelve the allied squadrons were beginning to come within range of our advanced coast batteries. In front sailed the French ships, after them the Turkish and English. At the same time some French men-of-war issued from the Bay of Kamiesch and approached battery No. 10. About one o'clock the advanced French vessels began to take up their positions, indicated the day before by buoys. The No. 10 and Constantine batteries opened fire on

them. As there was a dead calm at sea, after a few discharges the ships were enveloped in smoke, which precluded all possibility of observing their ulterior movements.

"Having inspected the fortifications on the town-side, Korniloff, who had taken up his quarters in Volokhoff's house, returned home about ten o'clock in the morning in order to make all necessary arrangements for securing a supply of ammunition to the batteries. At the same time Prince Menschikoff, after inspecting the batteries on the Karabelnaïa, crossed to the town-side, and hearing the report of Korniloff with regard to the operations on the First and Second Sections, returned to the north side. Meanwhile, Colonel Todleben having ridden round these two Sections, went off to the left half of the line of defence. He found the 3rd bastion in a critical position; some of the guns were disabled and many of the embrasures filled up. But here, as everywhere, the sailors and sappers vied with each other in the zealous performance of their duty. The men on the Malakoff Mamelon were animated by a no less heroic spirit; here they had had an example before them in their energetic commander, Rear-

Admiral Istomin. The repair of the works was carried on everywhere under the violent fire of the enemy.

"The steamers, 'Vladimir' and 'Chersonese,' anchored in the Careening Bay, fired with remarkable precision on the English battery, between the Careening and Dockyard ravines, near Mikrinkoff's farm, thus weakening its effect against the batteries on the Malakoff Mamelon.

"Having performed the round of the Third and Fourth Sections, and made arrangements for the day's work, and, also, as far as it was possible, placed the troops out of danger, Colonel Todleben met Korniloff on the Peresip, and communicated to him the particulars of the operation of the Artillery on the Karabelnaia side, and also of the arrangements he had made. But wishing to witness all himself, and to support the energy of the troops by his own example, Korniloff rode off to the 3rd bastion. Many officers begged him not to expose himself to danger, and promised conscientiously to perform their duty. 'Although I am thoroughly convinced,' answered Korniloff, 'that each of you

will fulfil his duty, as honour and circumstances demand, yet on so solemn a day as this, I feel that I *must* see our heroes on the field of their glory!' And in spite of the entreaties of those surrounding him, he went on to the Malakoff Mamelon, where he was soon mortally wounded in the left leg by a cannon ball. 'Now, gentlemen, I leave you to defend Sebastopol! Do not surrender it!' said Korniloff, collecting his strength, and turning to the officers surrounding him. After this, he lost consciousness, and was taken to the naval hospital, where he died after two hours of intense suffering. His last words were: 'Tell all, how pleasant it is to die when the conscience is at rest! O God, bless Russia and the Emperor, save Sebastopol and the fleet!' The news of the brave Admiral's death was received with profound sorrow by the gallant defenders of Sebastopol who had a deeply-rooted faith in the good fortune and extraordinary endowments of Korniloff.

"Meanwhile the enemy's fleet took up a position in front of the harbour from the Chersonese Bay to the Volokhoff Tower. The right flank consisted of the French squadron, disposed in a semi-circle at

a mean distance of about 1,750 yards from battery No. 10; the English ships, constituting the left flank, placed themselves in the direction of the Constantine battery at a less distance from our coast batteries. There was something solemn in those moments of expectation; all with eager attention, but, at the same time, with firmness, preparing to meet the terrible naval bombardment, such as, up to this time, had been unheard of in the annals of war. At length, just after one o'clock, the first discharge thundered from the enemy's fleet. It was immediately answered by all the guns which could be brought to bear from batteries No. 10, the Alexander, Constantine, Kartasheffsky and the Volokhoff Tower. Battery No. 8 and the 7th bastion also opened fire, but soon ceased when it was found that they could not reach the enemy's ships. Even the inner batteries—Nicholas, Michael, Paul, and No. 4, fearing that the enemy might take advantage of the cloud of smoke and enter the harbour, discharged a few shots at the commencement of the fight.

"Observing the progress of affairs from the 7th bastion, amid the thunder and smoke of the naval

and land cannonades, it was impossible either to see battery No. 10 or to distinguish its fire. The enemy's shots flying over it, bounded along and lodged between the 6th and 7th bastions, in such enormous quantities that all communication with it was interrupted.

"These shots shattered and almost entirely destroyed the supplies of timber belonging to the garrison artillery, piled up in a hollow between the 7th bastion and battery No. 10.

"Receiving no intelligence whatever of this battery, it was to be presumed that it had been destroyed, that its guns, operating *en barbette*, were disabled; and that the artillerymen with the two companies of infantry occupying the battery, deprived of all shelter, had perished. It was also to be feared that the enemy, profiting by the smoke and the isolation of this battery, might take possession of it from the land side, which would have enabled the ships to advance closer to the town and bombard it with great effect.

"In consequence of this apprehension, 2 Battalions were posted at the gates of the crenellated wall

between the 6th and 7th bastions, with the object of driving back the enemy if he made an attempt on the battery from the land side.

"In the meantime, the contest with the English works continued with great vigour. One of their batteries on the Green Hill told with especial effect on us. It directed, at one and the same time, a front fire on the left face of the 4th bastion, and enfiladed the right one. Its shots bounded along the right bank of the Gorodskaia ravine, and took Titoff's and Bourtsoff's batteries and the plain behind the 3rd bastion in the rear.

"The upper tier of the Malakoff Tower was a heap of ruins, and the splinters of stone were constantly hitting the men serving the guns on the glacis. Several fires broke out in the town from heated shot thrown from the Green Hill; these were, however, happily soon extinguished.

"But the 3rd bastion suffered most of all. The English batteries on the Green Hill directed a front fire on its right face, while they enfiladed and took in the rear its left face and the adjoining trench. The heavy projectiles from these batteries, ricochetting

along the rear slopes of the height on which the bastion was placed, told with crushing effect on the whole space between the Naval Hospital and the Dockyard ravine, so that communication was in this part rendered extremely dangerous. At the same time the 3rd bastion was under the powerful fire of the batteries on the Woronzoff Hill, where the English ordnance was much superior to ours in calibre. By three o'clock in the afternoon one third of the guns on the 3rd bastion was already disabled, the embrasures before the remainder were entirely demolished, and the loss in men had been so heavy that the artillerymen at some of the guns had been twice replaced. Notwithstanding the evident superiority of the enemy, the men on the 3rd bastion, animated by the example of their brave commanders, Captain of the 1st rank, Yergomisheff, and Captains-Lieutenant Leslie and Ratchinsky, and not wishing to yield to the enemy, energetically stuck to their guns. All measures were taken on the bastion to keep up the fire in spite of all the injuries received: the embrasures were quickly cleared, the officers themselves, setting an example, went out on the parapets and took part in the work, while the sailors zealously assisted the sappers. But all their efforts were insufficient to

prevent the English artillery from maintaining a superiority over ours. To complete the unfortunate position of the 3rd bastion, about three o'clock in the afternoon a mortar-shell from one of the enemy's batteries exploded a powder-magazine in the salient angle of the bastion. When the smoke cleared away a horrible picture was presented to the eyes of those who had escaped. All the front part of the bastion had been precipitated into the ditch, the guns and carriages were overturned, and all around were strewed the burnt and disfigured bodies of the victims of the explosion; while in the distance, through the roll and infernal crash of the guns, were heard the triumphant shouts of the enemy. More than one hundred men perished in the explosion: of many of them, and among the number Captain-Lieutenant Leslie, no traces whatever were found. After this there was no longer any possibility of opposing the enemy's artillery; the defence at this point was entirely annihilated, and it was expected on the Karabelnaia side that the enemy, profiting by the results he had attained, would make an immediate assault.

"Under all these misfortunes, however, the brave defenders of the 3rd bastion did not waver: the loss

in artillerymen and officers was soon filled up by fresh forces, who immediately began to place a few of the uninjured guns in order. To draw the attention of the enemy from the 3rd bastion, Boudistcheff's battery, with a loud hurrah, opened a rapid fire. At the same time a body of volunteers was sent to procure ammunition from the Hospital landing-place. These volunteers had to proceed under a violent shower of missiles, from which many of them perished, as well as from the explosion of the charges they carried. A body of 75 men had been led from the Yagoudiil to the 3rd bastion; the next day only 25 of these returned to the ship, the remainder being either killed or wounded. This will give an idea of how fatal a position the 3rd bastion had been during those hours.

"About four o'clock in the afternoon, an ammunition box on the Malakoff Mamelon exploded. This, however, did not cause any considerable damage. An explosion was also observed on the English position on the Woronzoff Hill.

"At this time the contest between the coast

batteries and the allied fleet continued with undiminished fury.

"Towards evening news was received that the Constantine battery had sustained considerable damage. This battery, on account of its unfavourable situation, was exposed to the concentrated fire of the English ships, of which some battered it in front, while others taking up a position opposite to its north-western extremity, took the guns in flank and rear, covering the artillerymen with splinters from the stone parapet. Nearly all the guns were soon either disabled or otherwise silenced. In the court of the battery three ammunition boxes exploded.

"The remaining batteries proved much more successful in the contest.

"At twilight, Lieutenant Troitsky, having volunteered to inquire after the fate of battery No. 10, returned and gave an account of its condition. To the astonishment of all, he brought intelligence that the battery had sustained no serious damage, and had lost only a few men.

"About six o'clock in the evening, the enemy's

ships began to weigh anchor, and gradually to withdraw from the line. The coast batteries still continued to fire on them as they retired. Thus ended this memorable contest of the fleet with the coast batteries, a contest which had lasted uninterruptedly for about five hours.

"After this the English batteries alone continued the cannonade, keeping it up almost until night, principally against the 3rd bastion. Of the 22 guns on this work only two remained; the whole bastion was a wreck: the earthern breastwork was almost demolished, and platforms, guns, and bodies of the killed were scattered about in confusion. The silence on the bastion was only now and then interrupted by the discharge of a gun or the groans of the wounded begging for water. On the whole bastion there remained only 5 artillerymen, who stuck to the two guns which had remained uninjured, till they had fired their last charge.

"Thus ended the { *5th of October* / 17th of October }, usually known as the first bombardment of Sebastopol."

APPENDIX, No. II.

THE following is a more detailed description than could be conveniently included in a review of the Battle of Eupatoria, an event which General Todleben considered of the last importance:—

"In January, 1855, the allied army received new reinforcements; on the 19th of the same month the army of Omar Pasha commenced its disembarkation at Eupatoria; and on the 27th the Brigade of Guards, under General Urich, at Kamiesch. Moreover, in the beginning of February, the first troops of General Pelissier's army arrived at Kamiesch, so that the French could then number an army of 80,650 men in the Crimea, whilst that of the English was raised to 43,000.

"The effective strength of our army in the Penin-

sula, including the garrison of Sebastopol, attained a total of 135,000 fighting men, exclusive of sailors. In the meantime the enemy continued to concentrate large forces at Eupatoria. The garrison of the city, beside about 1,000 armed Tartars, a small detachment of French infantry, and a portion of the crew of a vessel called the 'Henry IV.', which had run ashore, consisting of about 276 men, amounted to 33 strong Battalions of 21,000 men belonging to the Turkish divisions of Mehamed Pasha and of Ibrahim Pasha, and to the Egyptian division of Selim Pasha, two Squadrons of Cavalry consisting of 200 men, commanded by Iskender Bey, and two Turkish batteries: the entire of these troops had arrived at Eupatoria on the 9th of February, and were placed under the command of Omar Pasha.

"The works in connection with the fortification of Eupatoria had been undertaken by the Allies on a vast scale, but at the commencement of February they were not yet completed. They were composed of a rampart of earth preceded by a ditch, with the exception, however, of a part looking towards the Putrid Lake, and near to the road leading to Tchotai; there, in lieu of an earthern rampart, stone walls had been

erected, and the houses had been placed in a state of defence. On the left side of the city the Quarantine buildings had been also fortified, and surrounded by a parapet; at the north side of the city, before the mills a crown work had been commenced, which was intended to be united with the general enclosure, but at the period of which we speak it still presented only the appearance of an advanced outwork. The Pointe de Sack had been intersected by a *fosse*, which rested on one side on the sea, and on the other on a lake watered by the sea; behind this *fosse*, upon the road to Sack, was raised a parapet filled with earth, the right flank of which was protected by the guns of the stranded vessel 'Henry IV.' Moreover, a battery had been erected in the town itself near the spot where the principal street opens upon the road which leads to Oraze: all these works were armed with 34 cannon, reckoned for the most part in those of the Marine artillery, and with 5 'affuts-trepieds à tubes pour fusées.'

"The war steamers, which were at all times anchored in the roads, increased the defensive power by means of the protection which was thus afforded to the city. We had not then any precise information as to the forces of the enemy, but we knew positively that

there was a considerable number of troops at Eupatoria: this conclusion could be arrived at as well from the reports of deserters and prisoners as from the important movements of the fleet, which had been observed in the road of Eupatoria. All our conjectures were, moreover, confirmed by the intelligence published in the 'Moniteur Français'. In the meantime, the allied forces could not decide upon taking up the offensive.

"The army of Prince Menschikoff, as we have already seen, had been reinforced by the arrival of the 18th Division of Infantry and the Reserve Brigades of the 10th and 12th Divisions, and they also expected the Reserve Brigade of the 16th Division of Infantry and 4 Battalions of the Reserve Brigade of the 17th Divisions, which formed part of the detachment ordered to protect the rear of the army of the Crimea.

"It is not then to be wondered at that we should have been animated by a desire to take advantage of the arrival of our fresh troops, in order to frustrate the accomplishment of the intentions of the enemy, and to force him, by a bold attack upon Eupatoria,

to abandon the city, or at least to cause the allied forces to refrain from making any further aggression, by obliging them to concentrate all their efforts in defending the city. In order to put this plan into execution, Staff-Colonel Ghersevanoff, Quartermaster-General of the army of the Crimea, acting under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, on the 27th January directed Lieut.-Colonel Batézatoul, chief Staff-officer on the detachment of Eupatoria, to arrange an attack upon that city.

"On the 1st February, Lieutenant-Colonel Batézatoul presented the plan which had been required. Supposing that the city was garrisoned by 15,000 men, it was arranged, on his plan, that the attack should be made by all the troops of the detachment of Eupatoria, and by a division of infantry with its artillery. As the ground in front of the city was swept by the cross-fires of the allied ships and the batteries, it was intended to direct the principal attack upon the centre, where it was thought less loss would arise from the guns of the ships. But in order to oblige the enemy to divide his forces, and to scatter them over several points, as well, also, as to divert his attention from the real object of our

attack, it was decided that before commencing the principal, two preliminary attacks should be made simultaneously upon the flanks of the city, the first was to be directed upon the fortifications of the Pointe de Sack, and immediately after these works were taken, the right flank of the city was to be attacked. The other attack, from the village of Otar Bainack, was to be directed against the barracks, and supposing that they were taken, it was ordered that a slight cannonade should be directed upon the Quarantine and the town, and then to attack the left flank of the latter at the same moment as the principal attack should have been commenced. The assaulting columns were composed as follows:—That on the left, of 2 Battalions of infantry, with 4 pieces of artillery, was to be supported by the entire detachment of Sack, which should advance for this purpose as far as the mamelon of Kara Tebe Oba (near the sea). The right column also, composed of 2 Battalions of infantry with 4 cannon, was to be supported by 2 Regiments of Lancers and a troop of artillery. The centre column was formed of 3 Regiments of infantry, and 4 field batteries. It had been resolved that the principal attack should commence after the false one, which had been directed against the flanks of the city;

it was to be preceded by a brisk cannonade, but not of long duration, after which a regiment formed upon two lines and a regiment of reserve were to attack the centre, whilst the third regiment was to be directed along the bay of the Putrid Lake upon the Cemetery. This regiment was ordered to attack in the rear the battery raised upon the Pointe de Sack, and on the flank the battery placed before the centre of the town, in order to be able afterwards to assault the town itself. All the rest of the cavalry was placed behind the central column, in order to support it and the two others, if necessary. Lieut-Colonel Batézatoul considered it to be an excessively difficult task to reform his troops after the assault in the narrow streets of the city; and still more to seize upon the Quarantine, which would be under a most violent cross-fire from the marine artillery. Prince Menschikoff, not wishing to postpone longer the contemplated assault, on the 31st January invited the commander of the detachment of Eupatoria, Lieut.-General de Wrangel, to join his staff, and soon after Lieut.-Col. Batézatoul was summoned there.

"Baron Wrangel represented to the Prince how difficult it would be to attack the town with the

small number of troops employed in the undertaking. But he received repeatedly an order to make a *reconnaissance* in person, and to report the result definitively. In order to comply with this order, Baron Wrangel, as soon as Lieut.-Colonel Batézatoul had returned to his staff, moved with him towards the city in order to reconnoitre, and on the following day, Lieut.-General Khrouloff arrived, and was appointed commander of the artillery of the detachment of Eupatoria.

"In the meantime, even before the *reconnoissance* undertaken by Baron Wrangel had been completed, the troops ordered for the assault were directed to concentrate themselves near Eupatoria. In compliance with this order, the following troops approached the city, so as to be at the disposition of Baron Wrangel:—the 8th Division of infantry, with its artillery, and the light battery of the 11th brigade of artillery, the 5th and 6th battalions of reserve of Podoly's regiment of chasseurs, with the 3rd and 4th light batteries of the 14th brigade of artillery, and 4 guns from the 3rd battery of the 11th and the 4th of the 12th brigade of artillery, which were stationed at Perekop, at Baskai, and in the neighbourhood of the

two towns, and, lastly, the infantry regiment of Azoff from Sebastopol. There were attached to these troops a park of flying artillery, also portions of a park of moveable artillery, No. 12, a number of carriages for carrying the ill and wounded, and an ambulance. All these troops had been ordered to take with them rations for twelve days, and there was, besides, a temporary magazine organized at Orta-Ablam, containing four days' rations for 16,000 men.

"Prince Menschikoff intimated to Baron Wrangel, on the 8th of February, all the arrangements which he had made, and ordered him, at the same time, to assault Eupatoria without delay, so as not to give the enemy time to reinforce the garrison of the city, for, independently of 4 large English war steamers which had passed Sebastopol in the direction of Eupatoria, the movement of the troops and of the enemy's navy, suggested the idea that the Allies were making preparations to throw fresh soldiers into the city. An order had also been given to commence the assault after a short and brisk cannonade, and after the city was taken, to establish themselves there, leaving the troops in it so that they might be protected from the ships' fire, either by

being placed under shelter or in the houses. The remainder of the detachment was to be placed beyond the range of the enemy's cannon, but so as to be able, according as the occasion might require, to reinforce the advance guard resting in the town.

"On the same day, the 8th February, Baron Wrangel despatched a courier to Prince Menschikoff to inform him of the result of the *reconnaissance* which he had made. After describing the fortifications of Eupatoria, he explained how the city had been placed in a state of defence by the best European engineers, who understood the ground perfectly, and had neglected no means of strengthening the place; that our infantry should be provisionally supplied with ladders and fascines in the assault; that we had to deal with an enemy, if not of superior, at least of equal force, and defended by works mounted with artillery, the approach to which was swept by a cross-fire from ships of war. The general thought that our field artillery could not gain any important results, because the enemy's artillery was protected by demi-bastions, and there was nothing in the city that could be fired. After having taken possession of the outer works, it would be necessary,

in order to seize also upon those in the interior, to understand the houses that had been placed in a state of defence, the barricades, &c.; he added that the streets were so narrow and winding, it would be very difficult to collect and to re-form the troops. Fearing, above all things, that the enemy, encouraged by a want of success on our part, might make a sortie from the town, in order to cut off our communications, whilst our troops were disorganized by previous fighting, Baron Wrangel considered the intended undertaking so hazardous that he would not decide upon accepting the responsibility of an assault; but he announced, that, if the Commander-in-Chief would give him a formal written order, he would make every effort to accomplish the object. In concluding his report, Baron Wrangel announced that, while waiting the reply of the Commander-in-Chief, he had made all the necessary arrangements for the concentration of his forces; and added that, when mustered together, they would be without shelter, without water or firing, and, moreover, that thick and deep mud had rendered the roads almost impassable.

"This report was received at general quarters on the night of the 8th or 9th of February. In the mean-

time, whilst waiting for a reply, Baron Wrangel, on the 8th of February, ordered his staff to leave Kronenthal and to move at first to Tup Mamai and then to Oraze; the 21st troop of heavy artillery, and the 23rd troop of light were ordered, on the 11th February, to leave Badrack and Iless, and to move to Altchine and Teschké. On the same day, the 11th February, Baron Wrangel received a reply to his report of the 8th. Prince Menschikoff ordered him at least to take steps to prevent a sortie of the enemy for the purpose of attacking our communications; he then ordered him to move the staff into the village of Kotour, to place the 18th Division of Infantry in such manner as he, Baron Wrangel, thought necessary, but in such a manner that it might act as a support to the Cavalry, then to send back Azoff's Regiment, the Reserve Battalions of Podolies, the foot artillery, the parks, and the ambulance, to the ground which they had previously occupied. Two hours after this first order, Prince Menschikoff sent another, in which he stated that Lieut.-General Khrouloff had carefully examined Eupatoria, and found that it was possible to take the city without too much loss. Prince Menschikoff, considering it to be of great importance not to allow the enemy still further to

strengthen Eupatoria with new fortifications and fresh troops, and, on the other hand, being aware that Baron Wrangel thought the capture of the city to be a work of exceeding difficulty, resolved to entrust the undertaking to Lieut.-General Khrouloff. Consequently, General the Baron Wrangel was directed to stop the march of the troops that were ordered to proceed to their quarters, and to hand over the command of the infantry to General Khrouloff.

"In order to support the infantry, orders were given to join (as long as the expedition lasted) to the detachment which had been concentrated for the assault, one Regiment of Dragoons with 2½ batteries, a Brigade of Lancers with its artillery, and some portion of the Cossacks, who formed the advance guard. Moreover, and for the same period, two Regiments of Dragoons, with 4 pieces of artillery, were to be posted at Sack, and a Brigade of Lancers included in the reserve in rear of the right flank of the principal detachment. In obedience with these orders, which had been written, Baron Wrangle surrendered, on the same day, to General Khrouloff the command of the troops appointed for the attack of Eupatoria. On this subject he furnished a report to the Comman-

der-in-Chief, in which he again stated that, although the opinion of General Khrouloff had prevailed over his own, the difficulties which he had pointed out really existed, and that General Khrouloff ought to await a more favourable opportunity for making the assault. General Wrangel added, once for all, that he did not think it absolutely impossible to attack Eupatoria, but that he considered it to be a solemn duty to point out all the difficulties of the undertaking. He wrote, in conclusion, that having under his orders a division of infantry which formed portion of the detachment of Eupatoria, he would undertake the responsibility of preserving our communications, and that, although the Allies should make a sortie with 50,000 men, they might, nevertheless, hope that a *rencontre* with them would have a happy issue. In the meantime, the troops ordered for the assault on Eupatoria were concentrated on the 15th February around the city, and occupied the quarters which had been previously assigned to the division of the Lancers in reserve—this division was placed back a little in the rear. After the departure of the 18th Division there only remained at Perekop to protect this city a Battalion of the regiment of chasseurs of Alexopol, with 4 guns of the reserve. On the 17th of Feb-

ruary 8 battalions of the reserve of the 16th Division of infantry also arrived at Perekop, but did not remain there, as they continued their march upon Baktchi-seraï. On the 19th of the same month 4 battalions of the reserve of the 17th Division of infantry, directed also upon Perekop, stopped there by order of the Commander-in-Chief. It thus happened that the detachment destined to defend the northern sides of the Black Sea, from Kherson as far as Perekop, changed its original organization, and there only remained above Perekop the combined Cavalry Brigade of Lieut.-General Rijoff.

"The detachment of General Khrouloff was composed as follows:—

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Sotnias.	Cannons.	Effective force in Men.
INFANTRY.					
Regiment of Infantry of the Count Zabalkansky	4	–	–	–	2,801
„ „ Poltawa	4	–	–	–	2,775
„ Chasseurs of Alexopol	3	–	–	–	1,658
„ „ Krémentchoug	4	–	–	–	2,845
„ Infantry of Azoff	4	–	–	–	3,157
Battalions of Reserve of the Regiment of Chasseurs of Podolia	2	–	–	–	1,505
Carried forward	21	–	–	–	14,741

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Sotnias.	Cannons.	Effective force in Men.
Brought forward	21	–	–	–	14,741
CAVALRY.					
Regiment of Lancers of H.R.H. the Archduke Leopold of Austria	–	8	–	–	1,040
„ „ Novo-Arkhanghelsk .	–	6	–	–	1,207
„ Dragoons of H.R.H. the Grand Duke Heir Apparent	–	10	–	–	836
ARTILLERY.					
4 Batteries of the 8th Brigade of Artillery . .	–	–	–	48	–
Light Batteries Nos. 3 and 4 of the 14th Brigade	–	–	–	16	–
„ Battery No. 4 of the 11th Brigade . . .	–	–	–	8	–
Guns of position of the 11th and 12th Brigades of Artillery	–	–	–	4	–
The 21st Heavy Troop	–	–	–	8	–
The 19th, 20th, and 23rd Light Troops . . .	–	–	–	24	–
There may be besides added in the composition of the detachment :—					
5 Sotnias of the Regiments Nos. 61 and 55 of the Cossacks of the Don	–	–	5	–	325
1 Battalion of Greek Volunteers, *en route* for Sebastopol	1	–	–	–	634
Total . .	22	24	5	108	18,883

"The situation of these troops was one of suffering. The villages around Eupatoria had been abandoned or destroyed by the inhabitants; they were in want of water and firewood. The temperature, by turns damp and cold, ended in an almost continual thaw, which rendered very difficult the march of the artillery and train equipages. As soon as the

troops were concentrated; preparations were made for the intended assault. The chiefs of the different corps were called upon to examine the grounds on which they were to operate. On the 12th February, the dispositions for the assault were made known to the troops, and arrangements made beforehand as to the firing of the artillery and the means of conveyance of the wounded from the field.

"In acting thus, General Khrouloff wished before the engagement to remove every cause for mistake, and to ensure that each should be convinced of the duties he had to perform.

"At first the intention was to attack on the 16th February, but the thaw rendered it necessary to postpone it to the 17th. On the night of that day it became sufficiently cold to enable the troops to act with less difficulty. The plan of the attack was so regulated that it should take place on three different points. In accordance with this plan, all the troops were divided into three columns,—that on the right was to attack the left flank of the town, following the road from Aisabai, the mid column should assault the centre of the town upon the Oraze

Road, and the left column the right flank upon the cart-road of Tchotai.

"These columns were comprised and commanded as follows:

"1st. The right column—chief of the column—the commander of the 1st Brigade of the Division of Lancers in reserve, General-Major Bobiloff; chief of artillery, Colonel Koloboff.

"This column was composed as follows:

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Sotnias.	Cannons.
Regiment of Infantry of the Count Diebitsch-Zabalkansky	4	–	–	–
„ „ Poltawa	4	–	–	–
„ of Lancers of the Archduke Leopold of Austria	–	8	–	–
„ „ of Novo-Arkhanghelsk	–	6	–	–
Of the Regiment No. 61 of the Cossacks of the Don	–	–	1	–
„ No. 55 „ „	–	–	1	–
Light Battery No. 3 of the 8th Brigade of Artillery	–	–	–	12
The 21st Heavy Troop	–	–	–	8
The 19th Light Troop	–	–	–	8
The 20th „ „	–	–	–	8
Total	8	14	2	36

"2nd. Central column—chief of the column—the commander of the 2nd brigade of the 8th Division

of Infantry, General Major Teterevnikoff; chief of artillery, Colonel Segerkranz.

"This column was composed as follows:

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Sotnias.	Cannons.
Regiment of Chasseurs of Alexopol	3	–	–	–
" " of Krémentchoug	4	–	–	–
Of the Regiment No. 61 of the Cossacks of the Don	–	–	1	–
Heavy Battery No. 3 of the 8th Brigade	–	–	–	12
Light Battery, No. 4	–	–	–	12
" " No. 5	–	–	–	12
Total	7	–	1	36

"Left column—chief of the column—the commander of the 1st Brigade of the 12th Division of Infantry, General-Major Ogaroff; chief of artillery, Captain Nedoveskoff.

"This column was composed as follows:

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Sotnias.	Cannons.
Regiment of Infantry of Azoff	4	-	-	-
The 5th and 6th Battalions of the Regiment of Chasseurs of Podoly	2	-	-	-
Battalion of Greek Volunteers	1	-	-	-
Regiment of Dragoons of H.R.H. the Grand Duke Heir Apparent	-	10	-	-
Of the Regiment No. 61 of the Cossacks of the Don	-	-	2	-
Light Battery, No. 4 of the 11th Brigade of Artillery	-	-	-	8
" " No. 3 " 14th " "	-	-	-	8
" " No. 4 " " " "	-	-	-	8
4 Guns of position of the 11th and 12th Brigades of Artillery	-	-	-	4
Light Troop, No. 23	-	-	-	8
Total	7	10	2	36

"In addition to the chiefs specially appointed to each column, General-Major Prince Ouroussoff, of the Emperor's suite, was nominated chief of all the infantry, and Colonel Scheidemann chief of all the artillery. The remainder of the troops of the Eupatoria detachment which had not been placed under the command of General Khrouloff, were during the conflict to protect the positions mentioned hereafter,—the Regiment of Dragoons of the Grand Dukes Constantine and Michael, with the 22nd troop of light artillery, under the command of Lieut.-General Baron Wrangel, the village of Sack, in order to watch the point of that name, and the 2nd Brigade

of the reserve Lancers, under the command of Lieut.-General Korff, the ground before the village of Bagaü. Baron Wrangel sent written instructions to General Korff, in case of defeat, to cover the retreat of General Khrouloff's troops, and, above all things, to prevent the enemy from cutting off the retreat upon Simpheropol, for it was of the last importance to us to preserve our communications with this city; it was so serious a consideration that it would have been better in an extreme case to leave exposed for some time the Perekop road. General Khrouloff, taking into consideration that our artillery would be obliged to cope with pieces of higher calibre, had resolved to at once open fire at a short distance, in order to make the firing more effective, and to avoid loss of time in the transport of guns during the battle from one place to another, but in order that our artillery might not suffer too much from the fire of the enemy's infantry, it was indispensable to erect fortifications to protect them, and to cause them to be preceded by a line of sharpshooters; accordingly, the troops received instructions, on the 16th of February, to prepare and to march on the evening of that day, so as to take advantage of the darkness of night to erect the fortifications intended to protect the artillerymen and sharp-

shooters, and afterwards, at a specified time, to occupy the positions which had been assigned to them. In accordance with these arrangements the troops, after having attended Divine Service at eight o'clock, a.m., employed themselves in making ready for the fight; at eight o'clock, p.m., they quitted their quarters, and proceeded to within four versts distance of the town, to the rendezvous, where they passed the night without bivouac fires. The cavalry and light horse batteries which formed portion of the detachment of General Khrouloff, had been ordered to be in their places at five o'clock, p.m.

"On the 16th February, towards midnight, the defences for the artillery and skirmishers were commenced. In order to facilitate the work, the line of the advanced guard of Cossacks was reinforced and advanced to within 200 sagenes of the town. The 4th battalion of the regiment of Alexopol and the 1st battalion of the regiment of Azoff, had been appointed to support these advanced guards. One company of each of these battalions was deployed as skirmishers, conjointly with the Cossacks, and the three remaining companies formed the reserve. The principal reserve of the

line of skirmishers was composed of the 3rd battalion of the regiment of Count Diebitsch, the 2nd battalion of that of Alexopol, and the 5th battalion of reserve of Podoly's regiment.

"The skirmishers had scarcely taken their places when the pioneers, numbering 420 men, selected from the Regiments of Count Diebitsch, Alexopol, and from the battalions of the reserve regiment of Podoly, commenced to erect the fortifications and to bore loop-holes for the marksmen at a distance of 200 sagenes from the precincts of the town. Demi-bastions were formed for each piece separately, at about 40 paces distant from each other, and on each space in front of the bastions 5 holes were bored, in order to place in each 5 riflemen. All these works were executed under the direction of Colonel Scheidemann, and with so much success, that in spite of the darkness of the night, when dawn appeared, the 76 cannon which were to be placed in line, occupied each its proper place.

"Then, also, the troops took order of battle. The artillery was placed first before all others. On the right wing, near the road of Aisabai, the light battery,

No. 3, of the 8th Brigade of Artillery. On its side the 21st heavy battery, the drivers of which were sent to the rear with the saddle-horses. In the centre the 4th light, the 3rd heavy, and the 5th light batteries, all three belonging to the 8th Brigade of Artillery. On the left wing, upon the Tchotai road, the 3rd and 4th light batteries of the 14th Brigade of Artillery, and 4 heavy pieces of the 11th and 12th Brigades. The rest of the artillery was placed in reserve. On the right wing, the 19th and 20th light batteries. On the left wing, the 4th light battery of the 11th Brigade of Artillery, and the 23rd troop of light artillery. At the distance of 200 sagenes, in the rear of the artillery, was ranged the 1st line of battle of the infantry. This line was composed of 2 battalions of each regiment, formed in columns of companies. Behind the first line was placed the second, also at a distance of 200 sagenes. It was composed of 2 battalions, formed in columns by half battalions; at the rear of this second line, and at an equal distance between each of the lines of battle was placed the reserve, composed of 4 battalions for the right, and 3 for the centre and left columns.

"The cavalry of the right column was placed *en*

échélon behind the right flank of the reserve of this column, so that the lancer regiment of Novo-Arkhanghelsk should be deployed in front; and behind it the lancer regiment of H.R.H. the Archduke Leopold of Austria in regimental column. The dragoon regiment of H.R.H. the Grand Duke Heir Apparent forming part of the left column, was formed *en échélon* by the regimental column behind the left flank of its reserve.

"The Cossacks of the central column, and a sotnia of the 55th of the right column, were, before the commencement of the action, directed upon our left wing, and were placed before the left of our dragoons, whilst a sotnia of the 61st regiment of the Cossacks of the Don, resting near the right column, was placed in the rear of the right of the lancer brigade.

"Let us see what passed in the meanwhile in the city of Eupatoria. The enemy, forewarned in time of our intention to attack, was sufficiently prepared for the combat. Thirty-four pieces of artillery, and five affûts-trépieds à fusées, which formed the armament of the fortified enclosure of the city, had been distributed in the following manner:—in the salient

No. 2, two pieces; in No. 3, one; upon the line to the left of No. 3, one; in the battery behind the salient No. 4, three; in the salient and the battery No. 5, seven; in the salient, No. 6, one; No. 7, six; No. 9, four; No. 10, one; to the left at the east, one; in the salients Nos. 11 and 12, three; in the battery of the city, four; there also were two out of five trépieds; the three others had been placed on No. 5 battery.

"In order to defend the fortifications, the troops were placed in the following manner:—a regiment of the Egyptian Brigade of Selim Pasha, occupied with a field battery a detached work before the mills. The French and the Egyptians served the guns in the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th batteries, and in that of the city; all the other works were defended by the Turks; the French steamer 'Le Véloce' anchored upon the right side of the town, and two English steamers, the 'Viper' and the 'Vigorous,' as also a Turkish vessel, anchored upon the left side, opposite the Quarantine.

"Such was the disposition of the forces of each side upon the night of the 16th or 17th of February.

"At five o'clock in the morning of the 17th of Feb-

ruary, as soon as the position of our troops could be distinguished, the enemy fired its first gun, which was immediately followed by a general fusilade. General Khrouloff, desiring to commence the assault with the left column, for the purpose of cutting off the communication between the garrison and the Pointe de Sack, ordered the 4th Light Battery of the 11th Brigade, and soon after the 23rd troop of light artillery to leave the reserve, in order to occupy the left flank of our batteries, so as to form an angle with this line, in order to take the city *en écharpe*; this movement was executed in about a quarter of an hour after fire had first opened.

"At eight o'clock in the morning the battalion of Greek volunteers, the Cossacks of three sotnias of the 61st Regiment and one sotnia of the 55th who had dismounted, were directed upon the city on the side of the Putrid Lake, where up to this time none of the enemy's artillery had been perceived.

"Sheltering themselves behind the walls of the cemetery and in the openings of the stone quarry, these troops approached to within 100 paces of the fortifications, and then opened fire upon the enemy.

A battalion of dragoons alighted, and having been sent to form their reserve, were posted behind the walls of one of the cemeteries; whilst the movement was being executed the cannon thundered with all its force; the 19th troop of light artillery was withdrawn from the reserve of the right flank and placed upon the line of our batteries. We had then commenced action with twenty-four heavy and seventy-six light pieces, against thirty heavy cannon with which the enemy answered us, in addition to rockets and some field pieces, which were fired from the steamers. The projectiles which were hurled by the marine artillery possessed a very great range, so that they fell even behind our reserve; this circumstance determined General-Major the Prince Ouroussoff to order our infantry to advance from the artillery in order to lessen the distance which separated them. Although the superior calibre of the Allies guns over ours was strongly marked, nevertheless, our artillery acted with so much success that many of the enemy's pieces were obliged to cease firing, and five ammunition waggons, or so many powder-magazines, exploded. Our riflemen posted in the holes bored in the spaces between the guns contributed much to the success of our artillery; they did not permit the enemy's

artillerymen to serve their guns regularly, and several times obliged the sharpshooters to cease firing. Taking advantage of the weakness of the enemy's fire, Lieut.-General Khrouloff at nine o'clock ordered the left column to assault, and in order to unite this column with the central, made the following dispositions:—

"Two squadrons of the Archduke Leopold's lancers, which were upon the right flank, were placed upon the left of the reserve of the central column upon the same line as the reserve. The riflemen of H.R.H. the Grand Duke the Heir Apparent dragoon regiment were posted at 300 sagenes on the left of the lancers. Moreover, on the suggestion of Colonel Volkoff, the lancer regiment of H.R.H. the Grand Duchess Catherine was placed upon the left flank of our position. As in the meantime the enemy's artillery and musketry fire had considerably slackened, we took advantage of this circumstance to advance our artillery still nearer to the town. Towards ten o'clock, the entire line of our batteries being in advance, and having approached within 150 sagenes of the town, opened fire, and showered upon it a hail storm of grape-shot. In the meanwhile, a portion of the enemy's infantry,

under protection of their sharpshooters and the fire of the war steamers, made a sortie from the town on the Quarantine side. Then General Major Bobiloff withdrew the 22nd troop of light artillery from the reserve, and advanced it within range of grape-shot upon the enemy, formed the Novo-Arkhanghelsk lancers in divisions, *en échelons* on the left, and covered this manœuvre with a line of Cossack sharpshooters. The enemy determined not to attack us, and soon re-entered the town, which enabled General Bobiloff to retire his cavalry so as to place them beyond the fire of the war steamers. Whilst our right wing was engaged in action, our left column was already prepared to assault, but in order to weaken still further the point selected for the attack, the 4th Light Battery of the 11th Brigade of Artillery and the 23rd troop of light artillery were advanced to within 100 sagenes of the enclosure of the town, and at this distance reopened fire with heavy discharges of grape-shot.

"Then, protected by these batteries, the 3rd and 4th Battalions of Azoff's infantry, under the command of General-Major Ogaroff, advanced to the assault in columns of companies by the side of the Putrid Lake.

Upon their left marched the Greek volunteers, reinforced by a battalion of dragoons on foot.

"Scarcely had our left column rushed to the assault, when they were received with a heavy fire of musketry, with a discharge of grape from the field pieces posted on the defence works, and from those on two war steamers, one of which had been moved from the left to the right flank of the enemy. Our two batteries then ceased firing, so as to avoid striking our troops. Although our soldiers had lost many officers and men, they nevertheless approached valiantly to the *fosse*; but they were not able to pass it, in the first place, because it was full of water, and afterwards because the scaling-ladders, being only two sagenes in height, were found to be too short.

"Our troops then retired upon the cemeteries, in order to take advantage of the shelter which the ground afforded. This attempt convinced General Khrouloff that to take Eupatoria would cost us an immense loss, and that our troops would be weakened to such an extent that, even after sacrificing much, they would not be able to retain possession of the town. These important considerations determined

the general to order a retreat. Our right and centre columns retired without being molested by the enemy. However, three squadrons of Turkish cavalry and a battalion of infantry, made a sortie from the town for the purpose of attacking the left column which was retiring, under the cover of the 1st and 2nd battalions of Azoff's Regiment. The cavalry advanced at the trot upon these two battalions. Our left column halted Azoff's 1st and 2nd battalions formed into square, and the 4th light battery of the 11th Brigade prepared to receive the enemy with grape-shot. The Turkish cavalry, having advanced within musket range of Azoff's Battalions, opened fire; but observing that our troops not only did not waver, but calmly maintained its square without even replying to their fire, determined not to attack, wheeled about, and quickly re-entered the town. The Battalion of Turks which had made a sortie from the fortifications, did not move against our troops, but disbanded themselves upon the field of battle near the cemeteries, and limited their exploits to finishing our wounded whom we had not been able to carry off in our retreat. When the Turks had re-entered the town, General Khrouloff ordered the retreat to be continued, covering the left flank of his line of battle with two

squadrons of Archduke Leopold's lancers, and with four sotnias of Cossacks.

"The retreat was executed in admirable order. Our troops preserved their line upon all points, as if on parade, although the enemy continued firing from the ships and from some cannon posted in the enclosure of the city. Towards eleven o'clock the firing ceased, and our advanced posts reoccupied the positions which had been previously assigned to them. We have to regret the following losses in this affair:

Losses.	Generals.	Superior Officers.	Subalterns.	Privates.	Total.	Horses.
Killed	-	1	3	164	148	365
Wounded	1	4	34	544	583	
Missing	-	-	-	18	18	-
Total	1	5	37	726	769	365

The Allies give the following return of their losses:—

Losses.		Officers.	Privates.	Total.	Horses.
Turks	Killed	7	80	87	97
	Wounded	10	267	277	
	Total	17	347	364	97
French	Killed	-	4	4	-
	Wounded	-	9	9	-
	Total	-	13	13	-

"Everything, however, leads to the belief that the enemy suffered much more than mentioned in their accounts; for, as we see, our artillery had poured a concentrated fire upon the enemy at a very close distance.

"Thus the principal object of our attack had not been attained. Eupatoria remained in the possession of the enemy, but the affair in itself was productive of advantageous results to our cause. This attack obliged the Allies to be always on guard and in readiness to repel others. It was from apprehension on this point that they always maintained at Eupatoria a large garrison, and that they established there a vast entrenched camp."

Losses sustained by the Russian army during the defence of Sebastopol, in the years 1854-55.

OCTOBER.

Date.	Killed.				Wounded.				Slightly Wounded.				Missing.				Total.
	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	
	1	3	17	373	1	2	17	668	-	1	5	24	-	-	-	-	1,112
5	-	-	-	64	-	-	2	221	-	1	5	31	-	-	-	-	324
6	-	-	-	98	-	2	1	334	1	2	11	70	-	-	-	-	519
7	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	19*
8	-	-	2	50	-	1	4	197	-	1	7	46	-	-	-	-	308
	-	-	1	30	-	1	2	157	-	2	4	43	-	-	-	11	251
9	-	1	2	40	-	-	10	186	-	1	2	40	-	-	-	-	282
10	-	-	-	39	-	2	4	175	-	-	4	52	-	-	-	-	276
11	-	-	-	33	-	5	3	132	-	2	7	47	-	-	-	-	229
12	-	-	-	18	-	-	3	109	-	1	6	22	-	-	-	1	160
13	-	-	7	37	-	1	14	178	-	1	2	17	-	-	-	13	270
14	-	-	1	23	-	-	-	79	-	-	2	23	-	-	-	2	130*
	-	-	1	23	-	2	4	133	-	-	3	35	-	-	-	-	201
15	-	-	1	27	-	-	5	112	-	-	2	26	-	-	-	-	173
16	-	-	-	29	-	-	-	119	-	1	1	16	-	1	-	3	170
17	-	-	1	17	-	-	2	52	-	-	1	19	-	-	1	-	93
18	-	-	-	9	-	-	1	69	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	104
19	-	-	-	22	-	-	3	112	-	-	1	23	-	-	-	-	161
20	-	-	1	34	-	-	4	150	-	1	3	34	-	-	-	-	227
21	-	-	-	41	1	-	2	148	-	-	3	47	-	-	-	1	243
22	-	-	-	28	-	-	1	115	-	-	2	27	-	-	-	1	174
23	-	1	7	274	-	-	14	585	-	-	2	195	-	-	-	-	1,078*
24	-	-	1	19	-	-	6	74	-	-	2	18	-	-	-	-	121
	-	-	1	50	-	-	1	176	-	-	2	32	-	-	-	-	262
25	-	-	-	39	-	-	-	118	-	-	-	39	-	-	-	-	196
26	-	-	-	32	-	-	-	116	-	-	2	22	-	-	-	-	172
27	-	-	-	27	-	-	-	85	-	-	1	13	-	-	-	-	126
28	-	-	-	27	-	-	1	93	-	-	2	22	-	-	-	-	145
29	-	-	-	12	-	-	1	31	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	51
30	-	-	-	15	-	-	3	65	-	-	3	19	-	-	-	-	105
31																	
Total	1	5	45	1,532	2	17	108	4,801	1	14	85	1,037	-	1	1	32	7,682

* At the Sortie.

Losses sustained by the Russian army during the defence of Sebastopol, in the years 1854-55.

NOVEMBER.

Date.	Killed.				Wounded.				Slightly Wounded.				Missing.				Total.
	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	
1	-	-	-	20	-	1	2	69	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	-	109
2	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	25	-	-	1	13	-	-	-	-	47
3	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	20
4	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	11	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	22
5	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	1	31
6	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	23
7	-	-	-	6	-	1	1	19	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	40
8	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	18*
	-	-	-	3	-	-	1	21	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	32
9	-	-	-	5	-	1	-	28	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	42
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	8	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	18
11	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	21
12	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
14	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	1	13
15	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	1	5	-	-	-	-	18
17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	17
18	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	23
19	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	13*
	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13†
20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	13*
	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	13†
21	-	-	-	3	-	-	2	20	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	27
22	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	15
23	-	-	-	3	-	-	2	23	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	32
24	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
25	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	8
26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	6
27	-	-	-	3	-	-	2	7	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	13
28	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
29	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	9
30	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	26*
	-	-	-	13	-	-	1	54	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	71†
Total	-	-	-	124	-	3	16	519	-	-	1	126	-	-	1	6	797

* By the Bombardment. † At the Sortie.

Losses sustained by the Russian army during the defence of Sebastopol, in the years 1854-55.

DECEMBER.

Date.	Killed.				Wounded.				Slightly Wounded.				Missing.				Total.
	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	
1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	1	32
2	-	-	-	7	-	-	1	63	-	-	1	15	-	-	-	1	88
3	-	-	-	8	-	-	1	31	-	-	4	22	-	-	-	-	66
4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	17	-	-	1	13	-	-	-	-	32
5	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	9	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	17
6	-	-	-	3	-	-	2	19	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	31
7	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	16	-	-	1	12	-	-	-	-	32
8	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	20
9	-	-	-	5	-	1	3	18	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	42
	-	-	-	5	-	-	3	26	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	4	44*
10	-	-	-	1	-	2	1	21	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	26
11	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	36
12	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	31	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	50
13	-	-	-	6	-	-	1	22	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	1	38
14	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	38	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	1	54
15	-	-	1	6	-	-	-	29	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	40
16	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	21	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	43
17	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	37	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	51
18	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	38	-	-	2	17	-	-	-	1	63
19	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	33	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	1	61
20	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	2	33
	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7†
21	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	14	-	-	2	11	-	-	-	-	29
22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	16
23	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	13	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	1	19
24	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	15
25	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	12
26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	4
	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	25†
27	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	28
28	-	-	1	11	-	-	-	13	-	-	2	12	-	-	-	1	40
29	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	15	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	19
30	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	1	15
	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	22†
31	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	13	-	-	1	9	-	-	-	1	27
	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18†
Total	-	-	4	151	-	3	20	696	-	-	15	289	-	-	-	17	1,195

* At the two Sorties. † At the Sortie.

Losses sustained by the Russian army during the defence of Sebastopol, in the years 1854-55.

JANUARY.

Date.	Killed.				Wounded.				Slightly Wounded.				Missing.				Total.
	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	
1	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	15	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	1	24
2	-	-	-	21	-	-	3	16	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	40*
								2									6†
3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	18
4	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	9
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	5
6	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	8
7	-	-	2	21	-	-	3	77	-	-	2	71	-	-	-	-	176‡
	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	17	-	1	1	3	-	-	-	1	27†
8	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	13	-	-	1	5	-	-	-	-	22
9	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	26
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	-	-	2	3	-	-	-	1	28
11	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	31
12	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	16
13	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	16
14	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19
15	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	12	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	1	17
16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	16
17	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	17	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	33
18	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	27
19	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	34	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38*
	-	-	-	4	-	-	1	20	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	1	35†
20	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	21	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	32
21	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	23
22	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	14	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	19
23	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	29
24	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	21
25	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	25	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	30
26	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	10	-	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	15
27	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	16
28	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	29
29	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	1	27
30	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	23
31	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	25
Total	-	-	3	100	-	-	12	576	-	2	8	206	-	-	-	9	916

* At the Sortie. † By the Bombardment. ‡ At the two Sorties.

Losses sustained by the Russian army during the defence of Sebastopol, in the years 1854-55.

FEBRUARY.

Date.	Killed.				Wounded.				Slightly Wounded.				Missing.				Total.
	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	
1	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	16	-	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	25
2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	28
3	-	-	-	3	-	-	1	19	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	1	26
4	-	-	-	3	-	-	2	16	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	25
5	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	25
6	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	27
7	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	16
8	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	15
9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	1	26
10	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	26	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	1	32
11	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	24
	-	-	-	67	-	-	6	342	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	417*
12	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	25
13	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	34
14	-	-	-	3	-	-	1	14	-	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	22
15	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	29	-	-	1	15	-	-	-	-	51
16	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	23
17	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	23
18	-	-	-	3	-	-	1	17	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	28
19	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	26
20	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	17	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	22
21	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	25	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	1	36
22	-	-	-	5	-	-	1	19	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	38
23	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	26
24	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	27	-	-	2	11	-	-	-	-	43
25	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	1	33
26	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	27
27	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	33	-	-	1	25	-	-	-	-	68
28	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	33	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	3	55
Total	-	-	-	151	-	-	15	864	-	1	6	216	-	-	-	12	1,265

* At the Sortie.

Losses sustained by the Russian army during the defence of Sebastopol, in the years 1854-55.

MARCH.

Date.	Killed.				Wounded.				Slightly Wounded.				Missing.				Total.
	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	
1	-	-	-	7	-	-	4	53	-	-	-	45	-	-	-	-	05
2	-	-	1	6	-	-	2	50	-	-	1	8	-	-	-	-	68†
	-	-	1	7	-	1	-	10	-	-	-	49	-	-	-	-	68‡
3	-	-	-	13	-	-	3	54	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	20	96*
	-	-	-	15	-	-	3	83	-	-	-	54	-	-	-	2	157
4	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	44	-	-	-	53	-	-	-	-	107
5	-	-	-	15	-	-	2	85	-	1	2	66	-	-	-	-	171
	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	45
6	-	-	-	18	-	-	1	67	-	1	2	43	-	-	-	1	134‡
7	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	33	-	-	-	1	65
8	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	24	-	-	1	8	-	-	-	-	36
9	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	44	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	1	63
10	-	1	6	369	-	3	14	922	-	-	14	235	-	-	-	-	1564†
	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	28	-	1	-	21	-	-	-	-	56*
	-	-	2	10	-	-	4	60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	76†
11	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	33	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	65
12	-	-	-	21	-	-	-	102	-	-	2	100	-	-	-	-	225
13	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	82	-	-	1	59	-	-	-	-	150
14	-	-	-	15	-	-	5	70	-	-	-	71	-	-	-	-	161
15	-	-	-	13	-	-	2	59	-	-	4	80	-	-	-	-	158
16	-	-	-	8	-	-	1	79	-	-	3	72	-	-	-	-	163
17	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	80	-	-	-	56	-	-	-	-	146
18	-	-	-	7	-	-	1	46	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	94
19	-	-	-	6	-	-	1	33	-	-	1	56	-	-	-	-	97
20	-	-	1	20	-	-	1	77	-	1	1	72	-	-	-	-	173
21	-	-	1	12	-	-	1	33	-	-	2	27	-	-	-	-	76
22	-	1	-	18	-	1	-	87	-	-	5	107	-	-	-	-	219
23	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	55	-	-	2	43	-	-	-	-	112
24	-	-	-	10	-	-	5	53	-	-	-	57	-	-	-	-	125
25	-	-	-	13	-	1	-	30	-	-	2	26	-	-	-	-	72
26	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	31
27	-	1	1	60	-	-	9	304	-	2	9	150	-	-	-	-	536
28	-	-	2	70	-	2	5	351	-	-	2	254	-	-	-	1	687
29	-	-	1	86	-	2	4	437	-	1	9	355	-	-	-	-	895
30	-	-	2	90	-	1	10	372	-	1	6	248	-	-	-	-	730*
31	-	1	2	12	-	-	2	64	-	-	2	38	-	-	-	14	135
	-	-	1	123	-	1	6	460	-	1	13	556	-	-	-	12	1173
Total	-	4	21	1,135	-	12	82	4,493	-	9	84	3,141	-	-	-	52	9,034

* By the Bombardment. † At the Sortie. ‡ In the Lunette Kamich.

Losses sustained by the Russian army during the defence of Sebastopol, in the years 1854-55.

APRIL.

Date.	Killed.				Wounded.				Slightly Wounded.				Missing.				Total
	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	
1	-	-	3	150	-	3	13	607	-	1	4	166	-	-	-	-	947
2	-	-	1	65	-	-	3	346	-	1	1	102	-	-	-	-	519
3	-	-	-	78	-	-	3	416	-	-	6	129	-	-	-	-	632
4	-	1	-	84	-	-	1	244	-	-	2	100	-	-	-	-	432
5	-	-	-	49	-	-	2	235	-	-	2	72	-	-	-	-	360
6	-	-	-	64	-	-	2	185	-	-	3	76	-	-	-	-	330*
	-	-	-	14	-	-	3	60	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	90†
7	-	-	3	31	-	-	3	140	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	193
8	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	149
9	-	-	-	30	-	-	1	139	-	-	1	30	-	-	-	-	201
10	-	-	-	30	-	-	2	81	-	-	-	34	-	-	-	-	147
11	-	-	-	18	-	-	4	64	-	-	-	33	-	-	-	-	119
12	-	-	1	17	-	-	2	106	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	145*
	-	-	5	53	-	1	7	272	-	-	-	41	-	-	-	6	385†
13	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	49	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	77*
	-	-	4	11	-	-	-	48	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	79†
14	-	-	-	12	-	-	1	56	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	81
15	-	-	-	15	-	-	1	73	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	-	112
16	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	67	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	107
17	-	-	1	30	-	-	1	116	-	-	-	48	-	-	-	-	196
18	-	-	1	12	-	-	2	61	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	-	93
19	-	1	9	283	-	2	13	541	-	-	4	98	-	-	-	-	950‡
20	-	-	-	131	-	-	3	242	-	-	1	48	-	-	-	-	425
21	-	-	-	44	-	1	-	158	-	-	1	100	-	-	-	-	304
22	-	-	-	10	-	-	2	70	-	1	1	40	-	-	-	-	124
23	-	-	-	35	-	-	1	136	-	-	-	72	-	-	-	-	244*
	-	-	-	4	-	-	1	10	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	1	21†
24	-	-	-	14	-	1	-	66	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	97
25	-	-	1	12	-	1	2	80	-	-	-	41	-	-	-	-	137
26	-	-	-	14	-	1	-	58	-	-	1	18	-	-	-	-	92
27	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	52	-	-	1	44	-	-	-	-	104
28	-	-	-	9	-	-	1	33	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	51
29	-	-	-	22	-	-	3	66	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	4	106§
30	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	29
Total	-	2	30	1,413	-	10	77	4,995	-	3	28	1,509	-	-	-	11	8,078

* By the Bombardment. † At the Sortie.
‡ Bombardment and carrying of our quarters. § Bombardment and Sortie.

Losses sustained by the Russian army during the defence of Sebastopol, in the years 1854-55.

MAY.

Date.	Killed.				Wounded.				Slightly Wounded.				Missing.				Total.
	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	
1	-	-	1	13	-	-	3	89	-	-	-	42	-	-	-	-	148*
	-	-	-	27	-	-	2	52	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	81†
2	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	58	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	79
3	-	-	-	11	-	-	1	48	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	1	72
4	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	35	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	60
5	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	57	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	81
6	-	-	-	9	-	-	4	55	-	-	1	13	-	-	-	-	82
7	-	-	-	14	-	-	1	68	-	-	-	31	-	-	-	-	114
8	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	49	-	1	2	18	-	-	-	-	79
9	-	-	-	13	-	-	2	36	-	-	-	21	-	-	-	-	72
10	-	-	1	28	-	-	5	103	-	-	-	43	-	-	-	-	182
	1	2	15	939	-	7	45	1724	-	-	3	75	-	-	-	88	2,899
11	-	-	2	191	-	-	7	285	-	-	-	79	-	-	-	-	494
12	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	73	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	111
13	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	46	-	-	1	23	-	-	-	-	85
14	-	-	-	21	-	1	-	62	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	104
15	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	53	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	67
16	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	29
17	-	-	-	6	-	-	2	30	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	49
18	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	31	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	46
19	-	-	-	8	-	-	3	55	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	86
20	-	-	-	11	-	-	1	62	-	-	1	11	-	-	-	-	86
21	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	62	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	-	104
22	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	61	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	75
23	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	54	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	74
24	-	-	-	10	-	-	2	72	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	108
25	-	-	4	105	-	2	5	520	-	-	-	116	-	-	-	-	752
26																	
27																	
28	-	4	28	1,350	-	12	86	3,643	-	7	36	1,299	-	1	1	247	6,714
29																	
30	-	-	-	30	-	-	3	143	-	-	-	21	-	-	-	1	198
31	-	-	-	18	-	-	1	120	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	1	150
Total	1	6	51	2,845	-	22	173	7,758	-	8	44	2,033	-	1	1	338	13,280

* By the Bombardment. † At the Sortie.

Losses sustained by the Russian army during the defence of Sebastopol, in the years 1854-55.

JUNE.

Date.	Killed.				Wounded.				Slightly Wounded.				Missing.				Total.
	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	
1	–	–	–	29	–	–	4	27	–	–	–	21	–	–	–	–	81
2	–	–	–	14	–	–	–	56	–	–	–	9	–	–	–	–	79
3	–	–	1	12	–	–	1	68	–	–	–	10	–	–	–	–	92
4																	
5	–	1	15	684	–	4	39	2,735	–	4	31	825	–	–	–	14	4,352*
6																	
7	–	–	–	62	–	–	12	280	–	–	–	16	–	–	–	2	372
8	–	–	–	16	1	–	1	77	–	–	1	18	–	–	–	3	117
9	–	–	1	8	–	–	–	67	–	–	–	9	–	–	–	–	85
10	–	–	–	13	–	–	2	52	–	–	–	6	–	–	–	–	73
11	–	–	–	7	–	–	–	27	–	–	1	3	–	–	–	–	38
12	–	–	–	14	–	–	2	43	–	–	–	6	–	–	–	–	65
13	–	–	–	12	–	–	–	51	–	–	–	11	–	–	–	–	74
14	–	–	–	13	–	–	1	61	–	–	2	6	–	–	–	–	83
15	–	–	–	13	–	–	1	65	–	–	–	11	–	–	–	–	90
16	–	–	–	11	–	–	–	72	–	–	–	9	–	–	–	–	92
17	–	–	–	13	–	–	2	76	–	–	–	10	–	–	–	–	101
18	–	–	1	14	–	–	2	88	–	–	–	11	–	–	–	–	116
19	–	–	–	26	–	1	1	102	–	–	1	16	–	–	–	–	147
20	–	–	2	23	–	–	5	108	–	–	1	15	–	–	–	–	154
21	–	–	–	10	–	–	–	75	–	–	–	18	–	–	–	–	103
22	–	–	–	10	–	–	–	64	–	–	–	5	–	–	–	–	79
23	–	–	–	25	–	1	2	103	–	–	1	6	–	–	–	–	138
24	–	–	–	19	–	–	1	61	–	–	–	9	–	–	–	–	90
25	–	–	–	15	–	1	1	129	–	–	–	15	–	–	–	–	161
26	–	–	–	26	–	–	–	125	–	–	–	19	–	–	–	–	170†
	–	–	–	7	–	–	–	15	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	22‡
27	–	–	–	25	–	1	1	128	–	1	1	15	–	–	–	–	172
28	–	–	2	54	1	–	10	450	–	–	1	38	–	–	–	–	556
29	–	–	–	18	–	–	–	127	–	1	–	15	–	–	–	–	161
30	–	–	–	22	–	1	1	118	–	–	–	29	–	–	–	–	171
Total	–	1	22	1,215	2	9	89	5,450	–	6	40	1,181	–	–	–	19	8,034

* Bombardment and assault of the Karabelnaia.
† By the Bombardment. ‡ At the Sortie.

Losses sustained by the Russian army during the defence of Sebastopol, in the years 1854-55.

JULY.

Date.	Killed.				Wounded.				Slightly Wounded.				Missing.				Total.
	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	
1	-	-	2	37	-	-	-	103	-	-	1	12	-	-	-	-	155
2	-	-	-	30	-	-	5	122	-	-	-	21	-	-	-	-	178*
	-	-	-	8	-	-	2	38	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	51†
3	-	-	-	33	-	1	1	140	-	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	197
4	-	-	-	25	-	-	1	165	-	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	213*
	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12†
5	-	-	1	29	-	1	2	161	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	210
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
6	-	-	-	32	-	-	3	184	-	-	2	15	-	-	-	-	236
7	-	-	-	40	-	-	2	192	-	1	-	27	-	-	-	-	262
8	-	-	-	49	-	-	-	259	-	-	1	37	-	-	-	-	346
9	-	1	-	44	-	-	4	213	-	-	-	29	-	-	-	-	291
10	-	-	-	27	-	-	3	225	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	275
11	-	-	-	40	-	1	1	224	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	290
12	-	-	1	45	-	-	2	188	-	-	-	27	-	-	-	-	263*
	-	-	-	7	-	-	1	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	29†
13	-	-	-	31	-	1	1	214	-	-	-	36	-	-	-	-	283
14	-	-	-	42	-	-	2	199	-	-	1	20	-	-	-	-	264
15	-	-	-	32	-	1	2	250	-	-	1	22	-	-	-	-	308
16	-	-	-	41	-	-	-	208	-	-	1	22	-	-	-	-	272
17	-	-	-	45	-	-	1	199	-	-	1	28	-	-	-	-	274
18	-	-	1	28	-	1	-	190	-	-	1	24	-	-	-	-	245
19	-	-	-	41	-	1	-	196	-	-	1	17	-	-	-	-	256
20	-	-	-	33	-	-	-	98	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	140
21	-	-	3	41	-	-	-	91	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	153
	-	-	1	6	-	1	1	47	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	56*
22	-	-	1	37	-	-	-	145	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	187†
23	-	-	-	42	-	-	-	126	-	-	-	29	-	-	-	-	197
24	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	91	-	-	2	14	-	-	-	-	120*
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1†
25	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	65	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	84
26	-	-	-	28	-	-	-	121	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	164
27	-	-	-	29	-	-	-	112	-	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	263
28	-	-	1	32	-	-	1	172	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	225
29	-	-	1	28	-	-	-	169	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	216
30	-	-	-	23	-	-	2	150	-	-	-	31	-	-	-	-	207
31	-	-	-	32	-	-	1	168	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	-	218
Total	-	1	12	1,064	-	8	38	5,366	-	1	12	648	-	-	-	3	7,153

* By the Bombardment. † At the Sortie.

Losses sustained by the Russian army during the defence of Sebastopol, in the years 1854-55.

AUGUST.

Date.	Killed.				Wounded.				Slightly Wounded.				Missing.				Total.
	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	Generals.	Field and Staff Officers.	Subordinate Officers.	Privates.	
1	-	-	-	32	-	-	1	168	-	-	2	57	-	-	-	-	260
2	-	-	2	50	-	-	2	213	-	-	1	77	-	-	-	-	345
3	-	-	-	39	-	-	1	161	-	-	-	75	-	-	-	-	276
4	-	-	1	30	-	-	-	169	-	1	2	57	-	-	-	-	260
5	-	-	-	183	-	-	7	666	-	-	5	397	-	-	-	-	1,258
6	-	1	-	125	-	1	2	565	-	-	4	256	-	-	-	-	894
7	-	1	2	120	-	-	4	405	-	1	1	267	-	-	-	-	801
8	-	-	1	98	-	-	8	441	-	1	2	183	-	-	-	1	736
9	-	1	2	85	-	-	3	348	-	-	1	117	-	-	-	-	563
10	-	-	-	67	-	-	5	324	-	-	2	128	-	-	-	-	526
11	-	-	1	74	-	-	4	364	-	-	2	223	-	-	-	2	670
12	-	-	-	91	-	-	2	409	-	-	2	159	-	-	-	3	666
13	-	-	-	80	-	-	1	375	-	-	-	106	-	-	-	3	565
14	-	-	2	72	-	1	2	326	-	1	4	75	-	-	-	-	483
15	-	-	3	83	-	-	3	362	-	-	5	65	-	-	-	-	521
16	-	-	-	67	-	1	2	301	-	-	2	114	-	-	-	-	487
17	-	-	1	69	-	-	3	302	-	-	1	90	-	-	-	-	466
18	-	-	2	79	-	-	3	322	-	-	1	114	-	-	-	-	521
19	-	-	1	67	-	-	3	107	-	-	1	127	-	-	-	-	305
20	-	-	1	79	-	-	3	403	-	-	1	26	-	-	-	-	513
21	-	-	3	84	-	-	3	354	-	-	1	96	-	-	-	-	541
22	-	-	3	72	-	-	4	355	-	-	5	75	-	-	-	-	514
23	-	-	3	47	-	-	1	332	-	-	2	98	-	-	-	-	483
24	-	-	3	836	-	2	32	3,121	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,994
25	-	-	-	168	-	1	10	1,879	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,058
26	-	-	-	98	-	1	9	1,201	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,310
27	1	4	55	2,625	4	26	209	5,825	1	9	38	1,132	1	-	24	1739	11,692
Total	1	7	86	5,520	4	34	324	19,739	1	14	90	4,115	1	-	24	1748	31,708

LONDON:
PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET
AND CHARING CROSS



Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 31 October, 2019